Theme

Register of 2024 public money · GF1002

Old age

In short. Most studies of the 1993, 2003 and 2010 reforms find that people worked longer; the 2010 reform also raised unemployment and disability. No causal study measures retirees' incomes.

2024

€392bn, of public money, the largest of 155 lines

Strength of evidence

Strong level 4 of 4, on 1 of its 9 goals: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate) · on rules or parts of the line, which have no separate cost

Studies

28 causal studies tied; 13 findings on its goals

Summary

Version 1 · written 19 October 2026 · history

What it is and who gets it

Pensions and other benefits for old age paid by all public bodies, in cash and in kind: the basic and complementary pension schemes, civil servants' pensions, the old-age minimum, and help with daily tasks and lodging for older people.

Goals and the evidence on each

  • Adequate living standard for retirees and solidarity among them (pensions in line with earnings, purchasing power, poverty): touched only, 3 studies measure something it depends on
  • Equity: equal treatment, limit pension gaps within and between generations, close the women-men pension gap: no causal study found
  • Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate): Strong, 13 findings
  • Better knowledge of rights and access to benefits (information, opening of rights, non-take-up): no causal study found
  • Financial balance of the pension system (medium and long term), contributions shared fairly, full employment: touched only, 4 studies measure something it depends on
  • Adequate living standard for dependent elderly (out-of-pocket costs, prevention of loss of autonomy): no causal study found
  • Meet autonomy needs of the elderly (home care under APA, services for 75+, home adaptation): no causal study found
  • Adapted supply across the territory for dependent elderly (territorial disparities, evaluation of establishments): no causal study found
  • Financial balance of the autonomy branch: no causal study found

What the studies find

Of the 13 findings on its goals: 11 in the goal's direction, 2 mixed, 0 with no significant effect, 0 against it; 9 of them study a cut in the measure.

  • Each extra quarter of contributions required by the 1993 reform lengthened careers by one and a half months on average (Antoine Bozio, 2006).
  • The 2003 surcote, a bonus for working on, delayed claiming by two months and raised the probability of working after 60 by 16% for those born in 1944 (Samia Benallah, 2011).
  • Raising the minimum age from 60 to 62 in 2010 raised both employment and paid unemployment between 60 and 62 (Patrick Aubert et al., 2025); one study finds that about a fifth of the fall in public spending was offset by other public insurance schemes (Simon Rabaté and Julie Rochut, 2019) (quote not yet matched to the source).

What is missing

  • No causal study of the 2023 reform, of the old-age minimum (ASPA) or of combining work and pension was found (search of 18 October 2026) (search notes).
  • No causal study measures equity between pensioners, including between women's and men's pensions, or the goals set for dependent older people (the goals).

Other official evidence, without a causal design

  • A review without a causal design, of the pension system's effects on employment, is summarised by the Cour's evaluation platform as finding « La progression de l'emploi des personnes âgées de 55 à 60 ans masque des disparités » (Cour des comptes, 2025).

This site's own evaluation (not counted): Retirement age (2023 reform), Retirement age (2010 reform).

How this summary was made

Literature searched on 18 October 2026: causal evaluations of old-age pension rules and reforms published in 2025-2026, after the search of 4 October 2026: the 2023 reform, the old-age minimum (ASPA), combining work and pension, the retirement age, retirees' living standards. Searched: the HAL API (6 queries, 2025-2026), the OpenAlex API (8 queries, from 2025), the IPP's list of publications (ipp.eu, 6 pages), the Cour des comptes evaluation platform (the page of evaluations.csv row 28); IDEAS/RePEc answered with a bot-traffic notice and no results. Strength of evidence rated by the rule on the Method page.

  • Version 1, 19 October 2026, written · by writer: First version. Latest updates

Under the register's two definitions

Broad definition: a causal study in the line

evaluated

At least one causal study is tied to this line, on all of it or on one of its rules; the line then counts in full, so this is an upper bound.

Strict definition: a single measure with its own cost and study

not yet evaluated

A spending category: the register holds no separate cost for the measures inside it, so none of its money counts under this definition.

28 causal studies are tied to this line, the latest from 2026. The share of public money under each definition is on the evaluations page.

