Theme

Register of 2024 public money · GF0401

General economic, commercial and labour affairs

In short. Studies find counselling and hiring aids raised employment, sometimes briefly or at other job seekers' expense; training for job seekers did not speed exits from unemployment, with mixed later gains.

2024

€45.3bn, of public money, line 13 of 155

Strength of evidence

Moderate level 3 of 4, on 1 of its 14 goals: Access and return to employment (P102-1) · on rules or parts of the line, which have no separate cost

Studies

40 causal studies tied; 19 findings on its goals

Summary

Version 1 · written 19 October 2026 · history

What it is and who gets it

The State's labour-market programmes (France Travail, subsidised contracts, insertion through work, youth support, apprenticeship and training aids, short-time work) and its support to firms (loan guarantees, export promotion, tourism), with the regions' economic action.

Goals and the evidence on each

  • Access and return to employment (P102-1): Moderate, 4 findings
  • Efficiency of France Travail services (employment 6 months after prescribed training, satisfaction, vacancies filled) (P102-2): touched only, 6 studies measure something it depends on
  • Use insertion tools for those furthest from work (subsidised contracts, IAE, youth support, disabled workers) (P102-3): Limited, 2 findings
  • Effective control of vocational training providers (P103-1): no causal study found
  • Secure employment by anticipating economic change (EDEC, short-time work, FNE-Formation) (P103-2): Very limited, 1 finding
  • Integration into work through apprenticeship and work-study (contracts signed, employment after the contract) (P103-3): Limited, 2 findings
  • Skills society: training of job seekers, certifying training, positive exits 6 months after training (PIC) (P103-4): Moderate, 5 findings
  • Access to employment for residents of priority neighbourhoods (P103-5): Limited, 4 findings
  • Effectiveness of aid to firms (growth and 3-year survival of aided firms vs comparable firms, leverage of guarantees, electricity prices) (P134-1): Very limited, 1 finding
  • Effective public support for firms' internationalisation (Business France export leverage) (P134-2): no causal study found
  • Fair and secure functioning of markets (payment delays, anti-competitive practices, inspections) (P134-3): no causal study found
  • Develop France's tourist attractiveness (tourism receipts) (P134-4): no causal study found
  • Social and territorial cohesion (access to France Services, FNADT) (P112-1): no causal study found
  • Strengthen strategic and technical capacity of local authorities (engineering support) (P112-2): no causal study found

What the studies find

Of the 19 findings on its goals: 11 in the goal's direction, 7 mixed, 1 with no significant effect, 0 against it.

What is missing

  • No causal study measures the official indicators of France Travail's service, the control of training providers, export support, tourism or territorial cohesion, nor short-time work in 2020-2021 (the goals) (search of 19 October 2026).
  • Of the economy ministry's aid to firms, only Bpifrance's guarantees are studied (Alexandre Gazaniol and Mathilde Lê, 2021); the research tax credit's studies count on its own line, the CICE's, replaced in 2019, on no goal (the goals).

Other official evidence, without a causal design

  • A review without a causal design, of 12,700 million euros of employment support, finds that performance monitoring puts the « qualité de la sortie en emploi à moyen terme » second to the spending of contract budgets (IGF-IGAS, 2024).

This site's own evaluation (not counted): Apprenticeship hiring aid, France Relance industrial grants.

How this summary was made

Literature searched on 19 October 2026: causal evaluations of the State's labour-market programmes and support to firms published since the search of 4 October 2026: France Travail's services and counselling, training of job seekers, the youth employment contract (CEJ), subsidised contracts, insertion through work (IAE), emplois francs, apprenticeship aid, short-time work, the 2020 state-guaranteed loans (PGE), Bpifrance, export support, enterprise zones. Searched: the HAL API (13 queries, 2025-2026), the OpenAlex API (9 queries, then refused for the day), the Crossref API (10 queries), the IPP's list of publications (ipp.eu, 8 pages), the strategie-plan.gouv.fr and cae-eco.fr sites, Persée, the arXiv; the Dares site answered with a captcha, vie-publique.fr with a challenge, SSRN, Wiley and Cairn with 403, HAL's full texts with a bot check, and IDEAS' search returned nothing. Strength of evidence rated by the rule on the Method page.

