Register of 2024 public money · GF0702
Outpatient services
In short. Studies find care use raised by incentives to limit extra fees, zero-cost dentures and outreach, with no significant overall effect of free complementary cover. None measures forgoing care.
2024
€91.8bn, of public money, line 3 of 155
Strength of evidence
Moderate level 3 of 4, on 1 of its 6 goals: Equal access to care (low out-of-pocket costs) · on rules or parts of the line, which have no separate cost
Studies
23 causal studies tied; 16 findings on its goals
Summary
Version 1 · written 19 October 2026 · history
What it is and who gets it
Care outside hospital paid by all public bodies, mostly the health insurance's reimbursement of general practitioners, specialists, dentists, nurses and other health professionals; medicines are counted on another line.
Goals and the evidence on each
- Care pathways: coordinated, continuous, accessible, high-quality and efficient care across territories (law): Limited, 3 findings
- Equal access to care (low out-of-pocket costs): Moderate, 6 findings
- Contain the share of the population in under-served areas (GP distribution): Limited, 3 findings
- Everyone has a médecin traitant (100% coverage): Very limited, 1 finding
- Develop coordinated practice in primary care (MSP, centres, 100% CPTS coverage): no causal study found
- Quality of care: GPs reaching public-health targets (ROSP): Moderate, 3 findings
What the studies find
Of the 16 findings on its goals: 13 in the goal's direction, 2 mixed, 1 with no significant effect, 0 against it.
- Incentives for specialists to limit extra fees (CAS, OPTAM) led them to treat more patients, including lower-income ones (Aimée Kingsada, 2024); removing out-of-pocket costs for full dentures in 2021 raised their use by 58.85% relative to the projected trend (S. Tubert-Jeannin et al., 2026).
- Free complementary cover (CMU-C) showed no overall effect on care use when introduced, except among those with no cover before (Michel Grignon et al., 2008); its income threshold had no significant effect on doctor visits, except more specialist visits among adults under 30 (Sophie Guthmuller and Jérôme Wittwer, 2017).
- Pay for performance raised cervical screening and the benzodiazepine target modestly, with no significant effect on breast screening (Panayotis Constantinou et al., 2016) (Audrey Michel-Lepage and Bruno Ventelou, 2016) (Jonathan Sicsic and Carine Franc, 2017); the 2017 rise in the GP fee raised GPs' activity by 7 to 10% (Philippe Choné and Lionel Wilner, 2025).
What is missing
- No study measures the official indicators of equal access, forgoing care and the share of health costs households pay, nor the spread of coordinated practice (the goals).
- No causal study of the 2019 merger of CMU-C and ACS, of generalised third-party payment or of state medical aid (AME) was found (search of 18 October 2026) (search notes).
Other official evidence, without a causal design
- A review without a causal design puts the specific cost of the long-term illness regime, across all care, at 12,300 million euros in 2021 and finds savings limited « sauf à dénaturer le dispositif ALD » (IGF-IGAS, 2024).
How this summary was made
Literature searched on 18 October 2026: causal evaluations of outpatient care published in 2025-2026, after the search of 4 October 2026: GP and specialist fees and incentives, free or subsidised complementary cover, extra fees (OPTAM), group practices, under-served areas, out-of-pocket reforms. Searched: the HAL API (7 queries, 2025-2026), the OpenAlex API (7 queries, from 2025), the IPP's list of publications (ipp.eu, 6 pages) and the note and CREST working paper it links. Strength of evidence rated by the rule on the Method page.
- Version 1, 19 October 2026, written · by writer: First version. Latest updates
Under the register's two definitions
Broad definition: a causal study in the line
evaluated
At least one causal study is tied to this line, on all of it or on one of its rules; the line then counts in full, so this is an upper bound.
Strict definition: a single measure with its own cost and study
not yet evaluated
A spending category: the register holds no separate cost for the measures inside it, so none of its money counts under this definition.
23 causal studies are tied to this line, the latest from 2026. The share of public money under each definition is on the evaluations page.
Against the Haut-commissariat's perimeters of aid to companies:
- not placed: the report lists no measure of this line
The literature
The studies that touch this line
Michel Grignon et al. (2008). Does free complementary health insurance help the poor to access health care? Evidence from France. Health Economics.
- Design, as recorded: before/after enrolment with difference-in-differences comparisons (automatic vs voluntary enrollees)
- Goal measured: Equal access to care (low out-of-pocket costs)
- Impact: mixed « CMU-C had no overall effect on utilisation, with effects concentrated among enrollees previously without complementary cover »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
Julien Mousquès et al. (2010). Effect of a French experiment of team work between general practitioners and nurses on efficacy and cost of type 2 diabetes patients care. Health Policy 98(2-3).
- Design, as recorded: case-control, two consecutive periods
- Goal measured: Care pathways: coordinated, continuous, accessible, high-quality and efficient care across territories (law)
- Impact: effect « Asalée patients were more often correctly followed up and under glycaemic control than controls at no extra cost »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
Sophie Guthmuller et al. (2014). Improving Takeup of Health Insurance Program: A Social Experiment in France. Journal of Human Resources 49(1).
