Theme

Register of 2024 public money · GF0703

Hospital services

In short. After the 2004 payment reform, heart-attack mortality fell more in private non-profit hospitals facing more competition; a hospital quality bonus and a discharge programme had no significant effect on quality.

2024

€109.3bn, of public money, line 2 of 155

Strength of evidence

Moderate level 3 of 4, on 1 of its 3 goals: Improve the quality of hospital care · on rules or parts of the line, which have no separate cost

Studies

11 causal studies tied; 5 findings on its goals

Summary

Version 1 · written 19 October 2026 · history

What it is and who gets it

Hospital care paid by all public bodies: stays and day cases in public hospitals and private clinics, whose medical, surgical and obstetric stays have been paid by activity-based tariffs since 2004-2005, and care in nursing and convalescent homes.

Goals and the evidence on each

  • Reduce avoidable emergency-department visits: Very limited, 1 finding
  • Improve the quality of hospital care: Moderate, 4 findings
  • Efficiency: raise the share of ambulatory surgery (70% target): no causal study found

What the studies find

Of the 5 findings on its goals: 2 in the goal's direction, 1 mixed, 2 with no significant effect, 0 against it.

What is missing

  • No study measures healthcare-associated infections, the official indicator of hospital quality, or the share of surgery done without an overnight stay, the efficiency goal (the goals).
  • No causal study of the 2020 Ségur pay rises, of hospital investment plans or of the effect of hospital mergers on quality or cost was found (search of 18 October 2026) (search notes).

Other official evidence, without a causal design

How this summary was made

Literature searched on 18 October 2026: causal evaluations of hospital financing and organisation published in 2025-2026, after the search of 4 October 2026: activity-based tariffs (T2A), emergency departments, ambulatory surgery, the Ségur de la santé, hospital quality. Searched: the HAL API (6 queries, 2025-2026), the OpenAlex API (6 queries, from 2025), the IPP's list of publications (ipp.eu, 6 pages); the Drees study of evaluations.csv row 27 read in full (drees.solidarites-sante.gouv.fr). Strength of evidence rated by the rule on the Method page.

  • Version 1, 19 October 2026, written · by writer: First version. Latest updates

Under the register's two definitions

Broad definition: a causal study in the line

evaluated

At least one causal study is tied to this line, on all of it or on one of its rules; the line then counts in full, so this is an upper bound.

Strict definition: a single measure with its own cost and study

not yet evaluated

A spending category: the register holds no separate cost for the measures inside it, so none of its money counts under this definition.

11 causal studies are tied to this line, the latest from 2025. The share of public money under each definition is on the evaluations page.

Against the Haut-commissariat's perimeters of aid to companies:

  • not placed: the report lists no measure of this line

The perimeters, and the share of each with a causal study

The literature

The studies that touch this line

  • Laurie Rachet-Jacquet et al. (2021). Hospital payment schemes and high-priced drugs: Evidence from the French Add-on List. Health Policy.

    • Design, as recorded: fixed-effects panel around delisting events
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: no significant effect « prescription volumes, generic shares and price levels are not systematically affected by delisting »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
    • another outcome, not counted
    • a study of a cut
  • Philippe Choné et al. (2013). Introducing Activity-Based Payment in the Hospital Industry: Evidence from French Data. SSRN working paper.

    • Design, as recorded: difference across hospital status and exposure to local competition around the 2005-2008 reform (structural nonprice competition model, tested empirically)
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: effect « we find empirical evidence supporting these predictions »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Laurent Gobillon and Carine Milcent (2017). Competition and Hospital Quality: Evidence from a French Natural Experiment. IZA Discussion Papers.

    • Design, as recorded: natural experiment: change in mortality after the reform by local competition intensity; duration model stratified at hospital level
    • Goal measured: Improve the quality of hospital care
    • Impact: effect « enjoyed larger declines in mortality in places where there is greater competition »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Benoît Lalloué et al. (2017). Evaluation of the effects of the French pay-for-performance program-IFAQ pilot study. International Journal for Quality in Health Care.

    • Design, as recorded: difference-in-differences (participating vs non-participating volunteer hospitals)
    • Goal measured: Improve the quality of hospital care
    • Impact: no significant effect « the difference-in-differences effect was positive but not significant »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Carine Milcent (2021). From downcoding to upcoding: DRG based payment in hospitals. International Journal of Health Economics and Management 21(1).