  • Version 1, 19 October 2026, written · by writer: First version. Latest updates

Under the register's two definitions

Broad definition: a causal study in the line

evaluated

At least one causal study is tied to this line, on all of it or on one of its rules; the line then counts in full, so this is an upper bound.

Strict definition: a single measure with its own cost and study

not yet evaluated

A spending category: the register holds no separate cost for the measures inside it, so none of its money counts under this definition.

40 causal studies are tied to this line, the latest from 2026. The share of public money under each definition is on the evaluations page.

Against the Haut-commissariat's perimeters of aid to companies:

  • perimeter 1, and so perimeter 2 · Dépenses budgétaires directes ciblées sur les entreprises (in part, and the register cannot cost the part). The report names it: « aides à l’emploi des jeunes (aide à l’embauche d’apprentis) », p. 49 (pdf p. 51).

The perimeters, and the share of each with a causal study

The literature

The studies that touch this line

  • Alexandre Gazaniol and Mathilde Lê (2021). The Impact of Public Loan Guarantees on Banks' Risk Taking and Firms' Growth: Evidence from France. Économie & prévision.

    • Design, as recorded: propensity-score matching with difference-in-differences
    • Goal measured: Effectiveness of aid to firms (growth and 3-year survival of aided firms vs comparable firms, leverage of guarantees, electricity prices) (P134-1)
    • Impact: effect « les garanties publiques ont un impact positif sur la survie, l'investissement, le chiffre d'affaires et l'emploi des entreprises »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Emmanuel Duguet (2012). The effect of the incremental R&D tax credit on the private funding of R&D: an econometric evaluation on French firm level data. Revue d'économie politique.

    • Design, as recorded: propensity-score matching (Rubin methodology)
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: effect « the tax credit adds to the private funding of R&D »
    • Leakage: no leakage found « 1 Euro of tax credit would give slightly more than one Euro of total R&D »
    • Permanence: not informed
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Vincent Dortet-Bernadet and Michaël Sicsic (2017). The effect of R&D subsidies and tax incentives on employment: an evaluation for small firms in France. Economie et Statistique / Economics and Statistics.

    • Design, as recorded: matching combined with labour-demand model
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: effect « between 18 and 34% of the supplementary aid obtained by businesses between 2008 and 2010 was used to finance new jobs »
    • Leakage: leakage found « only between 18 and 34% of the supplementary aid obtained by businesses between 2008 and 2010 was used to finance new jobs for highly qualified workers »
    • Permanence: not informed
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Clément Carbonnier et al. (2018). Évaluation interdisciplinaire des impacts du CICE en matière d'emplois et de salaires. LIEPP report for France Stratégie (HAL).

    • Design, as recorded: comparison by intensity of exposure (difference-in-differences) and discontinuity at the CICE wage threshold
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: no significant effect « les entreprises les plus intensément ciblées par le CICE n'ont pas connu de hausse de l'emploi entre 2013 et 2015 »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Rémi Monin and Milena Suarez Castillo (2018). L'effet du CICE sur les prix : une double analyse sur données sectorielles et individuelles. Insee working paper (HAL).

    • Design, as recorded: inter- and intra-sector variation in CICE exposure with factor model controls
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: no significant effect « cet effet déflationniste ne peut être distingué d'une baisse générale des prix dans ces secteurs »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Antoine Bozio et al. (2019). Évaluation d'impact de la réforme 2008 du crédit impôt recherche. IPP report (HAL).

    • Design, as recorded: difference-in-differences: pre-2008 CIR users vs never-users (parallel trends)
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: effect « des effets positifs de la réforme sur les dépenses de R&D de l'ordre de 15 % à 18 % »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Clément Carbonnier et al. (2022). Who benefits from tax incentives? The heterogeneous wage incidence of a tax credit. Journal of Public Economics.

