Theme

Register of 2024 public money · GF1007

Social exclusion n.e.c.

In short. Studies find the 1989 minimum income lowered some groups' employment, in-work benefits mostly had no significant effect, help with claims raised take-up and the RSA cut young adults' homelessness.

2024

€36.5bn, of public money, line 18 of 155

Strength of evidence

Strong level 4 of 4, on 1 of its 4 goals: Social and professional integration and the incentive to work and stay in work · on rules or parts of the line, which have no separate cost

Studies

23 causal studies tied; 22 findings on its goals

Summary

Version 1 · written 19 October 2026 · history

What it is and who gets it

The minimum income (RSA), funded mostly by the départements, the in-work benefit (prime d'activité), funded by the State, and other aid against poverty and exclusion, such as emergency shelter.

Goals and the evidence on each

  • Adequate means of existence and the fight against poverty: Limited, 1 finding
  • Social and professional integration and the incentive to work and stay in work: Strong, 19 findings
  • Reduce non-take-up of minimum benefits: Limited, 2 findings
  • Equal access of children to school canteens (P304-1): no causal study found

What the studies find

Of the 22 findings on its goals: 5 in the goal's direction, 5 mixed, 8 with no significant effect, 4 against it; 1 of them studies a cut in the measure.

What is missing

Other official evidence, without a causal design

  • A review without a causal design finds that the general emergency shelter stock « ne permet pas de répondre à l'ensemble des demandes » (IGF-IGAS-IGA, 2025).

How this summary was made

Literature searched on 19 October 2026: causal evaluations of the RSA, the prime d'activité, youth support programmes (Garantie jeunes, CEJ), non-take-up and the effects of minimum income on poverty and homelessness since 2024, and the IPP's reports on them. Searched: the HAL API (13 queries in French and English, 2024-2026, five on titles), the OpenAlex API (7 queries, from 2024), the IPP site's search (2 queries); HAL's pdf links answered with a bot check. Strength of evidence rated by the rule on the Method page.

  • Version 1, 19 October 2026, written · by writer: First version. Latest updates

Under the register's two definitions

Broad definition: a causal study in the line

evaluated

At least one causal study is tied to this line, on all of it or on one of its rules; the line then counts in full, so this is an upper bound.

Strict definition: a single measure with its own cost and study

not yet evaluated

A spending category: the register holds no separate cost for the measures inside it, so none of its money counts under this definition.

23 causal studies are tied to this line, the latest from 2026. The share of public money under each definition is on the evaluations page.

Against the Haut-commissariat's perimeters of aid to companies:

  • not placed: the report lists no measure of this line

The perimeters, and the share of each with a causal study

The literature

The studies that touch this line

  • Yves Goulard de Curraize and Helene Perivier (2009). L'allocation de parent isole a-t-elle favorise l'inactivite des femmes ?. Economie et Statistique, no. 429-430, pp. 159-176 (HAL deposit dated 2010).

    • Design, as recorded: DiD around 1976 API introduction: lone mothers with youngest child under 3 vs lone mothers with youngest child aged 7-9, logit with controls
    • Goal measured: Social and professional integration and the incentive to work and stay in work
    • Impact: no significant effect « la réaction de l'offre de travail des mères isolées a été faible au regard de la désincitation potentiellement introduite par l'API »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
  • Mathilde Badufle et al. (2026). L'impact du Contrat d'engagement jeune sur les trajectoires professionnelles des bénéficiaires. Rapport IPP n°63.

    • Design, as recorded: Event study / DiD comparing Mission locale entrants into Garantie jeunes just before the 1 March 2022 switch with CEJ entrants just after (relative effect CEJ vs GJ)
    • Goal measured: Social and professional integration and the incentive to work and stay in work
    • Impact: no significant effect « L’effet mesuré reste toutefois modeste et statistiquement peu significatif en moyenne »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Mathilde Badufle et al. (2026). Le contrat d'engagement jeune - jeunes en rupture : une évaluation quantitative. Rapport IPP n°64.

    • Design, as recorded: Staggered DiD (later CEJ-JR entrants as controls)
    • Goal measured: Social and professional integration and the incentive to work and stay in work
    • Impact: no significant effect « Cet effet moyen du traitement (ATT) est estimé à 0,07 avec une p-value de 0,09 »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Arthur Félix W. Sawadogo and Océane Vilches (2024). Bénéficier de la Garantie jeunes : une plus-value pour l'insertion des jeunes en situation de vulnérabilité ?. Céreq Échanges, Après la formation initiale : les vicissitudes du parcours professionnel, tome 2.