    • Design, as recorded: WEAK: before/after the 2009 classification change on a longitudinal stay database; counterfactual design not described in abstract
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: adverse « The implementation of a finer classification led to an upcoding-learning effect. »
    • Leakage: leakage found « The end result has been a budget transfer from public non-research hospitals to for-profit hospitals. »
    • Permanence: not informed
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Jan Chrusciel et al. (2023). Effect of the Implementation of the French Hospital Regionalization Policy on Patient Mobility. Health Systems and Reform.

    • Design, as recorded: interrupted time series
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: no significant effect « the policy did not achieve major changes in patterns of mobility between hospitals »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Anne Penneau (2023). Do mobile hospital teams in residential aged care facilities increase health care efficiency: an evaluation of French residential care policy. The European Journal of Health Economics.

    • Design, as recorded: difference-in-differences (treated vs untreated RACFs)
    • Goal measured: Reduce avoidable emergency-department visits
    • Impact: effect « reduced the number of patients transferred to hospital and the number of emergency department visits »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • A. Payen et al. (2023). The impact of including a medication review in an integrated care pathway: A pilot study. British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology.

    • Design, as recorded: retrospective matched cohort
    • Goal measured: Improve the quality of hospital care
    • Impact: mixed « The pathway did not change potentially inappropriate medications; the same abstract reports fewer 30-day readmissions. »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Brigitte Dormont and Alexis Dottin (2024). Does the opening of an emergency department influence hospital admissions? Evidence from French private hospitals. Social Science & Medicine.

    • Design, as recorded: panel with hospital fixed effects around ED openings (event-type comparison)
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: not informed
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
    • another outcome, not counted
  • François Roubille et al. (2024). PRADOC: A Multicenter Randomized Controlled Trial to Assess the Efficiency of PRADO-IC, a Nationwide Pragmatic Transition Care Management Plan for Hospitalized Patients With Heart Failure in France. Journal of the American Heart Association.

    • Design, as recorded: multicentre randomised controlled trial
    • Goal measured: Improve the quality of hospital care
    • Impact: no significant effect « The PRADO-IC has not significantly improved clinical outcomes »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Carine Milcent (2025). Competition in French hospital: Does it impact the patient management in healthcare?. Journal of Economic Analysis (per OpenAlex; HAL record lists 'The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy'); earlier HAL working paper halshs-03152752 (2021).

    • Design, as recorded: difference-in-differences on time variation in local competition intensity, hospital fixed effects
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: mixed « with a positive effect on high-technical procedures in the private sector and a negative effect on length of stay in public hospitals »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
    • another outcome, not counted

Each study is coded by this site from the phrase quoted beside each verdict: impact on the goal it measures, leakage to people the law does not target, and permanence where the aim is a lasting change. The rows are in criteria.csv and studies.csv.

Searches

When the literature was searched

  • 2026-10-04: every line, for causal evaluations of its measures and rules. Searched: the HAL, Crossref, OpenAlex, PubMed and IDEAS/RePEc catalogues of research and publishers' pages, line by line, and a general web search engine until its allowance ran out; some research departments' sites refused automated access, so a study they publish may have been missed (data/literature/gaps). Found: literature/studies.csv.
  • 2026-10-18: causal evaluations of hospital financing and organisation published in 2025-2026, after the search of 4 October 2026: activity-based tariffs (T2A), emergency departments, ambulatory surgery, the Ségur de la santé, hospital quality. Searched: the HAL API (6 queries, 2025-2026), the OpenAlex API (6 queries, from 2025), the IPP's list of publications (ipp.eu, 6 pages); the Drees study of evaluations.csv row 27 read in full (drees.solidarites-sante.gouv.fr). Found: nothing new to code: a study of cost variation within the DRG classification without a counterfactual (Milcent, Health Economics Review 2025), a pricing review (Or and Penneau 2025, WHO) and a student report on ambulatory surgery.

Back to every line of the register

Sources: Eurostat, Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances, Direction de la Sécurité sociale, and the publishers of the studies, each named in its panel.

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Version unreleased-ef7a7ba2, built on 2026-11-12 from ef7a7ba2.