    • Design, as recorded: exposure-based difference-in-differences (firm payroll share below wage threshold) and bunching test
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: not informed
    • Leakage: who ends up with it « Wage gains load on incumbents in high -skill occupations. »
    • Permanence: not informed
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Clément Brébion (2019). Vocational training and industrial relations in France and Germany (PhD thesis, chapter 3). PhD thesis (HAL theses).

    • Design, as recorded: regional variation in subsidy after regionalisation (elasticity of apprentice hiring to training cost)
    • Goal measured: Integration into work through apprenticeship and work-study (contracts signed, employment after the contract) (P103-3)
    • Impact: effect « a limited but significantly negative elasticity of the number of apprentices hired to training costs »
    • Leakage: leakage found « the subsidy fosters turnover strategies »
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Pierre Cahuc et al. (2014). Do Hiring Credits Work in Recessions?. working paper (HAL).

    • Design, as recorded: quasi-experimental eligibility comparison (difference-in-differences)
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: effect « the program has had a strong and rapid impact on employment »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Pierre Cahuc et al. (2019). The Effectiveness of Hiring Credits. Review of Economic Studies.

    • Design, as recorded: quasi-experimental variation in labour cost from eligibility rules (difference-in-differences) plus structural search and matching model
    • Goal measured: Access and return to employment (P102-1)
    • Impact: effect « had significant positive employment effects »
    • Leakage: who ends up with it « no effects on wages »
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Laetitia Challe et al. (2020). Les effets des emplois francs sur les discriminations dans le recrutement : une évaluation par testing répétés. working paper (HAL).

    • Design, as recorded: repeated correspondence tests before and after rollout (three waves), comparing callback gaps by residence and origin
    • Goal measured: Access to employment for residents of priority neighbourhoods (P103-5)
    • Impact: no significant effect « n'a pas coïncidé avec un changement des discriminations dans l'accès à l'emploi »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Bruno Crépon et al. (2005). Counseling the unemployed: does it lower unemployment duration and recurrence?. working paper (HAL).

    • Design, as recorded: duration models (timing-of-events style identification of time-dependent causal effects)
    • Goal measured: Access and return to employment (P102-1)
    • Impact: effect « We find significant favorable effects on both outcomes »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: lasts « the program shifts the incidence of recurrence, one year after employment, from 33 to 26% »
  • Denis Fougère et al. (2009). Does the public employment service affect search effort and outcomes?. European Economic Review.

    • Design, as recorded: structural job search model estimated on unemployment duration data
    • Goal measured: Access and return to employment (P102-1)
    • Impact: effect « the exit rate from unemployment increases with the arrival rate of job contacts obtained by the public employment service »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
    • a simulation, not counted
  • Bruno Crépon et al. (2013). Do Labor Market Policies have Displacement Effects? Evidence from a Clustered Randomized Experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics.

    • Design, as recorded: two-level clustered randomised controlled trial
    • Goal measured: Access and return to employment (P102-1)
    • Impact: effect « were significantly more likely to have found a stable job than those who were not »
    • Leakage: leakage found « they appear to have come partly at the expense of eligible workers who did not benefit from the program »
    • Permanence: fades « But these gains are transitory »
  • Luc Behaghel et al. (2014). Private and public provision of counseling to job seekers: evidence from a large controlled experiment. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics.

    • Design, as recorded: randomised controlled trial (intention-to-treat and per-beneficiary effects)
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: effect « an effect per beneficiary that is twice as large under the public as under the private program »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Roland Rathelot and Patrick Sillard (2008). Zones Franches Urbaines : quels effets sur l'emploi salarié et les créations d'établissements ?. Economie et statistique 415.

    • Design, as recorded: propensity-score matching of ZFU to ZRU control group
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: effect « L'impact du classement en ZFU sur les créations d'établissement et d'emplois s'avère alors significatif et positif. »
    • Leakage: leakage found « résulte pour les deux tiers d'un déplacement d'activités économiques en provenance de zones non ciblées »
    • Permanence: not informed
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Pauline Givord et al. (2012). A Long-Term Evaluation of the First Generation of the French Urban Enterprise Zones. Insee working paper (HAL).

