Theme

Register of 2024 public money · GF1006

Housing

A category of general government spending, COFOG level 2 (Eurostat). In 2024: .

Broad definition: a causal study in the line

evaluated

At least one causal study is tied to this line, on all of it or on one of its rules; the line then counts in full, so this is an upper bound.

Strict definition: a single measure with its own cost and study

not yet evaluated

A spending category: the register holds no separate cost for the measures inside it, so none of its money counts under this definition.

7 causal studies are tied to this line, the latest from 2014. The share of public money under each definition is on the evaluations page.

Summary to come: this line is number 22 in the order of writing, by 2024 amount, in queue.csv.

Against the Haut-commissariat's perimeters of aid to companies:

  • not placed: the report lists no measure of this line

The perimeters, and the share of each with a causal study

The literature

The studies that touch this line

  • Anne Laferrère and David Le Blanc (2002). Comment les aides au logement affectent-elles les loyers ?. Economie et Statistique 351:3-30.

    • Design, as recorded: Natural experiment around the 1992-1994 bouclage: rent growth of aided vs non-aided dwellings, quality-adjusted rents, and panel analysis of rent growth on transition to aided status
    • Goal measured: Meet housing needs: decent, good-quality, independent housing and access to it (law)
    • Impact: effect « Grâce à l'aide, les ménages ont pu se loger mieux »
    • Leakage: leakage found « Il y a donc eu aussi augmentation pure de loyer »
    • Permanence: not applicable
  • Gabrielle Fack (2005). Pourquoi les ménages pauvres paient-ils des loyers de plus en plus élevés ?. Economie et Statistique 381-382.

    • Design, as recorded: Difference-in-differences: low-income households made eligible by the early-1990s extension versus households not affected by the reform
    • Goal measured: Help modest households meet housing costs (net housing-cost burden) (P109-1; law: take charge of part of housing expenses)
    • Impact: mixed « entre 50 % et 80 % des allocations logement perçues par ces ménages auraient été absorbées par les augmentations de leurs loyers »
    • Leakage: leakage found « entre 50 % et 80 % des allocations logement perçues par ces ménages auraient été absorbées par les augmentations de leurs loyers »
    • Permanence: not applicable
  • Gabrielle Fack (2006). Are housing benefit an effective way to redistribute income? Evidence from a natural experiment in France. Labour Economics 13(6):747-771.

    • Design, as recorded: Natural experiment: a French housing benefit reform that extended eligibility, comparing newly eligible claimants with unaffected households (difference-in-differences; reform identified in the author's companion 2005 paper as the early-1990s extension)
    • Goal measured: Meet housing needs: decent, good-quality, independent housing and access to it (law)
    • Impact: effect « students who used the benefit to become independent »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
  • Anne Laferrère and David Le Blanc (2004). Gone with the Windfall: How Do Housing Allowances Affect Student Co-residence?. CESifo Economic Studies 50(3):451-477.

    • Design, as recorded: Before/after comparison across five cross-sections of the French Housing Survey around the 1991-1993 extension to students, plus a model identifying the windfall share
    • Goal measured: Meet housing needs: decent, good-quality, independent housing and access to it (law)
    • Impact: effect « housing allowances provide an increased opportunity for students to move out of their parents' home »
    • Leakage: leakage found « as much as half of the allowance came as a windfall gai to students and their parents »
    • Permanence: not applicable
  • Céline Grislain-Letrémy and Corentin Trevien (2014). The Impact of Housing Subsidies on the Rental Sector: the French Example. Insee Working Paper (Documents de travail) G2014/08.

    • Design, as recorded: Instrumental variables based on a spatial discontinuity in the subsidy scheme
    • Goal measured: Meet housing needs: decent, good-quality, independent housing and access to it (law)
    • Impact: no significant effect « higher subsidies seem to have almost no effect on housing quality and to have no impact on the number of offered rental dwellings »
    • Leakage: leakage found « housing subsidies had an inflationist impact »
    • Permanence: not applicable
  • Gabrielle Fack (2006). Are housing benefit an effective way to redistribute income? Evidence from a natural experiment in France. Labour Economics 13(6), 747-771.

    • Design, as recorded: natural experiment (housing benefit reform)
    • Goal measured: Help modest households meet housing costs (net housing-cost burden) (P109-1; law: take charge of part of housing expenses)
    • Impact: mixed « leaving only 22 cents available to reduce their net rent and increase their consumption »
    • Leakage: leakage found « one additional euro of housing benefit leads to an increase of 78 cents in the rent paid by new benefit claimants »
    • Permanence: not applicable
  • Céline Grislain-Letrémy and Corentin Trevien (2014). The Impact of Housing Subsidies on the Rental Sector. Insee working paper (HAL Insee).

    • Design, as recorded: instrumental variables based on a spatial discontinuity in the subsidy scheme
    • Goal measured: Help modest households meet housing costs (net housing-cost burden) (P109-1; law: take charge of part of housing expenses)
    • Impact: touched « housing subsidies had an inflationist impact »
    • Leakage: not informed
    • Permanence: not applicable
    • a goal only touched, not counted

Each study is coded by this site from the phrase quoted beside each verdict: impact on the goal it measures, leakage to people the law does not target, and permanence where the aim is a lasting change. The rows are in criteria.csv and studies.csv.

Searches

When the literature was searched

  • 2026-10-04: every line, for causal evaluations of its measures and rules. Searched: the HAL, Crossref, OpenAlex, PubMed and IDEAS/RePEc catalogues of research and publishers' pages, line by line, and a general web search engine until its allowance ran out; some research departments' sites refused automated access, so a study they publish may have been missed (data/literature/gaps). Found: literature/studies.csv.

Back to every line of the register

Sources: Eurostat, Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances, Direction de la Sécurité sociale, and the publishers of the studies, each named in its panel.

The page is static HTML and reads in full without JavaScript. The script adds the tooltips, traces a flow through a diagram, opens in place the evidence kept on separate pages, shows and hides the diagrams on a phone, recomputes the wealth calculator, places you on the page that asks where you stand, and keeps the theme you pick: light, dark or high contrast.

Questions, ideas or corrections: open an issue at github.com/samoht/budget/issues. Who makes this site, and the corrections made to it, are on the Method page.

Every data file, with its columns, licence and checksum: the Data page. Every chart, by question: the index of the charts. Every line of the register: the register's index.

The evidence summaries of the register as they are written: Latest updates (Atom feed).

Text and data: Licence Ouverte / Open Licence 2.0, except third-party data, which keep their publishers' terms. Code: ISC. See LICENSE.md.

Version unreleased-ef7a7ba2, built on 2026-11-12 from ef7a7ba2.