Theme

Register of 2024 public money · GF0902

Secondary education

In short. Randomised trials (guidance meetings, boarding places) find gains in grade progression and maths; a study of priority-education zones finds no significant effect on results. Evidence on job entry is limited.

2024

€63.8bn, of public money, line 7 of 155

Strength of evidence

Strong level 4 of 4, on 1 of its 3 goals: Bring as many young people as possible to expected competences and diplomas (6e tests, DNB, EP gap, delay at 3e) · on rules or parts of the line, which have no separate cost

Studies

16 causal studies tied; 11 findings on its goals

Summary

Version 1 · written 19 October 2026 · history

What it is and who gets it

Collèges and lycées, general and vocational: mostly teachers' pay by the State, with the départements (collèges) and regions (lycées) paying for buildings and technical staff.

Goals and the evidence on each

  • Bring as many young people as possible to expected competences and diplomas (6e tests, DNB, EP gap, delay at 3e): Strong, 8 findings
  • Further study or labour-market entry after secondary school: Limited, 2 findings
  • Balanced territorial allocation of means (class-size gap, experienced teachers in EP, replacement of absent teachers): Very limited, 1 finding

What the studies find

Of the 11 findings on its goals: 2 in the goal's direction, 5 mixed, 3 with no significant effect, 1 against it.

What is missing

  • No causal study measures the replacement of absent teachers or the class-size gap between priority and other schools, indicators of the third goal (the goals).
  • No causal study was found of the 2016 collège reform, the 2023 vocational lycée reform or homework help (Devoirs faits) (search of 18 October 2026).

This site's own evaluation (not counted): Priority education (REP/REP+).

How this summary was made

Literature searched on 18 October 2026: causal evaluations of collège and lycée policies (priority education, class size, vocational lycées, guidance, social mixing, homework help) since the search of 4 October 2026, and the IPP's education reports. Searched: HAL API and OpenAlex, 12 queries in French and English on publications from 2025; the IPP site's search; education.gouv.fr (DEPP) refused automated access (403). Strength of evidence rated by the rule on the Method page.

  • Version 1, 19 October 2026, written · by writer: First version. Latest updates

Under the register's two definitions

Broad definition: a causal study in the line

evaluated

At least one causal study is tied to this line, on all of it or on one of its rules; the line then counts in full, so this is an upper bound.

Strict definition: a single measure with its own cost and study

not yet evaluated

A spending category: the register holds no separate cost for the measures inside it, so none of its money counts under this definition.

16 causal studies are tied to this line, the latest from 2026. The share of public money under each definition is on the evaluations page.

Against the Haut-commissariat's perimeters of aid to companies:

  • not placed: the report lists no measure of this line

The perimeters, and the share of each with a causal study

The literature

The studies that touch this line

  • Thomas Piketty and Mathieu Valdenaire (2006). L'impact de la taille des classes sur la réussite scolaire dans les écoles, collèges et lycées français - Estimations à partir du panel primaire 1997 et du panel secondaire 1995. Les Dossiers (DEP, ministère de l'Éducation nationale) - HAL record.

    • Design, as recorded: RDD at class-opening and closing enrolment thresholds
    • Goal measured: All pupils master the core knowledge and skills by the end of primary school
    • Impact: effect « Une réduction d'un élève par classe de la taille de CE1 conduit à une augmentation de 0,7 point du score »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Maxime Fajeau et al. (2025). Efficacité économique de la réduction de la taille des classes. Report (HAL).

    • Design, as recorded: REVIEW: public-spending-efficiency (EDP/MVPF) calculation using parameters from experimental and quasi-experimental studies
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: effect « une forte rentabilité de la politique dans l'enseignement primaire »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Julien Silhol and Lionel Wilner (2022 (WP); 2026 (journal)). Teachers' Desired Mobility to Disadvantaged Schools: Do Financial Incentives Matter?. CESifo Working Paper 9906 (2022); Economics of Education Review 115, 102839 (2026).

    • Design, as recorded: quasi-natural experiment around the 2018 reform; counterfactual simulations
    • Goal measured: Balanced territorial allocation of means (class-size gap and experienced teachers in priority education)
    • Impact: touched « most responsive teachers have less experience and work already in those areas »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
    • a goal only touched, not counted
  • Liliane Bonnal et al. (2002). School-to-work transition: apprenticeship versus vocational school in France. International Journal of Manpower 23(5), pp. 426-442.