    • Design, as recorded: difference-in-differences with propensity-score subclassification; regression discontinuity design
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: effect « a strong positive impact of the Entreprise Zone policy on employment and business location during the first years of the policy »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: fades « after some years, the early positive results are reduced »
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Thierry Mayer et al. (2012). Les effets de (re)localisation des Zones Franches. LIEPP Policy Brief.

    • Design, as recorded: spatial and time differencing (policy brief of the JEG paper)
    • Goal measured: Access to employment for residents of priority neighbourhoods (P103-5)
    • Impact: mixed « sans grand impact sur l'emploi des résidents »
    • Leakage: leakage found « cet effet est largement dû à des (re)localisations opportunistes de petites entreprises au sein des villes considérées »
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Laurent Gobillon et al. (2012). Do unemployed workers benefit from enterprise zones? The French experience. Journal of Public Economics.

    • Design, as recorded: two-stage: duration model on individual data, then conditional linear matching (difference-in-differences) on aggregate data
    • Goal measured: Access to employment for residents of priority neighbourhoods (P103-5)
    • Impact: effect « It had a small but significant effect on the rate at which unemployed workers find a job »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: fades « This effect is localized and significant only in the short run »
  • Pauline Givord et al. (2013). Place-based tax exemptions and displacement effects: An evaluation of the Zones Franches Urbaines program. Regional Science and Urban Economics.

    • Design, as recorded: selection on observables (conditional independence given known selection covariates), difference-in-differences; spillovers on neighbouring areas
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: mixed « significant effects on business creation and on employment while the effect on firms that were located in the treated areas before the program is not significant »
    • Leakage: leakage found « significant negative spillovers of the program on neighboring areas »
    • Permanence: not informed
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Anthony Briant et al. (2015). Can Tax Breaks Beat Geography? Lessons from the French Enterprise Zone Experience. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy.

    • Design, as recorded: augmented difference-in-differences interacting treatment with spatial isolation indicators
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: mixed « only accessible neighborhoods were able to draw benefits from tax breaks and social exemptions »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Laurent Gobillon and Thierry Magnac (2016). Regional Policy Evaluation: Interactive Fixed Effects and Synthetic Controls. Review of Economics and Statistics.

    • Design, as recorded: interactive fixed effects (Bai) vs difference-in-differences vs synthetic controls
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: not informed
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Thierry Mayer et al. (2017). The impact of Urban Enterprise Zones on establishment location decisions and labor market outcomes: evidence from France. Journal of Economic Geography.

    • Design, as recorded: spatial and time differencing (difference-in-differences within ZFU-hosting municipalities)
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: effect « the policy has a positive effect on employment, especially for low-wage workers »
    • Leakage: leakage found « this positive effect is entirely due to within-municipality diversion effects »
    • Permanence: not informed
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Pauline Givord et al. (2018). A long-term evaluation of the first generation of French urban enterprise zones. Journal of Urban Economics (quote from 2012 Insee WP version).

    • Design, as recorded: difference-in-differences with propensity-score subclassification, and regression discontinuity design
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: effect « a strong positive impact of the Entreprise Zone policy on employment and business location during the first years of the policy »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: fades « but gains faded as closures rose »
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Pauline Charnoz (2018). Do Enterprise Zones Help Residents? Evidence from France. Annals of Economics and Statistics 130.

    • Design, as recorded: programme evaluation (estimator not named in abstract)
    • Goal measured: Access to employment for residents of priority neighbourhoods (P103-5)
    • Impact: effect « the unemployment rate of French EZ residents has decreased significantly as a result of the program »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Pascale Lofredi (2005). Stimulating rural development through tax incentives: an evaluation of France's Zones de revitalisation rurale (ZRR) program. working paper / conference (HAL, INRAE).

    • Design, as recorded: panel fixed-effects and random-growth-rate models (Heckman-Hotz) with comparison group
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: no significant effect « no positive effects were found, apart from a mixed impact on certain particularly targeted sectors »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Luc Behaghel et al. (2015). Replacing churches and mason lodges? Tax exemptions and rural development. Journal of Public Economics.