    • Design, as recorded: Propensity score matching, beneficiaries vs non-beneficiaries among 2017 school leavers with at most secondary diploma
    • Goal measured: Social and professional integration and the incentive to work and stay in work
    • Impact: effect « la Garantie jeunes exerce un effet positif mais modeste sur l'insertion »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Mathilde Gaini et al. (2018). Résultats de l'évaluation quantitative de la Garantie jeunes. Travail et Emploi 153.

    • Design, as recorded: DiD exploiting staggered territorial roll-out: eligible youth in first pilot territories versus not-yet-treated territories, panel survey
    • Goal measured: Social and professional integration and the incentive to work and stay in work
    • Impact: effect « a eu un effet sur le taux d'emploi des bénéficiaires »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Michaël Sicsic (2022). Does labour income react more to income tax or means-tested benefits reforms?. Fiscal Studies 43(3): 291-319.

    • Design, as recorded: 2SLS elasticity of labour income to the marginal net-of-tax rate, instrumented by income tax and means-tested benefit reforms 2006-2015, plus semi-parametric graphical evidence
    • Goal measured: Social and professional integration and the incentive to work and stay in work
    • Impact: mixed « around 0.1 in response to in-work benefit reforms, while I found no statistically significant response to family allowance reforms »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
  • Arthur Heim (2024). Social investment and the changing face of poverty: essays on the design and evaluation of family and social policies in France (chapter 2). PhD thesis (tel-04801852).

    • Design, as recorded: Randomised controlled trial, compared with doubly robust DiD
    • Goal measured: Social and professional integration and the incentive to work and stay in work
    • Impact: no significant effect « the programme has no average effect on labour market participation and poverty after the end of the training »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Laura Castell et al. (2025). Take-up of Social Benefits: Experimental Evidence from France. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy.

    • Design, as recorded: Two nationwide randomised experiments (encouragement to a meeting with social services; online simulator), with marginal treatment effects
    • Goal measured: Reduce non-take-up of minimum benefits
    • Impact: mixed « a meeting with social services to assess eligibility and help with applications to social benefits increased new benefit take-up by 29 percent. By contrast, an online simulator that gave personalized information on benefit eligibility did not increase take-up »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
  • Laurent Lequien (2011). Essais d'évaluation de politique publique dans les champs de l'éducation, de la santé et des politiques d'emploi (chapitre 1). PhD thesis (pastel-00705944).

    • Design, as recorded: Randomised experiment (chapter 1)
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: not informed
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Arthur Heim and Alexandra Galitzine (2024). Social investment and the changing face of poverty: essays on the design and evaluation of family and social policies in France (chapter 3). PhD thesis of Arthur Heim (tel-04801852).

    • Design, as recorded: Counterfactual income distributions estimated from randomised assignment of an information/support programme contemporaneous with the 2019 reform; labour income elasticities
    • Goal measured: Social and professional integration and the incentive to work and stay in work
    • Impact: adverse « indicating significant disincentives to employment and increased in-work poverty »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
  • Antoine Bozio et al. (2026). Impact de la revalorisation de la prime d'activité sur les comportements d'activité. Rapport IPP n°67 (for the Cour des comptes and DGCS).

    • Design, as recorded: Two DiD strategies: households with vs without children (EITC/WFTC-style relative control); and new eligibles / increased-amount group vs group above the new exit point
    • Goal measured: Social and professional integration and the incentive to work and stay in work
    • Impact: no significant effect « elle ne génère aucun effet détectable sur l’emploi »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
  • Marco Fugazza et al. (2003). L'influence de la PPE sur l'activité des femmes : une estimation à partir du modèle Ines. Economie et Prévision.

    • Design, as recorded: Structural discrete-choice labour supply model with Ines microsimulation of disposable income
    • Goal measured: Social and professional integration and the incentive to work and stay in work
    • Impact: no significant effect « l'impact de la PPE demeure limité »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • a simulation, not counted
  • Elena G.F. Stancanelli (2008). Evaluating the impact of the French tax credit on the employment rate of women. Journal of Public Economics 92(10-11): 2036-2047.

    • Design, as recorded: DiD around the 2001 introduction of the PPE, treatment/control groups from eligibility rules, marital status and presence of children
    • Goal measured: Social and professional integration and the incentive to work and stay in work
    • Impact: mixed « We find evidence of a negative employment effect for married women »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
  • Hans Bloemen and Elena Stancanelli (2007). A Model with Endogenous Programme Participation: Evaluating the Tax Credit in France. Working paper (SSRN).