    • Design, as recorded: simultaneous maximum likelihood model correcting for selection into apprenticeship
    • Goal measured: Further study or labour-market entry after secondary school
    • Impact: effect « apprentices have a distinct advantage over those who attended vocational school »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Élodie Alet and Liliane Bonnal (2011). Vocational schooling and educational success: comparing apprenticeship to full-time vocational high-school. TSE Working Paper.

    • Design, as recorded: IV: bivariate probit using local apprenticeship share and its interaction with prior achievement
    • Goal measured: Bring as many young people as possible to expected competences and diplomas (6e tests, DNB, EP gap, delay at 3e)
    • Impact: mixed « is not associated with any significant effect on the probability to drop-out, apprenticeship training leads to a higher probability of success at the exam »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Robert J. Gary-Bobo and Mohamed-Badrane Mahjoub (2013). Estimation of Class-Size Effects, Using "Maimonides' Rule" and Other Instruments: the Case of French Junior High Schools. Annals of Economics and Statistics, issue 111-112, pp. 193-225.

    • Design, as recorded: IV: Maimonides-rule RDD at class-opening thresholds and random variation of grade enrolment conditional on school enrolment; simultaneous probit model of grade transitions
    • Goal measured: Bring as many young people as possible to expected competences and diplomas (6e tests, DNB, EP gap, delay at 3e)
    • Impact: mixed « These effects vanish in grades 8 and 9. »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Julien Grenet (2013). Is Extending Compulsory Schooling Alone Enough to Raise Earnings? Evidence from French and British Compulsory Schooling Laws. Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

    • Design, as recorded: RDD by birth cohort
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: no significant effect « the impact of the change to French law was close to zero »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Dominique Goux et al. (2017). Adjusting Your Dreams? High School Plans and Dropout Behaviour. The Economic Journal.

    • Design, as recorded: randomised controlled trial
    • Goal measured: Bring as many young people as possible to expected competences and diplomas (6e tests, DNB, EP gap, delay at 3e)
    • Impact: effect « the intervention reduces grade repetition and dropout by 25% to 40% »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Francesco Avvisati et al. (2014). Getting Parents Involved: A Field Experiment in Deprived Schools. The Review of Economic Studies 81(1), pp. 57-83.

    • Design, as recorded: large-scale randomised controlled experiment
    • Goal measured: Bring as many young people as possible to expected competences and diplomas (6e tests, DNB, EP gap, delay at 3e)
    • Impact: mixed « However, test scores did not improve under the intervention. »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Denis Meuret (1994). L'efficacité de la politique des zones d'éducation prioritaire dans les collèges. Revue française de pédagogie, pp. 41-64.

    • Design, as recorded: value-added comparison ZEP vs non-ZEP controlling for initial chances of success (selection on observables)
    • Goal measured: Bring as many young people as possible to expected competences and diplomas (6e tests, DNB, EP gap, delay at 3e)
    • Impact: adverse « les élèves progressent en ZEP un peu moins qu'ils ne progresseraient ailleurs »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Roland Bénabou et al. (2009). The French zones d'éducation prioritaire: Much ado about nothing?. Economics of Education Review 28(3), pp. 345-356.

    • Design, as recorded: difference-in-differences and IV based on political variables
    • Goal measured: Bring as many young people as possible to expected competences and diplomas (6e tests, DNB, EP gap, delay at 3e)
    • Impact: no significant effect « there is no impact on student success of the ZEP program »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Laurent Davezies and Manon Garrouste (2020). More Harm than Good? Sorting Effects in a Compensatory Education Program. Journal of Human Resources 55(1), pp. 240-277.

    • Design, as recorded: RDD
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: adverse « the program decreases the individual probability of attending a treated school »
    • Leakage: leakage found « symmetrically increases the probability of attending a private school »
    • Permanence: not informed
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Corinne Prost (2013). Teacher Mobility: Can Financial Incentives Help Disadvantaged Schools to Retain Their Teachers?. Annals of Economics and Statistics, issue 111-112, pp. 171-191.

    • Design, as recorded: mobility model on matched teacher-school data exploiting the 1990 ZEP bonus
    • Goal measured: Balanced territorial allocation of means (class-size gap, experienced teachers in EP, replacement of absent teachers)
    • Impact: no significant effect « the incentives driven by bonuses are not sufficient to retain teachers in ZEP schools »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Luc Behaghel et al. (2017). Ready for Boarding? The Effects of a Boarding School for Disadvantaged Students. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 9(1), pp. 140-164.