- Design, as recorded: randomised experiment
- Goal measured: Equal access to care (low out-of-pocket costs)
- Impact: touched « a voucher increase has a small but significant effect on takeup and the invitation to an information meeting discourages it »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
- a goal only touched, not counted
Olivier Saint-Lary and Jonathan Sicsic (2015). Impact of a pay for performance programme on French GPs' consultation length. Health Policy.
- Design, as recorded: WEAK: multilevel regression comparing signatory and non-signatory GPs, cross-sectional
- Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
- Impact: no significant effect « the CAPI was no longer a significant predictor of the consultation length »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
- another outcome, not counted
Panayotis Constantinou et al. (2016). Effect of pay-for-performance on cervical cancer screening participation in France. International Journal of Health Economics and Management.
- Design, as recorded: binary panel-data models vs 2011 baseline (signatory vs non-signatory GPs)
- Goal measured: Quality of care: GPs reaching public-health targets (ROSP)
- Impact: effect « P4P had a modest positive effect on recommended screening participation. »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: fades « apparently transiently »
Audrey Michel-Lepage and Bruno Ventelou (2016). The true impact of the French pay-for-performance program on physicians' benzodiazepines prescription behavior. The European Journal of Health Economics.
- Design, as recorded: treatment-effect model with instrumental variables (self-selection into CAPI)
- Goal measured: Quality of care: GPs reaching public-health targets (ROSP)
- Impact: effect « The P4P contract has a positive but modest impact on the achievement of GPs regarding benzodiazepines indicator. »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
Jonathan Sicsic and Carine Franc (2017). Impact assessment of a pay-for-performance program on breast cancer screening in France using micro data. The European Journal of Health Economics.
- Design, as recorded: difference-in-differences (CAPI signatory vs non-signatory GPs)
- Goal measured: Quality of care: GPs reaching public-health targets (ROSP)
- Impact: no significant effect « The French P4P program had a nonsignificant impact on breast cancer screening uptake. »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
Sophie Guthmuller and Jérôme Wittwer (2017). The Impact of the Eligibility Threshold of a French Means-Tested Health Insurance Programme on Doctor Visits: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis. Health Economics.
- Design, as recorded: regression discontinuity at the CMU-C income threshold
- Goal measured: Equal access to care (low out-of-pocket costs)
- Impact: mixed « with more specialist visits among adults under 30 »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
Magali Dumontet et al. (2017). Gatekeeping and the utilization of physician services in France: Evidence on the Médecin traitant reform. Health Policy.
- Design, as recorded: WEAK: trend break before/after the reform on claims panel, plus survey evidence
- Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
- Impact: effect « fell after the policy was in place »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
- another outcome, not counted
L. Arnaud Lafargue (2017). Intérêt au déploiement du PAERPA dans l'Oise ? Comparaison des pratiques des médecins généralistes avec un territoire pilote. Medical thesis (DUMAS).
- Design, as recorded: WEAK: cross-sectional questionnaire comparison, pilot territory (Mayenne) vs control (Oise)
- Goal measured: Care pathways: coordinated, continuous, accessible, high-quality and efficient care across territories (law)
- Impact: effect « les pratiques des médecins PAERPA étaient significativement meilleures sur la prévention des chutes »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
B. Carré et al. (2019). Does the take up of public insurance programs improves health care consumption of poor individuals?. European Journal of Public Health 29 (Suppl. 4) (conference abstract).
- Design, as recorded: WEAK: panel-data regressions of use around take-up (conference abstract)
- Goal measured: Equal access to care (low out-of-pocket costs)
- Impact: effect « may play an important role in access to care for the poor population »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
Guillaume Chevillard et al. (2019). Has the diffusion of primary care teams in France improved attraction and retention of general practitioners in rural areas?. Health Policy.
- Design, as recorded: before/after comparison of rural areas with and without PCTs
- Goal measured: Contain the share of the population in under-served areas (GP distribution)
- Impact: effect « suggest that they could attract and retain GPs there »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
Matthieu Cassou et al. (2020). General practitioners' income and activity: the impact of multi-professional group practice in France. The European Journal of Health Economics.
- Design, as recorded: coarsened exact matching and difference-in-differences, panel
- Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
- Impact: effect « an increase in income 2.5% higher than that of other GPs »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
- another outcome, not counted
Fanny Duchaine et al. (2020). L'impact des zonages déficitaires sur l'évolution des disparités territoriales d'infirmiers libéraux en France entre 2006 et 2016. HAL working paper.
- Design, as recorded: WEAK: comparison of zones by zoning status over 2006-2016 (method not detailed in abstract)
- Goal measured: Contain the share of the population in under-served areas (GP distribution)
- Impact: effect « un effet positif, bien qu'à nuancer »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
Guillaume Chevillard and Julien Mousquès (2021). Medically underserved areas: are primary care teams efficient at attracting and retaining general practitioners?. Social Science & Medicine.