    • Design, as recorded: Joint model of employment probability and endogenous programme eligibility (with hours responses) around the 2001 PPE introduction, French labour force surveys 1999-2002
    • Goal measured: Social and professional integration and the incentive to work and stay in work
    • Impact: no significant effect « We find no significant impact of the tax credit on either employment or hours of French women. »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
  • Marion Cochard et al. (2008). Les effets incitatifs de la prime pour l'emploi : une évaluation difficile. Economie et Statistique 412.

    • Design, as recorded: Treatment (potential PPE beneficiaries) vs comparable control group, two comparison methods on the 2001 Enquête Revenus fiscaux
    • Goal measured: Social and professional integration and the incentive to work and stay in work
    • Impact: no significant effect « Il n'apparaît pas d'effet significatif de la PPE sur l'emploi »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
  • Olivier Bargain and Karina Doorley (2011). Caught in the trap? Welfare's disincentive and the labor supply of single men. Journal of Public Economics 95(9-10): 1096-1110.

    • Design, as recorded: RDD at the age-25 RMI eligibility threshold (childless singles), French Census data
    • Goal measured: Social and professional integration and the incentive to work and stay in work
    • Impact: adverse « the RMI reduces the participation of uneducated single men by 7–10% at age 25 »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
  • Olivier Bargain and Augustin Vicard (2014). Le RMI et son successeur le RSA découragent-ils certains jeunes de travailler ? Une analyse sur les jeunes autour de 25 ans. Economie et Statistique 467-468.

    • Design, as recorded: RDD at the age-25 RMI/RSA eligibility threshold, annual census surveys 2004-2011
    • Goal measured: Social and professional integration and the incentive to work and stay in work
    • Impact: no significant effect « le RMI et le RSA n'ont pas d'effet désincitatif marqué sur l'emploi des jeunes autour de cet âge »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
  • Marc Gurgand and David N. Margolis (2008). Does work pay in France? Monetary incentives, hours constraints, and the guaranteed minimum income. Journal of Public Economics 92(7): 1669-1697.

    • Design, as recorded: Structural extensive-margin labour supply model estimated on a representative sample of RMI recipients, with simulation of intéressement and PPE (no reform-based quasi-experiment)
    • Goal measured: Social and professional integration and the incentive to work and stay in work
    • Impact: mixed « have little impact in this population due to their very limited scope. The negative income tax (Prime pour l'emploi), seems to be an exception. »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • a simulation, not counted
  • Matthieu Chemin and Etienne Wasmer (2021). Ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of the 1989 French welfare reform using a natural experiment: the 1908 social laws in Alsace-Moselle. Working paper (HAL hal-03234843).

    • Design, as recorded: DiD and triple differences, Alsace-Moselle (pre-existing similar transfer since 1908) vs rest of France around the 1989 RMI introduction; calibrated matching model for ex-ante simulation
    • Goal measured: Social and professional integration and the incentive to work and stay in work
    • Impact: adverse « a 3% fall in employment (among unskilled workers 25-55 years old) »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
  • Antoine Terracol (2009). Guaranteed minimum income and unemployment duration in France. Labour Economics 16(2): 171-182.

    • Design, as recorded: Timing-of-events multivariate duration model (Abbring-van den Berg) correcting self-selection into RMI, European Community Household Panel
    • Goal measured: Social and professional integration and the incentive to work and stay in work
    • Impact: adverse « RMI receipt has a strong negative impact during the first months of program participation »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
  • Olivier Bargain and Karina Doorley (2017). The Effect of Social Benefits on Youth Employment: Combining Regression Discontinuity and a Behavioral Model. Journal of Human Resources 52(4): 1032-1059.

    • Design, as recorded: RDD at age-25 social assistance eligibility threshold combined with a structural labour supply model; out-of-sample validation on the RSA reform
    • Goal measured: Social and professional integration and the incentive to work and stay in work
    • Impact: not informed
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • a simulation, not counted
  • Thomas Breda et al. (2026). Évaluation quantitative de l'accompagnement rénové des bénéficiaires du RSA. Rapport IPP n°68.

    • Design, as recorded: ITT event study comparing pilot zones with control departments; ATT by matching participants to similar recipients in non-pilot territories; spillover estimates on non-treated recipients
    • Goal measured: Social and professional integration and the incentive to work and stay in work
    • Impact: effect « la probabilité d’être en emploi salarié à six mois augmente d’environ 0,9 point de pourcentage dans les zones traitées »
    • Leakage: leakage found « les effets négatifs observés sur les bénéficiaires non éligibles des zones d’emploi compensent en partie les effets positifs dans les zones d’expérimentation »
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Guillaume Allègre (2011). Le RSA : redistribution vers les travailleurs pauvres et offre de travail. Revue de l'OFCE 118.

