Theme

Register of 2024 public money · GF0101

Executive and legislative organs, financial and fiscal affairs, external affairs

In short. Studies of tax disclosure rules find that stricter documentation cut reported charity deductions in 1983 and that a lighter wealth-tax return lowered reported wealth; none measures diplomacy's goals.

2024

€42.8bn, of public money, line 15 of 155

Strength of evidence

Very limited level 1 of 4, on 1 of its 8 goals: Fight against tax fraud (P156-1) · on rules or parts of the line, which have no separate cost

Studies

2 causal studies tied; 2 findings on its goals

Summary

Version 1 · written 19 October 2026 · history

What it is and who gets it

The executive and Parliament, the tax and financial administration, and foreign affairs and consulates, mostly paid for by the State; COFOG also records France's contributions to the EU budget here.

Goals and the evidence on each

  • Fight against tax fraud (P156-1): Very limited, 2 findings
  • Quality of service to taxpayers and partners (P156-2): no causal study found
  • Control the DGFiP's running costs (P156-3): no causal study found
  • International security and the safety of French nationals abroad (P105-1): no causal study found
  • Multilateralism and a sovereign, united, democratic Europe (P105-2): no causal study found
  • An efficient, high-quality diplomatic service (P105-3): no causal study found
  • Quality and efficiency of consular services (P151-1): no causal study found
  • Simpler consular procedures (P151-2): no causal study found

What the studies find

Of the 2 findings on its goals: 1 in the goal's direction, 0 mixed, 0 with no significant effect, 1 against it; 1 of them studies a cut in the measure.

  • Tightening the documents needed to claim charitable deductions in 1983 sharply cut the gifts reported, which the authors attribute to overreporting before the reform (Gabrielle Fack and Camille Landais, 2016).
  • From 2011, a simplified wealth-tax return without asset-by-asset disclosure lowered affected taxpayers' reported wealth growth by 0.5 points a year, 20% of the control group's rate, which the authors attribute to evasion (Bertrand Garbinti et al., 2023).

What is missing

  • No causal study of the tax administration's audits, reminder letters, withholding at source or online filing was found, nor of diplomacy or consular services (search of 19 October 2026) (search notes).
  • France's EU budget contributions and the Presidency's and Parliament's budgets carry no performance objectives; the goals of customs and of the Prime Minister's services are not yet coded (the goals).

How this summary was made

Literature searched on 19 October 2026: causal evaluations of the executive, Parliament, the tax administration and diplomacy since the search of 4 October 2026: tax audits and enforcement, reminder letters, withholding at source, online filing, the right to make a mistake, the ban on holding several mandates, elected officials' pay, parliamentary staff, embassies and state visits. Searched: the HAL API (17 queries), the OpenAlex API (18 queries, then refused for the day), the Crossref API (10 queries), the NBER and IDEAS/RePEc pages, the DITP site; Cairn answered with 403, HAL's files with a bot check, and the DITP site's search ignored its terms. Strength of evidence rated by the rule on the Method page.

  • Version 1, 19 October 2026, written · by writer: First version. Latest updates

Under the register's two definitions

Broad definition: a causal study in the line

evaluated

At least one causal study is tied to this line, on all of it or on one of its rules; the line then counts in full, so this is an upper bound.

Strict definition: a single measure with its own cost and study

not yet evaluated

A spending category: the register holds no separate cost for the measures inside it, so none of its money counts under this definition.

2 causal studies are tied to this line, the latest from 2023. The share of public money under each definition is on the evaluations page.

Against the Haut-commissariat's perimeters of aid to companies:

  • not placed: the report lists no measure of this line

The perimeters, and the share of each with a causal study

The literature

The studies that touch this line

  • Gabrielle Fack and Camille Landais (2016). The effect of tax enforcement on tax elasticities: Evidence from charitable contributions in France. Journal of Public Economics.

    • Design, as recorded: natural experiment (1983 enforcement reform), before/after elasticity comparison; bunching at kink points
    • Goal measured: Fight against tax fraud (P156-1)
    • Impact: effect « The reform led to a substantial drop in the amount of contributions reported to the administration »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Bertrand Garbinti et al. (2023). Tax Design, Information, and Elasticities: Evidence From the French Wealth Tax. NBER Working Paper 31333 (June 2023, revised May 2026); HAL hal-04349153.

    • Design, as recorded: Dynamic bunching with a control group: the wealth growth of taxpayers below and just above the 2013 threshold compared with a counterfactual built from taxpayers far above it, unaffected by the reform; the share of compliers and the LATE estimated (Angrist et al. 1996 framework)
    • Goal measured: Fight against tax fraud (P156-1)
    • Impact: adverse « annual wealth growth rates are on average 20% lower among affected taxpayers »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
    • a study of a cut

Each study is coded by this site from the phrase quoted beside each verdict: impact on the goal it measures, leakage to people the law does not target, and permanence where the aim is a lasting change. The rows are in criteria.csv and studies.csv.

Searches

When the literature was searched

  • 2026-10-04: every line, for causal evaluations of its measures and rules. Searched: the HAL, Crossref, OpenAlex, PubMed and IDEAS/RePEc catalogues of research and publishers' pages, line by line, and a general web search engine until its allowance ran out; some research departments' sites refused automated access, so a study they publish may have been missed (data/literature/gaps). Found: literature/studies.csv.
  • 2026-10-19: causal evaluations of the executive, Parliament, the tax administration and diplomacy since the search of 4 October 2026: tax audits and enforcement, reminder letters, withholding at source, online filing, the right to make a mistake, the ban on holding several mandates, elected officials' pay, parliamentary staff, embassies and state visits. Searched: the HAL API (17 queries), the OpenAlex API (18 queries, then refused for the day), the Crossref API (10 queries), the NBER and IDEAS/RePEc pages, the DITP site; Cairn answered with 403, HAL's files with a bot check, and the DITP site's search ignored its terms. Found: one study coded as row 381 (the wealth tax's simplified return, NBER 2023, revised 2026); not coded: a close-election study of mayors holding a département seat and the grants they obtain (Revue économique 2021), a study of state visits pooling France, Germany and the United States (2007), two studies of parliamentary staff and reserves without a retrievable abstract, correlations and before-and-after studies of the cumul des mandats.

Back to every line of the register

Sources: Eurostat, Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances, Direction de la Sécurité sociale, and the publishers of the studies, each named in its panel.

The page is static HTML and reads in full without JavaScript. The script adds the tooltips, traces a flow through a diagram, opens in place the evidence kept on separate pages, shows and hides the diagrams on a phone, recomputes the wealth calculator, places you on the page that asks where you stand, and keeps the theme you pick: light, dark or high contrast.

Questions, ideas or corrections: open an issue at github.com/samoht/budget/issues. Who makes this site, and the corrections made to it, are on the Method page.

Every data file, with its columns, licence and checksum: the Data page. Every chart, by question: the index of the charts. Every line of the register: the register's index.

The evidence summaries of the register as they are written: Latest updates (Atom feed).

Text and data: Licence Ouverte / Open Licence 2.0, except third-party data, which keep their publishers' terms. Code: ISC. See LICENSE.md.

Version unreleased-ef7a7ba2, built on 2026-11-12 from ef7a7ba2.