Against the Haut-commissariat's perimeters of aid to companies:

  • not placed: the report lists no measure of this line

The perimeters, and the share of each with a causal study

The literature

The studies that touch this line

  • Montserrat Botey (2026). Pension Reform and Indebtedness in Retirement: Consumption Smoothing or Credit Expansion? Evidence from France. Revue d'économie politique.

    • Design, as recorded: DiD comparing reform-affected and non-affected cohorts of retirees
    • Goal measured: Adequate living standard for retirees and solidarity among them (pensions in line with earnings, purchasing power, poverty)
    • Impact: touched « La réforme Balladur augmente principalement l'endettement des retraités les moins diplômés et financièrement vulnérables »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • a goal only touched, not counted
    • a study of a cut
  • Antoine Bozio et al. (2021). Impact of later retirement on mortality: Evidence from France. Health Economics.

    • Design, as recorded: IV / reform-induced variation in claiming age across cohorts from the 1993 private-sector reform; mortality between ages 61 and 79; minimum detectable effects computed
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: no significant effect « has no significant impact on the probability to die »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • another outcome, not counted
    • a study of a cut
  • Hélène Blake and Clémentine Garrouste (2019). Collateral Effects of a Pension Reform in France. Annals of Economics and Statistics.

    • Design, as recorded: DiD comparing private-sector (treated) and public-sector workers across cohorts born 1933-1943
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: adverse « a negative effect of the 1993 reform on perceived and physical health »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • another outcome, not counted
    • a study of a cut
  • Elsa Perdrix (2022). Does later retirement change your healthcare consumption? Evidence from France. Annals of Economics and Statistics.

    • Design, as recorded: 2SLS using the cohort-by-cohort increase in claiming age from the 1993 reform (cohorts 1934-1943); two-part model for extensive and intensive margins
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: not informed
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • another outcome, not counted
    • a study of a cut
  • Christophe Daniel et al. (2018). Durée d'assurance et équivalent patrimonial des droits à retraite : l'impact de la réforme de 1993. Economie et prévision.

    • Design, as recorded: First-difference and DiD regressions plus quantile regressions around the 1993 reform
    • Goal measured: Adequate living standard for retirees and solidarity among them (pensions in line with earnings, purchasing power, poverty)
    • Impact: touched « reporter son départ en retraite réduit l'EPDR moyen d'environ 20% »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • a goal only touched, not counted
    • a study of a cut
  • Antoine Bozio (2006). Réformes des retraites : estimations sur données françaises. PhD thesis (EHESS), HAL tel-05209355.

    • Design, as recorded: DiD using the public sector, untouched by the 1993 reform, as control group (savings chapter); cohort variation in required contribution period (career chapter)
    • Goal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate)
    • Impact: mixed « a one-quarter increase in the contribution period led to an average increase of one and a half months in the length of careers »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • a study of a cut
  • Antoine Bozio (2011). La réforme des retraites de 1993 : l'impact de l'augmentation de la durée d'assurance. Economie et statistique.

    • Design, as recorded: DiD using variation by generation (1934-1943) and by insurance duration at age 60
    • Goal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate)
    • Impact: effect « un report de neuf mois pour toute année supplémentaire d'assurance requise »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • a study of a cut
  • Julie Tréguier (2021). Départ à la retraite : femmes et hommes prennent-ils les mêmes décisions ?. Revue économique.

    • Design, as recorded: Reform-induced change in financial incentives from the 2003 reform used to identify retirement responses of women and men (estimator not stated in retrieved text)
    • Goal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate)
    • Impact: effect « Les hommes sont plus sensibles aux incitations financières et décalent davantage leur âge de départ »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • a study of a cut
  • Denis Fougère and Pierre Gouëdard (2021). The effects of financial incentives and disincentives on teachers' retirement decisions: Evidence from the 2003 French pension reform. Working paper, HAL hal-03465859.

    • Design, as recorded: Structural option-value model a la Stock and Wise estimated on 12,463 teachers, with reform simulations
    • Goal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate)
    • Impact: effect « the reform has progressively increased the average retirement age up to 61 »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • a simulation, not counted
    • a study of a cut
  • Manuella Baraton et al. (2011). Une évaluation de l'effet de la réforme de 2003 sur les départs en retraite. Le cas des enseignants du second degré public. Economie et statistique.

