Register of 2024 public money · GF0101
Executive and legislative organs, financial and fiscal affairs, external affairs
In short. Studies of tax disclosure rules find that stricter documentation cut reported charity deductions in 1983 and that a lighter wealth-tax return lowered reported wealth; none measures diplomacy's goals.
2024
€42.8bn, of public money, line 15 of 155
Strength of evidence
Very limited level 1 of 4, on 1 of its 8 goals: Fight against tax fraud (P156-1) · on rules or parts of the line, which have no separate cost
Studies
2 causal studies tied; 2 findings on its goals
Summary
Version 1 · written 19 October 2026 · history
What it is and who gets it
The executive and Parliament, the tax and financial administration, and foreign affairs and consulates, mostly paid for by the State; COFOG also records France's contributions to the EU budget here.
Goals and the evidence on each
- Fight against tax fraud (P156-1): Very limited, 2 findings
- Quality of service to taxpayers and partners (P156-2): no causal study found
- Control the DGFiP's running costs (P156-3): no causal study found
- International security and the safety of French nationals abroad (P105-1): no causal study found
- Multilateralism and a sovereign, united, democratic Europe (P105-2): no causal study found
- An efficient, high-quality diplomatic service (P105-3): no causal study found
- Quality and efficiency of consular services (P151-1): no causal study found
- Simpler consular procedures (P151-2): no causal study found
What the studies find
Of the 2 findings on its goals: 1 in the goal's direction, 0 mixed, 0 with no significant effect, 1 against it; 1 of them studies a cut in the measure.
- Tightening the documents needed to claim charitable deductions in 1983 sharply cut the gifts reported, which the authors attribute to overreporting before the reform (Gabrielle Fack and Camille Landais, 2016).
- From 2011, a simplified wealth-tax return without asset-by-asset disclosure lowered affected taxpayers' reported wealth growth by 0.5 points a year, 20% of the control group's rate, which the authors attribute to evasion (Bertrand Garbinti et al., 2023).
What is missing
- No causal study of the tax administration's audits, reminder letters, withholding at source or online filing was found, nor of diplomacy or consular services (search of 19 October 2026) (search notes).
- France's EU budget contributions and the Presidency's and Parliament's budgets carry no performance objectives; the goals of customs and of the Prime Minister's services are not yet coded (the goals).
How this summary was made
Literature searched on 19 October 2026: causal evaluations of the executive, Parliament, the tax administration and diplomacy since the search of 4 October 2026: tax audits and enforcement, reminder letters, withholding at source, online filing, the right to make a mistake, the ban on holding several mandates, elected officials' pay, parliamentary staff, embassies and state visits. Searched: the HAL API (17 queries), the OpenAlex API (18 queries, then refused for the day), the Crossref API (10 queries), the NBER and IDEAS/RePEc pages, the DITP site; Cairn answered with 403, HAL's files with a bot check, and the DITP site's search ignored its terms. Strength of evidence rated by the rule on the Method page.
- Version 1, 19 October 2026, written · by writer: First version. Latest updates
Under the register's two definitions
Broad definition: a causal study in the line
evaluated
At least one causal study is tied to this line, on all of it or on one of its rules; the line then counts in full, so this is an upper bound.
Strict definition: a single measure with its own cost and study
not yet evaluated
A spending category: the register holds no separate cost for the measures inside it, so none of its money counts under this definition.
2 causal studies are tied to this line, the latest from 2023. The share of public money under each definition is on the evaluations page.
Against the Haut-commissariat's perimeters of aid to companies:
- not placed: the report lists no measure of this line
The literature
The studies that touch this line
Gabrielle Fack and Camille Landais (2016). The effect of tax enforcement on tax elasticities: Evidence from charitable contributions in France. Journal of Public Economics.
- Design, as recorded: natural experiment (1983 enforcement reform), before/after elasticity comparison; bunching at kink points
- Goal measured: Fight against tax fraud (P156-1)
- Impact: effect « The reform led to a substantial drop in the amount of contributions reported to the administration »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
Bertrand Garbinti et al. (2023). Tax Design, Information, and Elasticities: Evidence From the French Wealth Tax. NBER Working Paper 31333 (June 2023, revised May 2026); HAL hal-04349153.
- Design, as recorded: Dynamic bunching with a control group: the wealth growth of taxpayers below and just above the 2013 threshold compared with a counterfactual built from taxpayers far above it, unaffected by the reform; the share of compliers and the LATE estimated (Angrist et al. 1996 framework)
- Goal measured: Fight against tax fraud (P156-1)
- Impact: adverse « annual wealth growth rates are on average 20% lower among affected taxpayers »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
- a study of a cut
Each study is coded by this site from the phrase quoted beside each verdict: impact on the goal it measures, leakage to people the law does not target, and permanence where the aim is a lasting change. The rows are in criteria.csv and studies.csv.
Searches
When the literature was searched
- 2026-10-04: every line, for causal evaluations of its measures and rules. Searched: the HAL, Crossref, OpenAlex, PubMed and IDEAS/RePEc catalogues of research and publishers' pages, line by line, and a general web search engine until its allowance ran out; some research departments' sites refused automated access, so a study they publish may have been missed (data/literature/gaps). Found: literature/studies.csv.
- 2026-10-19: causal evaluations of the executive, Parliament, the tax administration and diplomacy since the search of 4 October 2026: tax audits and enforcement, reminder letters, withholding at source, online filing, the right to make a mistake, the ban on holding several mandates, elected officials' pay, parliamentary staff, embassies and state visits. Searched: the HAL API (17 queries), the OpenAlex API (18 queries, then refused for the day), the Crossref API (10 queries), the NBER and IDEAS/RePEc pages, the DITP site; Cairn answered with 403, HAL's files with a bot check, and the DITP site's search ignored its terms. Found: one study coded as row 381 (the wealth tax's simplified return, NBER 2023, revised 2026); not coded: a close-election study of mayors holding a département seat and the grants they obtain (Revue économique 2021), a study of state visits pooling France, Germany and the United States (2007), two studies of parliamentary staff and reserves without a retrievable abstract, correlations and before-and-after studies of the cumul des mandats.