    • Design, as recorded: regression discontinuity design
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: no significant effect « We find no impact of the program on total employment or the number of businesses »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Jérémy Hervelin and Pierre Villedieu (2022). The Benefits of Early Work Experience for School Dropouts: Evidence from a Field Experiment. working paper (HAL).

    • Design, as recorded: correspondence study (randomised résumé characteristics)
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: effect « the chances to be invited for a job interview are more than doubled »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Bruno Crépon et al. (2012). Training the Unemployed in France: How Does it Affect Unemployment Duration and Recurrence?. Annals of Economics and Statistics.

    • Design, as recorded: timing-of-events duration model
    • Goal measured: Skills society: training of job seekers, certifying training, positive exits 6 months after training (PIC) (P103-4)
    • Impact: mixed « training does not accelerate the exit from unemployment, but has a significant and positive effect on the duration of the subsequent employment spell »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: lasts « a significant and positive effect on the duration of the subsequent employment spell »
  • Bruno Crépon et al. (2018). Information shocks and the empirical evaluation of training programs during unemployment spells. Journal of Applied Econometrics.

    • Design, as recorded: job search model with timing-of-events / random-effects duration models
    • Goal measured: Skills society: training of job seekers, certifying training, positive exits 6 months after training (PIC) (P103-4)
    • Impact: mixed « notification has a strong positive effect on the training probability but a negative one on the probability of leaving unemployment »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Héloïse Burlat (2024). Everybody's got to learn sometime? A causal machine learning evaluation of training programmes for jobseekers in France. Labour Economics.

    • Design, as recorded: selection on observables, Modified Causal Forest (heterogeneous treatment effects)
    • Goal measured: Skills society: training of job seekers, certifying training, positive exits 6 months after training (PIC) (P103-4)
    • Impact: mixed « Only qualifying training shows a positive medium-term effect. »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: mixed « a short-term negative lock-in effect for all programmes, persisting in the medium term for combined training »
  • Kevin Michael Frick et al. (2025). Skill Distance Between Occupations and Post-Training Professional Transitions of Jobseekers. Economie et Statistique / Economics and Statistics.

    • Design, as recorded: comparison of trained vs untrained job seekers' return-to-employment differential, decomposed by occupational skill distance (design details not stated in retrieved abstract)
    • Goal measured: Skills society: training of job seekers, certifying training, positive exits 6 months after training (PIC) (P103-4)
    • Impact: effect « the "return to employment" differential between jobseekers with and without training is driven by a reallocation of workers »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Mathilde Gaini et al. (2018). Résultats de l'évaluation quantitative de la Garantie jeunes. Travail et emploi.

    • Design, as recorded: quasi-experimental territorial staggered rollout (comparison of first-wave territories with others), panel survey
    • Goal measured: Use insertion tools for those furthest from work (subsidised contracts, IAE, youth support, disabled workers) (P102-3)
    • Impact: effect « a eu un effet sur le taux d'emploi des bénéficiaires »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: lasts « effet qui perdure dans les mois qui suivent la sortie de l'accompagnement »
  • Sylvain Chareyron et al. (2022). Can subsidies paid directly to employers reduce residential discrimination in employment? An assessment based on serial field experiments. Urban Studies.

    • Design, as recorded: field experiment: three waves of correspondence tests six months apart
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: effect « the programme decreases residential discrimination after six months »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: fades « we cannot conclude that the effect is still present 12 months later »
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Paul-Emmanuel Chouc et al. (2024). Évaluation du plan « 1 jeune 1 solution ». Rapport IPP n° 51, January 2024, for France Stratégie's committee evaluating France Relance.