    • Design, as recorded: Comparison of retirement probabilities of teachers still active at 60 across generations before and after the 2003 reform, by years of service and missing quarters (estimator not stated in retrieved text)
    • Goal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate)
    • Impact: effect « la réforme a bien eu un impact sur la probabilité de partir après 60 ans »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • a study of a cut
  • Sarah Le Duigou et al. (2020). Financial incentives to postpone retirement: Estimating the impacts of the 2003 French pension reform on the employment and wages of older workers by using a lifetime job search model. Revue de l'OFCE.

    • Design, as recorded: Structural equilibrium job-search model with endogenous wages and employment; reform simulations
    • Goal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate)
    • Impact: mixed « attenuate the impacts of financial incentives that cause wage increases and few new jobs »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • a simulation, not counted
  • Samia Benallah (2011). Comportements de départ en retraite et réforme de 2003 : les effets de la surcote. Economie et statistique.

    • Design, as recorded: Matching, first cohort eligible for the surcote (born 1944) versus non-eligible insured, extended to other cohorts
    • Goal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate)
    • Impact: effect « un report de deux mois de l'âge de liquidation des droits à la retraite »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
  • Kadija Charni (2019). Do the French pension reforms increase re-employment of older unemployed workers?. Applied Economics.

    • Design, as recorded: DiD on exit rates from unemployment (to employment and to inactivity) of individuals over 54 around the 2003 and 2010 reforms
    • Goal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate)
    • Impact: mixed « the 2003 pension reform reduces significantly the exit to employment »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • a study of a cut
  • Patrick Aubert et al. (2025). Impact de la réforme des retraites de 2010 sur l'équilibre financier de l'assurance chômage. Report / working paper, HAL halshs-05545826.

    • Design, as recorded: DiD on administrative data comparing generations 1950 and 1954
    • Goal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate)
    • Impact: effect « la réforme a accru l'emploi entre 60 et 62 ans »
    • Leakage: leakage found « une hausse du chômage indemnisé entre 60 et 62 ans »
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • a study of a cut
  • Denis Fougère et al. (2021). Slow Down Before You Stop: The Effect of the 2010 French Pension Reform on Older Teachers' Sick Leaves. Working paper, HAL halshs-03098517.

    • Design, as recorded: Panel-data comparison of teachers affected and not affected by the higher minimum retirement age (38,652 teachers)
    • Goal measured: Financial balance of the pension system (medium and long term), contributions shared fairly, full employment
    • Impact: not informed
    • Leakage: leakage found « teachers affected by the reform have an increased probability to take short sick leaves before retirement »
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • a study of a cut
  • Eve Caroli et al. (2023). The Health-Consumption Effects of Increasing Retirement Age Late in the Game. Economie et Statistique / Economics and Statistics.

    • Design, as recorded: Cohort-differentiated increase in retirement age from the 2010 reform (treated cohorts close to but below statutory age)
    • Goal measured: Financial balance of the pension system (medium and long term), contributions shared fairly, full employment
    • Impact: not informed
    • Leakage: leakage found « it increases health expenditures »
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • a study of a cut
  • Yves Dubois and Malik Koubi (2017). La réforme des retraites de 2010 : quel impact sur l'activité des seniors ?. Economie et prévision.

    • Design, as recorded: Comparison of employees impacted versus not impacted by the 2010 reform conditional on age and characteristics, 2008-2014; cross-checked against Destinie microsimulation
    • Goal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate)
    • Impact: effect « serait entre 19 et 22 points plus élevé que celui des salariés non impactés »
    • Leakage: leakage found « mais également par un accroissement du chômage »
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • a study of a cut
  • Mohamed Ali Ben Halima et al. (2022). L'effet de la réforme des retraites de 2010 sur l'absence maladie. Revue française d'économie.

    • Design, as recorded: Reform-induced variation in the eligibility age across generations 1950-1955 (estimator not stated in retrieved abstract)
    • Goal measured: Financial balance of the pension system (medium and long term), contributions shared fairly, full employment
    • Impact: not informed
    • Leakage: leakage found « une augmentation de la probabilité d'avoir au moins un arrêt maladie (+1,7 point de pourcentage) »
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • a study of a cut
  • Simon Rabaté and Julie Rochut (2019). Employment and substitution effects of raising the statutory retirement age in France. Journal of Pension Economics and Finance.