    • Design, as recorded: Ex ante microsimulation plus an estimated structural labour supply model on the Enquête revenus fiscaux 2003 (no ex post quasi-experiment)
    • Goal measured: Social and professional integration and the incentive to work and stay in work
    • Impact: adverse « en net, 12 000 individus renonceraient à travailler »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • a simulation, not counted
  • Gedeão Locks and Josselin Thuilliez (2023). The impact of minimum income on homelessness: Evidence from France. Journal of Urban Economics 135.

    • Design, as recorded: RDD at the age-25 RSA eligibility threshold
    • Goal measured: Adequate means of existence and the fight against poverty
    • Impact: effect « the RSA benefit reduces the homelessness rate by 20% among young adults aged 22 to 27 »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
  • Véronique Simonnet and Elisabeth Danzin (2014). L'effet du RSA sur le taux de retour à l'emploi des allocataires. Une analyse en double différence selon le nombre et l'âge des enfants. Economie et Statistique 467-468.

    • Design, as recorded: DiD before/after the 2009 RSA reform, comparing recipients by number and age of children within family types
    • Goal measured: Social and professional integration and the incentive to work and stay in work
    • Impact: mixed « S'ils ne mettent pas en évidence de réel effet du RSA sur l'emploi des hommes »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
  • Sylvain Chareyron et al. (2022). Droits et devoirs du RSA : l'impact des contrôles sur la participation des bénéficiaires. Revue économique 73(5): 735-759.

    • Design, as recorded: Regression discontinuity design (RDD listed in article keywords) on receipt of a sanction warning
    • Goal measured: Social and professional integration and the incentive to work and stay in work
    • Impact: effect « l'avertissement augmente la participation aux démarches d'insertion »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • a study of a cut
  • Sylvain Chareyron et al. (2018). Raising Take-Up of Social Assistance Benefits through a Simple Mailing: Evidence from a French Field Experiment. Revue d'économie politique.

    • Design, as recorded: Randomised controlled trial: two information-letter treatments sent after entry into the RSA
    • Goal measured: Reduce non-take-up of minimum benefits
    • Impact: mixed « pourrait permettre d'accroître la participation de certains types de bénéficiaires »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
  • Déliana Renou (2026). Revenu minimum et pauvreté : les effets d’une augmentation du RSA sur les conditions de vie des bénéficiaires. Working paper (Sciences Po; HAL hal-05500145).

    • Design, as recorded: WEAK: ex ante: the cross-sectional gradient of material deprivation in living standard, from one year of survey data, applied to a simulated 20% rise in income; no reform observed
    • Goal measured: Adequate means of existence and the fight against poverty
    • Impact: effect « Une augmentation du RSA de 20% permettrait une baisse d’environ 5 points »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • a simulation, not counted

Each study is coded by this site from the phrase quoted beside each verdict: impact on the goal it measures, leakage to people the law does not target, and permanence where the aim is a lasting change. The rows are in criteria.csv and studies.csv.

Searches

When the literature was searched

  • 2026-10-04: every line, for causal evaluations of its measures and rules. Searched: the HAL, Crossref, OpenAlex, PubMed and IDEAS/RePEc catalogues of research and publishers' pages, line by line, and a general web search engine until its allowance ran out; some research departments' sites refused automated access, so a study they publish may have been missed (data/literature/gaps). Found: literature/studies.csv.
  • 2026-10-19: causal evaluations of the RSA, the prime d'activité, youth support programmes (Garantie jeunes, CEJ), non-take-up and the effects of minimum income on poverty and homelessness since 2024, and the IPP's reports on them. Searched: the HAL API (13 queries in French and English, 2024-2026, five on titles), the OpenAlex API (7 queries, from 2024), the IPP site's search (2 queries); HAL's pdf links answered with a bot check. Found: Renou (2026), an ex ante estimate of a 20% rise in the RSA on deprivation, coded as study 384, a simulation; not coded: an experiment on outreach to retired self-employed workers whose outcome is health care use (Augé and Sirven, Health Economics 2026), a model of RSA caseloads in Paris (2025), self-financing tests of prime d'activité reforms (Bierbrauer et al., 2024), gains-to-work and legal analyses, and qualitative studies of the CEJ; three studies recoded from the means-of-existence goal to the integration goal from their own texts (Heim 2024, Heim and Galitzine 2024, Bozio et al. 2026).

Back to every line of the register

Sources: Eurostat, Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances, Direction de la Sécurité sociale, and the publishers of the studies, each named in its panel.

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