    • Design, as recorded: difference in treatment intensity at the 250-employee threshold: firms above it received the aid only if they committed to an insertion-contract target, so they received less on average; 2020 against 2016-2019
    • Goal measured: Integration into work through apprenticeship and work-study (contracts signed, employment after the contract) (P103-3)
    • Impact: effect « l'aide exceptionnelle a bien un impact global positif sur l'embauche d'apprentis »
    • Leakage: no leakage found « nous ne trouvons pas d'effet de substitution avec des personnes en contrat temporaire ou en stage »
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Comité d'évaluation du plan France Relance (chair Xavier Jaravel) (2024). Comité d'évaluation du plan France Relance, rapport final, volume I – Approche macroéconomique. France Stratégie, January 2024.

    • Design, as recorded: REVIEW: the committee's synthesis of the IPP's causal estimate for 2020 (Rapport IPP n° 51), extrapolated to 2021-2022 on the assumption that the 2020 ratio held
    • Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
    • Impact: effect « ont contribué de façon significative à la hausse des embauches en apprentissage »
    • Leakage: who ends up with it « qui concerne principalement des diplômés du supérieur ou du baccalauréat »
    • Permanence: not informed
    • another outcome, not counted
  • Thomas Breda et al. (2025). L'expérimentation « Territoires zéro chômeur de longue durée » : analyse quantitative des entreprises à but d'emploi et de leurs salariés. Rapport IPP n° 59, for the HCSP (call for projects of the TZCLD scientific evaluation committee).

    • Design, as recorded: event study with staggered treatment (Callaway and Sant'Anna) on local firms, communes with an EBE vs similar communes without; worker outcomes WEAK: survey of EBE employees matched with IAE leavers (Dares survey) on observables, selection acknowledged
    • Goal measured: Use insertion tools for those furthest from work (subsidised contracts, IAE, youth support, disabled workers) (P102-3)
    • Impact: touched « déclarent plus fréquemment être satisfaites de leur vie en général comparativement aux sortants de l’IAE »
    • Leakage: no leakage found « les EBE n’ont pas eu d’effet statistiquement significatif sur les autres entreprises locales »
    • Permanence: not informed
    • a goal only touched, not counted
  • Bruno Crépon et al. (2026). Targeting Support Using Job Seekers' Biases: A Randomized Experiment. arXiv 2608.16849 [econ.GN] (August 2026).

    • Design, as recorded: Randomised experiment (n = 52,465) run with France Travail, two message arms against a control; effects by groups of job seekers classified by machine learning from their stated beliefs and search behaviour
    • Goal measured: Access and return to employment (P102-1)
    • Impact: mixed « For individuals with initially low search effort, the intervention raises reemployment probabilities by 2.9 percentage points »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • Coline Louis et al. (2026). Paying for Training to Make Training Pay Off: Evidence From France. Industrial Relations (2026); HAL hal-05540305.

    • Design, as recorded: Synthetic triple-difference estimator in an event-study framework: trainees affected by the allowance rise (no unemployment benefit) against unaffected trainees, before and after May 2021
    • Goal measured: Skills society: training of job seekers, certifying training, positive exits 6 months after training (PIC) (P103-4)
    • Impact: mixed « We find no evidence that the reform increased employment rates within 24 months of training entry, but it did enhance job quality »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: lasts « within 24 months of training entry »
  • Isabelle Benoteau (2015). Quels effets du recrutement en contrat aidé sur la trajectoire professionnelle ? Une évaluation à partir du Panel 2008. Economie et Statistique n° 477, pp. 85-129.

    • Design, as recorded: Matching of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, adapted to the timing of entry into the subsidised contract, on the Dares Panel 2008 survey (selection on observables)
    • Goal measured: Use insertion tools for those furthest from work (subsidised contracts, IAE, youth support, disabled workers) (P102-3)
    • Impact: mixed « joue positivement sur le fait d’être en emploi stable deux ans et demi après l’entrée en contrat aidé, à la différence du passage par un contrat aidé du secteur non marchand »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: lasts « deux ans et demi après l’entrée en contrat aidé »
  • Pierre Cahuc et al. (2021). The Heterogeneous Impact of Short-Time Work: From Saved Jobs to Windfall Effects. IZA Discussion Paper n° 14381 (May 2021); HAL hal-03881632.