    • Design, as recorded: DiD around the 2010 reform comparing work-to-retirement trajectories of successive birth cohorts facing different statutory ages; outcomes include employment, unemployment, sickness and disability insurance
    • Goal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate)
    • Impact: effect « despite a sizable effect on the employment rate »
    • Leakage: leakage found « around one fifth in the decrease in public spending is offset by increasing expenses in other public insurance schemes »
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • a study of a cut
  • Jean-Olivier Hairault et al. (2010). Distance to Retirement and The Job Search of Older Workers: The Case For Delaying Retirement Age. Journal of the European Economic Association.

    • Design, as recorded: Employment regressions on distance to retirement (French LFS) plus life-cycle job-search model simulations
    • Goal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate)
    • Impact: effect « the likelihood of employment is significantly affected by the distance from retirement »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
  • Jean-Olivier Hairault et al. (2009). Le faible taux d'emploi des seniors : distance à l'entrée dans la vie active ou distance à la retraite ?. Revue de l'OFCE.

    • Design, as recorded: Employment regressions separating distance to retirement from distance to labour-market entry (experience)
    • Goal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate)
    • Impact: effect « the negative effect of proximity to retirement on older workers' employment is confirmed »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
  • Elena Stancanelli and Arthur van Soest (2012). Retirement and Home Production: A Regression Discontinuity Approach. American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings).

    • Design, as recorded: Fuzzy RDD at the earliest retirement age under French law
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: not informed
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Nicolas Moreau and Elena Stancanelli (2015). Household Consumption at Retirement: A Regression Discontinuity Study on French Data. Annals of Economics and Statistics.

    • Design, as recorded: RDD on retirement of each partner (age-based retirement eligibility)
    • Goal measured: Adequate living standard for retirees and solidarity among them (pensions in line with earnings, purchasing power, poverty)
    • Impact: touched « We find a significant and sizable drop in food and clothes expenditure upon retirement of the male partner. However, the drop in food expenditure is not robust »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • a goal only touched, not counted
  • Elena Stancanelli (2012). Spouses' Retirement and Hours of Work Outcomes: Evidence from Twofold Regression Discontinuity. Working paper, HAL halshs-00755648 (SSRN 10.2139/ssrn.2157933).

    • Design, as recorded: Twofold RDD exploiting early retirement age legislation (over 85,000 couples)
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: not informed
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Elena Stancanelli and Arthur van Soest (2012). Joint Leisure Before and After Retirement: a double Regression Discontinuity Approach. Working paper, HAL halshs-00768901.

    • Design, as recorded: Double RDD using French early retirement law
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: not informed
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Elena Stancanelli (2017). Couples' Retirement under Individual Pension Design: a Regression Discontinuity Study for France. Labour Economics.

    • Design, as recorded: Sharp RDD with birth month relative to a reference month as running variable, plus incremental DiD
    • Goal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate)
    • Impact: effect « We find a significant drop in each spouse's probability of retirement. »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • a study of a cut
  • Nicolas Moreau and Elena Stancanelli (2022). L'effet du passage à la retraite sur l'emploi du temps des retraités. Annali Memotef.

    • Design, as recorded: RDD exploiting the jump in retirement probability at 60, the minimum legal retirement age
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: not informed
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Luc Behaghel et al. (2014). Retirement, Early Retirement and Disability: Explaining Labor Force Participation after 55 in France. NBER Working Paper 20030.

    • Design, as recorded: Structural option-value model (Stock and Wise) with three retirement routes, estimated on combined microdata; counterfactual route simulations
    • Goal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate)
    • Impact: effect « a decrease in the generosity of the pension and DI schemes induces people to stay longer in the labor market »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • a simulation, not counted
    • a study of a cut
  • Simon Rabaté (2019). Can I stay or should I go? Mandatory retirement and the labor-force participation of older workers. Journal of Public Economics.

    • Design, as recorded: DiD exploiting inter-industry, reform-induced variation in mandatory retirement legislation
    • Goal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate)
    • Impact: effect « exit rates from employment are estimated to be 6% higher when mandatory retirement is possible »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
  • Sarah Le Duigou and Pierre-Jean Messe (2024). The influence of unemployment insurance rules on employment effects of pension reforms. Annals of Economics and Statistics.

