Register of 2024 public money · GF0108
Transfers of a general character between different levels of government
A category of general government spending, COFOG level 2 (Eurostat). In 2024: .
Broad definition: a causal study in the line
evaluated
At least one causal study is tied to this line, on all of it or on one of its rules; the line then counts in full, so this is an upper bound.
Strict definition: a single measure with its own cost and study
not yet evaluated
A spending category: the register holds no separate cost for the measures inside it, so none of its money counts under this definition.
11 causal studies are tied to this line, the latest from 2026. The share of public money under each definition is on the evaluations page.
Summary to come: this line is number 150 in the order of writing, by 2024 amount, in queue.csv.
Against the Haut-commissariat's perimeters of aid to companies:
- not placed: the report lists no measure of this line
The literature
The studies that touch this line
Benoit de Lapasse and Julien Desclodur (2025). Les trajectoires budgétaires des communes nouvelles : comparaison avec leurs "proches voisines". Insee (conference communication, HAL).
- Design, as recorded: matched comparison group (financial, demographic, geographic criteria), event-time comparison of budget trajectories
- Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
- Impact: not informed
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
- another outcome, not counted
Roberto Brunetti (2026). Municipalities' Voting Power and Housing Supply: Evidence from French Intermunicipal Cooperation. HAL preprint.
- Design, as recorded: instrumental variables (reform-induced change in voting power)
- Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
- Impact: mixed « with no statistically significant change in the total number of permits it issues »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
- another outcome, not counted
Andrew C. Eggers et al. (2018). Regression Discontinuity Designs Based on Population Thresholds: Pitfalls and Solutions. American Journal of Political Science 62(1), 210-229 (online 2017).
- Design, as recorded: regression discontinuity (methodological: compound treatment and sorting)
- Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
- Impact: not informed
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
- another outcome, not counted
Abel François et al. (2025). Legislature Size does Matter for Public Spending: Causal Evidence and Mechanisms at Work. Working paper (HAL).
- Design, as recorded: difference-in-differences (2014 council-size change) and regression discontinuity at population thresholds
- Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
- Impact: effect « the council size is clearly a positive causal factor of municipal public spending »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
- another outcome, not counted
Marie-Laure Breuillé et al. (2018). Inter-municipal cooperation and local taxation. Journal of Urban Economics.
- Design, as recorded: instrumented difference-in-differences
- Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
- Impact: not informed
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
- another outcome, not counted
Touria Jaaidane et al. (2023). Inter-municipal cooperation and public employment: evidence from French municipalities. Annals of Regional Science.
- Design, as recorded: event study; instrumental variables
- Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
- Impact: effect « cooperation triggers personnel downsizing at the municipal level »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
- another outcome, not counted
Clémence Tricaud (2025). Better Alone? Evidence on the Costs of Intermunicipal Cooperation. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics (SSRN WP 2021).
- Design, as recorded: difference-in-differences (forced vs voluntary integrators)
- Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
- Impact: mixed « rural municipalities ended up with fewer local public services »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
- another outcome, not counted
Federica Galli et al. (2026). Is compulsory inter-municipal cooperation an efficiency booster?. Regional Science and Urban Economics.
- Design, as recorded: causal panel evaluation of staggered EPCI integration after efficiency scoring (estimator not named in abstract)
- Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
- Impact: effect « the RCT law increased municipal efficiency by 1.1% to 1.9% »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
- another outcome, not counted
Tidiane Ly and Sonia Paty (2020). Local taxation and tax base mobility: Evidence from France. Regional Science and Urban Economics (quote from 2018 WP).
- Design, as recorded: difference-in-differences
- Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
- Impact: effect « the reduction in the mobility of the tax base indeed results in higher business property tax rates »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
- another outcome, not counted
Touria Jaaidane and Sophie Larribeau (2023). The effects of inter-municipal cooperation and central grant allocation on the size of the French local public sector. European Journal of Political Economy.
- Design, as recorded: panel with an 'original identification strategy' (not detailed in abstract)
- Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
- Impact: effect « cuts in grants lead to cuts in municipalities' public wage bills »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
- another outcome, not counted
- a study of a cut
Touria Jaaidane and Sophie Larribeau (2026). When the money stops: fiscal and political reactions to changing grant eligibility. Public Choice.
- Design, as recorded: staggered difference-in-differences
- Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted
- Impact: not informed
- Leakage: who ends up with it « municipalities substitute grants with local tax revenues »
- Permanence: not informed
- another outcome, not counted
- a study of a cut
Each study is coded by this site from the phrase quoted beside each verdict: impact on the goal it measures, leakage to people the law does not target, and permanence where the aim is a lasting change. The rows are in criteria.csv and studies.csv.
This site
This site's own evaluation
DETR rural investment grant (eligibility cap) · This site's evaluation
- Impact: not informed « At the cap on potentiel financier, eligibility adds €5.3 of DETR per inhabitant in the first year, so the design detects only leverages above about 12. Per euro of DETR, equipment spending rose by 10.3 over one year (95% Anderson-Rubin interval 1.3 to 23.5), 8.0 over two (-0.3 to 17.8) and 6.9 over three (-1.3 to 15.6): every interval holds the State's 3.6, and those over two and three years hold zero. Placebo cutoffs on the eligible side find jumps in equipment spending half as large as those at the cap. »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
DSR, fraction cible (rank 10,000) · This site's evaluation
- Impact: no significant effect « A euro of fraction cible raised the commune's self-financing capacity by 1.36 euros in the first year (95% interval 0.62 to 2.10): it was saved. The intervals exclude more than 0.21 euro of extra operating spending, 0.66 of extra equipment spending and 0.03 of local tax cuts. By the third year equipment spending per euro reaches 0.32 (-0.97 to 1.63), so investing the saved money later is not excluded. »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
DSU (two-thirds rank) · This site's evaluation
- Impact: not informed « At the two-thirds rank the DSU jumps by €5.6 per inhabitant, too little against town budgets: per euro, equipment spending moved by 0.53 in the first year (95% interval -10.6 to 10.3), and operating spending, borrowing and debt have intervals as wide. »
- Leakage: not informed
- Permanence: not informed
Searches
When the literature was searched
- 2026-10-04: every line, for causal evaluations of its measures and rules. Searched: the HAL, Crossref, OpenAlex, PubMed and IDEAS/RePEc catalogues of research and publishers' pages, line by line, and a general web search engine until its allowance ran out; some research departments' sites refused automated access, so a study they publish may have been missed (data/literature/gaps). Found: literature/studies.csv.