    • Design, as recorded: randomised allocation of boarding-school seats (lottery)
    • Goal measured: Bring as many young people as possible to expected competences and diplomas (6e tests, DNB, EP gap, delay at 3e)
    • Impact: mixed « this effect mostly comes from strong students »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Pierre Cahuc et al. (2024). L’expérimentation AvenirPro : un levier pour l’insertion professionnelle des élèves de CAP et BacPro. Note IPP n° 109.

    • Design, as recorded: randomised field experiment: lycées drawn by lot within pairs ranked by their leavers' past employment (171 treated and as many controls); the draw of classes could not be carried out, so all pupils of treated and control lycées are compared
    • Goal measured: Further study or labour-market entry after secondary school
    • Impact: mixed « a augmenté de 16% à 23%, soit une hausse d’environ 45%, avec un niveau de confiance de 89,6%. [...] Le nombre d’élèves inscrits dans des études secondaires ou supérieures a baissé de 22% »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Ghazala Azmat et al. (2026). The Impact of Social Mixing at School: Evidence From a French Desegregation Program. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 21363 (2026); HAL halshs-05586531.

    • Design, as recorded: comparison of collèges that increased socioeconomic mixing under the programme with observationally similar collèges that did not, focused on those with the greatest baseline potential for mixing
    • Goal measured: Bring as many young people as possible to expected competences and diplomas (6e tests, DNB, EP gap, delay at 3e)
    • Impact: no significant effect « without negatively affecting the academic outcomes of either group »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed

Each study is coded by this site from the phrase quoted beside each verdict: impact on the goal it measures, leakage to people the law does not target, and permanence where the aim is a lasting change. The rows are in criteria.csv and studies.csv.

This site

This site's own evaluation

  • Priority education (REP/REP+) · This site's evaluation

    • Impact: not informed « The placebo fails: entering collèges were already falling behind before 2015, so the entry design cannot measure the label. »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed « Collèges that left priority education in 2015 moved by -1.5 points of brevet pass rate against those that stayed (95% confidence interval -5.5 to +2.6): the data cannot tell a loss from none. The social position index of their pupils moved by +1.4 points (95% interval -1.0 to +3.7). »

Searches

When the literature was searched

  • 2026-10-04: every line, for causal evaluations of its measures and rules. Searched: the HAL, Crossref, OpenAlex, PubMed and IDEAS/RePEc catalogues of research and publishers' pages, line by line, and a general web search engine until its allowance ran out; some research departments' sites refused automated access, so a study they publish may have been missed (data/literature/gaps). Found: literature/studies.csv.
  • 2026-10-18: causal evaluations of collège and lycée policies (priority education, class size, vocational lycées, guidance, social mixing, homework help) since the search of 4 October 2026, and the IPP's education reports. Searched: HAL API and OpenAlex, 12 queries in French and English on publications from 2025; the IPP site's search; education.gouv.fr (DEPP) refused automated access (403). Found: AvenirPro, Note IPP n° 109 (2024), coded as study 369; Azmat, Grenet, Huillery, Souidi and Algan (2026) on the collège social-mixing programme, coded as study 370; study 177's further studies read in its full text, which are still secondary school.

Back to every line of the register

Sources: Eurostat, Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances, Direction de la Sécurité sociale, and the publishers of the studies, each named in its panel.

The page is static HTML and reads in full without JavaScript. The script adds the tooltips, traces a flow through a diagram, opens in place the evidence kept on separate pages, shows and hides the diagrams on a phone, recomputes the wealth calculator, places you on the page that asks where you stand, and keeps the theme you pick: light, dark or high contrast.

Questions, ideas or corrections: open an issue at github.com/samoht/budget/issues. Who makes this site, and the corrections made to it, are on the Method page.

Every data file, with its columns, licence and checksum: the Data page. Every chart, by question: the index of the charts. Every line of the register: the register's index.

The evidence summaries of the register as they are written: Latest updates (Atom feed).

Text and data: Licence Ouverte / Open Licence 2.0, except third-party data, which keep their publishers' terms. Code: ISC. See LICENSE.md.

Version unreleased-ef7a7ba2, built on 2026-11-12 from ef7a7ba2.