    • Design, as recorded: Structural finite-horizon job-search model with age-specific UI rules and endogenous separations, estimated on quarterly separation and finding rates of workers aged 55-59
    • Goal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate)
    • Impact: effect « combining an increase in the retirement age with a reduction in the generosity of the unemployment insurance scheme is an efficient policy for raising older workers' employment rates »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • a simulation, not counted
    • a study of a cut
  • Pierre-Jean Messe and François-Charles Wolff (2019). Healthier when retiring earlier? Evidence from France. Applied Economics.

    • Design, as recorded: IV using eligibility rules of the 2004 long-career early retirement scheme
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: no significant effect « we fail to find any significant causal effect of early retirement on poor health »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Pierre-Jean Messe and François-Charles Wolff (2019). The short-term effects of retirement on health within couples: Evidence from France. Social Science & Medicine.

    • Design, as recorded: Semi-parametric DiD with matching: retirees versus those remaining employed (not reform-based)
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: mixed « transition into retirement has a short-term beneficial effect on respondents' self-assessed health. Conversely, we fail to find any significant effect of respondents' retirement on their spouses' health »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • another outcome, not counted

Each study is coded by this site from the phrase quoted beside each verdict: impact on the goal it measures, leakage to people the law does not target, and permanence where the aim is a lasting change. The rows are in criteria.csv and studies.csv.

This site

This site's own evaluation

  • Retirement age (2023 reform) · This site's evaluation

    • Impact: not informed « Descriptive: the employment gap between 60-64 and 55-59 grew by 4.5 points in 2024 and 5.5 points in 2025 against 2019-2022; no counterfactual design separates the reform from other trends. »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
  • Retirement age (2010 reform) · This site's evaluation

    • Impact: no significant effect « France's employment rate at 60-64 was 1.3 points above a synthetic France of European countries that were also raising pension ages, in 2011-2019; a fake start in 2005 finds -1.3. »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable

Searches

When the literature was searched

  • 2026-10-04: every line, for causal evaluations of its measures and rules. Searched: the HAL, Crossref, OpenAlex, PubMed and IDEAS/RePEc catalogues of research and publishers' pages, line by line, and a general web search engine until its allowance ran out; some research departments' sites refused automated access, so a study they publish may have been missed (data/literature/gaps). Found: literature/studies.csv.
  • 2026-10-18: causal evaluations of old-age pension rules and reforms published in 2025-2026, after the search of 4 October 2026: the 2023 reform, the old-age minimum (ASPA), combining work and pension, the retirement age, retirees' living standards. Searched: the HAL API (6 queries, 2025-2026), the OpenAlex API (8 queries, from 2025), the IPP's list of publications (ipp.eu, 6 pages), the Cour des comptes evaluation platform (the page of evaluations.csv row 28); IDEAS/RePEc answered with a bot-traffic notice and no results. Found: nothing new to code: descriptive or case-type studies (Aubert, and Nortier-Ribordy, Économie et statistique 2025; Drees, Études et résultats n° 1369, 2026, on poverty at retirement), a microsimulation (Bozio, Tô and Tréguier 2025) and a 14-country study (Lugova, Belloni and Legendre 2026).

Back to every line of the register

Sources: Eurostat, Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances, Direction de la Sécurité sociale, and the publishers of the studies, each named in its panel.

The page is static HTML and reads in full without JavaScript. The script adds the tooltips, traces a flow through a diagram, opens in place the evidence kept on separate pages, shows and hides the diagrams on a phone, recomputes the wealth calculator, places you on the page that asks where you stand, and keeps the theme you pick: light, dark or high contrast.

Questions, ideas or corrections: open an issue at github.com/samoht/budget/issues. Who makes this site, and the corrections made to it, are on the Method page.

Every data file, with its columns, licence and checksum: the Data page. Every chart, by question: the index of the charts. Every line of the register: the register's index.

The evidence summaries of the register as they are written: Latest updates (Atom feed).

Text and data: Licence Ouverte / Open Licence 2.0, except third-party data, which keep their publishers' terms. Code: ISC. See LICENSE.md.

Version unreleased-ef7a7ba2, built on 2026-11-12 from ef7a7ba2.