- Design, as recorded: difference-in-differences, areas with vs without new PCTs
- Goal measured: Contain the share of the population in under-served areas (GP distribution)
- Impact: effect « PCT settlements are efficient to attract young GPs »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
Christophe Loussouarn et al. (2021). Can General Practitioners Be More Productive? The Impact of Teamwork and Cooperation with Nurses on GP Activities. Health Economics 30(3) (French version: Revue d'économie politique 2019, hal-04387988).
- Design, as recorded: coarsened exact matching, difference-in-differences on panel
- Goal measured: Everyone has a médecin traitant (100% coverage)
- Impact: effect « un effet positif du dispositif mais relativement modeste sur le nombre de jours travaillés par les médecins (+1,2 %) »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
Matthieu Cassou et al. (2023). General Practitioners activity patterns: the medium-term impacts of Primary Care Teams in France. Health Policy.
- Design, as recorded: difference-in-differences with propensity score matching
- Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
- Impact: effect « GPs in MPCGs increased their patient list more rapidly than control GPs »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
- another outcome, not counted
Julie Gilles de la Londe et al. (2023). How does the quality of care for type 2 diabetic patients benefit from GPs-nurses' teamwork? A staggered difference-in-differences design based on a French pilot program. International Journal of Health Economics and Management.
- Design, as recorded: staggered difference-in-differences with coarsened exact matching
- Goal measured: Care pathways: coordinated, continuous, accessible, high-quality and efficient care across territories (law)
- Impact: effect « a positive and significant positive impact »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
Aimée Kingsada (2024). Can financial incentives improve access to care? Evidence from a French experiment on specialist physicians. Social Science & Medicine.
- Design, as recorded: difference-in-differences with two-way fixed effects and coarsened exact matching
- Goal measured: Equal access to care (low out-of-pocket costs)
- Impact: effect « Both the CAS and OPTAM successfully enhance access to care. »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
Quitterie Roquebert et al. (2025). Strengthening primary health care: The new contribution of midwives to gynecological care in France. Health Policy 161.
- Design, as recorded: quasi-experimental pre/post reform on administrative data
- Goal measured: Equal access to care (low out-of-pocket costs)
- Impact: touched « Our results show an increase in midwives' use following the reform »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
- a goal only touched, not counted
Estelle Augé and Nicolas Sirven (2026). Improving Healthcare Utilization in Retired Self-Employed Workers: Evidence From an Experiment in France. Health Economics 35(7).
- Design, as recorded: quasi-experiment, synthetic difference-in-differences
- Goal measured: Equal access to care (low out-of-pocket costs)
- Impact: effect « Proactive information outreach alone increased healthcare utilization by 0.6% »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
S. Tubert-Jeannin et al. (2026). The French 100% Santé Reform: Impacts on Dental Care Utilization. Journal of Dental Research 105(4).
- Design, as recorded: controlled interrupted time series, segmented negative binomial regression
- Goal measured: Equal access to care (low out-of-pocket costs)
- Impact: effect « Full denture utilization was 58.85% higher »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
Philippe Choné and Lionel Wilner (2025). Quels effets d'une revalorisation du tarif des consultations médicales sur l'offre de soins ?. Note IPP n° 118 (November 2025), summarising the CREST working paper 2025-07, Physician labor supply, financial incentives, and access to healthcare.
- Design, as recorded: difference-in-differences: sector-1 GPs, whose fee rose, against direct-access specialists (ophthalmologists, gynaecologists, stomatologists), and alternatively sector-2 GPs, before and after May 2017
- Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
- Impact: effect « l'activité des médecins a augmenté de 7 à 10 % suite à une hausse de la base de remboursement de 8,7 % »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
- another outcome, not counted
Each study is coded by this site from the phrase quoted beside each verdict: impact on the goal it measures, leakage to people the law does not target, and permanence where the aim is a lasting change. The rows are in criteria.csv and studies.csv.
Searches
When the literature was searched
- 2026-10-04: every line, for causal evaluations of its measures and rules. Searched: the HAL, Crossref, OpenAlex, PubMed and IDEAS/RePEc catalogues of research and publishers' pages, line by line, and a general web search engine until its allowance ran out; some research departments' sites refused automated access, so a study they publish may have been missed (data/literature/gaps). Found: literature/studies.csv.
- 2026-10-18: causal evaluations of outpatient care published in 2025-2026, after the search of 4 October 2026: GP and specialist fees and incentives, free or subsidised complementary cover, extra fees (OPTAM), group practices, under-served areas, out-of-pocket reforms. Searched: the HAL API (7 queries, 2025-2026), the OpenAlex API (7 queries, from 2025), the IPP's list of publications (ipp.eu, 6 pages) and the note and CREST working paper it links. Found: Note IPP n° 118 (Choné and Wilner, November 2025) on the 2017 GP fee rise, coded as row 367; not coded: a stated-preference experiment on task delegation (Combes, Paraponaris and Videau 2025), a thesis without a counterfactual on primary care teams (Angibaud 2025), descriptive and qualitative studies.