    • Design, as recorded: Instrumental variables with firm and year fixed effects: take-up instrumented by the past département-level approval rate of applications, alone and interacted with the leave-one-out growth of sales in the firm's industry and commuting zone (pp. 5, 18); the approval rate is argued exogenous to the firm, not quasi-random
    • Goal measured: Secure employment by anticipating economic change (EDEC, short-time work, FNE-Formation) (P103-2)
    • Impact: effect « short-time work did indeed save jobs and increase hours of work in firms faced with large negative shocks »
    • Leakage: leakage found « large windfall effects which significantly increased the cost of the policy per job saved »
    • Permanence: lasts « These firms have been able to recover rapidly in the aftermath of the Recession thanks to short-time work »

Each study is coded by this site from the phrase quoted beside each verdict: impact on the goal it measures, leakage to people the law does not target, and permanence where the aim is a lasting change. The rows are in criteria.csv and studies.csv.

This site

This site's own evaluation

  • Apprenticeship hiring aid · This site's evaluation

    • Impact: not informed « Descriptive: higher-education contracts fell by 17% (early 2025) and 38% (early 2026) relative to secondary when they lost the aid, while large firms lost it at every level; with the same aid for both, the ratio still fell by 8% in March-December 2025. »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed
  • France Relance industrial grants · This site's evaluation

    • Impact: no significant effect « Among surviving firms, winners' turnover moved by +2.3% against matched firms by 2024 (95% confidence interval -4.7% to +9.4%), operating margin by +1.0 points (-0.3 to +2.4); winners published accounts 7.6 points less often. The CO2 declared by their facilities moved by +3.3% against matched facilities by 2024 (95% interval -7.1% to +13.8%). »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not informed

Searches

When the literature was searched

  • 2026-10-04: every line, for causal evaluations of its measures and rules. Searched: the HAL, Crossref, OpenAlex, PubMed and IDEAS/RePEc catalogues of research and publishers' pages, line by line, and a general web search engine until its allowance ran out; some research departments' sites refused automated access, so a study they publish may have been missed (data/literature/gaps). Found: literature/studies.csv.
  • 2026-10-17: the apprenticeship hiring aid, in the IPP's reports for France Stratégie and the France Relance evaluation committee's. Searched: ipp.eu, the committee's final report (vie-publique.fr). Found: Rapport IPP n° 51 (2024); the committee's final report, volume I (2024).
  • 2026-10-17: the evaluations the IPP made for France Stratégie and the Haut-commissariat. Searched: the IPP's list of its work for the Haut-commissariat (ipp.eu), each report in full. Found: Rapport IPP n° 59 (2025) on Territoires zéro chômeur de longue durée.
  • 2026-10-19: causal evaluations of the State's labour-market programmes and support to firms published since the search of 4 October 2026: France Travail's services and counselling, training of job seekers, the youth employment contract (CEJ), subsidised contracts, insertion through work (IAE), emplois francs, apprenticeship aid, short-time work, the 2020 state-guaranteed loans (PGE), Bpifrance, export support, enterprise zones. Searched: the HAL API (13 queries, 2025-2026), the OpenAlex API (9 queries, then refused for the day), the Crossref API (10 queries), the IPP's list of publications (ipp.eu, 8 pages), the strategie-plan.gouv.fr and cae-eco.fr sites, Persée, the arXiv; the Dares site answered with a captcha, vie-publique.fr with a challenge, SSRN, Wiley and Cairn with 403, HAL's full texts with a bot check, and IDEAS' search returned nothing. Found: three studies coded as rows 376-378 (a France Travail randomised trial, arXiv 2026; the 2021 rise in the training allowance, Industrial Relations 2026; subsidised contracts, Economie et Statistique 2015); not coded: two studies of the PGE with self-selected participants or no magnitude, a youth programme the abstract does not name (Filippucci 2025), a regional distance-training scheme with no conclusion on employment (Rapport IPP n° 56), innovation grants and competitiveness clusters (another line), an e-mail trial on platform take-up; descriptive and qualitative studies.

Back to every line of the register

Sources: Eurostat, Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances, Direction de la Sécurité sociale, and the publishers of the studies, each named in its panel.

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