Official figures and this site's calculations

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Figures of one view and year of the diagram, with their sources and how they were computed, each under its own anchor. Back to Does it work?.

Impact, leakage, permanence

Crédit d'impôt en faveur de la recherche

Antoine Bozio et al. (2019)Évaluation d'impact de la réforme 2008 du crédit impôt rechercheGoal measured: « Augmenter les dépenses de recherche ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « nous obtenons des effets positifs de la réforme sur les dépenses de R&D de l'ordre de 15 % à 18 % »
Vincent Dortet-Bernadet and Michaël Sicsic (2017)L'effet des aides à la R&D sur l'emploi : une évaluation pour les petites entreprises en France / The effect of R&D subsidies and tax incentives on employment: an evaluation for small firms in FranceGoal measured: « Augmenter les dépenses de recherche ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « Public R&D support raised R&D employment in small firms »Leakage: leakage found. « s'accompagne d'un effet d'aubaine significatif : selon nos estimations, seulement entre 18 et 34 % du supplément d'aides obtenu par les entreprises entre 2008 et 2010 aurait servi à financer de nouveaux emplois hautement qualifiés »
Marianna Marino et al. (2016)Additionality or crowding-out? An overall evaluation of public R&D subsidy on private R&D expenditureGoal measured: « Augmenter les dépenses de recherche ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « We find evidence of either no additionality or substitution effects between public and private R&D expenditure. »Leakage: leakage found. « Crowding-out effects appear to be more pronounced for medium-high levels of public subsidies, and generally under the R&D tax credit regime. »
Emmanuel Duguet (2012)The effect of the incremental R&D tax credit on the private funding of R&D: an econometric evaluation on French firm level dataGoal measured: « Augmenter les dépenses de recherche ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « the tax credit adds to the private funding of R&D »Leakage: no leakage found. « 1 Euro of tax credit would give slightly more than one Euro of total R&D »
Benoît Mulkay and Jacques Mairesse (2013)The R&D tax credit in France: assessment and ex ante evaluation of the 2008 reformGoal measured: « Augmenter les dépenses de recherche ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Design: a structural or calibrated model's simulation, not a measured effect; not counted. Impact: effect. « obtaining a preferred estimate of -0.4 for the long run elasticity of the user cost of R&D capital »Leakage: leakage found. « the implicit long run budget multiplier would be about 0.7 »
Laurent Bach et al. (2021)Les impacts du crédit impôt recherche sur la performance économique des entreprises (IPP report); Évaluation du crédit d'impôt recherche, Avis de la CNEPI 2021Goal measured: « Augmenter les dépenses de recherche ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « l'étude n'identifie pas d'effet positif significatif des créances du CIR dont elles ont bénéficié en matière de R & D, d'innovation et d'investissement »
Antoine Bozio et al. (2015)Impact of Research Tax Credit on R&D and Innovation: Evidence from the 2008 French ReformGoal measured: « Augmenter les dépenses de recherche ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « a positive effect of the 2008 reform on R&D at both the intensive margin and extensive margin »
This site: Research tax credit (CIR)Research tax credit (CIR)Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « France's business R&D was 2.6% above its synthetic counterpart in 2008-2012, where one euro of R&D per euro of credit would give 12.2%; ranked among the donor countries, neither zero nor one euro per euro can be rejected (one-for-one p = 15%, the smallest possible being 8%). Researchers per thousand in employment were 9.4% above the synthetic in 2008-2012, ranked first of 10 units (p = 0.10, the smallest possible). »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Crédit d'impôt au titre de l'emploi d'un salarié à domicile

Claire Marbot and Delphine Roy (2011)Services à domicile : quel effet des incitations fiscales ?Goal measured: « Développer les emplois de service à la personne ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « La mise en place de la réduction d'impôt aurait suscité la création de 12 000 à 43 000 emplois en équivalent temps plein »
Claire Marbot and Delphine Roy (2011)Services à domicile : quel effet des incitations fiscales ? (2007 conversion into a tax credit)Goal measured: « Développer les emplois de service à la personne ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « la mesure aurait suscité la création de 4 000 à 14 000 emplois »
Claire Marbot (2011)Une évaluation de la réduction d'impôt pour l'emploi de salariés à domicile / An Evaluation of the French Tax Reduction for In-Home ServicesGoal measured: « Développer les emplois de service à la personne ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « la mise en place de la réduction d'impôt a eu un effet significativement positif, de l'ordre de 1,3 à 4,9 points de pourcentage »
Clément Carbonnier (2009)Réduction et crédit d'impôt pour l'emploi d'un salarié à domicile, conséquences incitatives et redistributivesGoal measured: « Développer les emplois de service à la personne ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « La réaction de la demande est bien significative, mais de faible ampleur. »
Anne Flipo et al. (2007)Is the household demand for in-home services sensitive to tax reductions? The French caseGoal measured: « Développer les emplois de service à la personne ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Design: a structural or calibrated model's simulation, not a measured effect; not counted. Impact: effect. « A ten per cent increase in the tax reduction would increase from 45.9 to 50.8 per cent the proportion of households benefiting from the tax reduction »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Crédits d'impôt "Prêt à taux zéro" et "Prêt à taux zéro renforcé PTZ+"

Laurent Gobillon and David le Blanc (2008)Economic effects of upfront subsidies to ownership: The case of the Prêt à Taux Zéro in FranceGoal measured: « Aider à l'acquisition de son logement ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Design: a structural or calibrated model's simulation, not a measured effect; not counted. Impact: effect. « the PTZ significantly increases access to ownership by allowing some households to leave the rental sector sooner »Leakage: leakage found. « 85% of the beneficiaries in a 4-year period would still have moved to own in the absence of the subsidy »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Crédit d'impôt en faveur de l'innovation

Simon Bunel and Benjamin Hadjibeyli (2021)Évaluation du crédit d'impôt innovation / An Evaluation of the Innovation Tax CreditGoal measured: « Augmenter les dépenses de recherche et d'innovation ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « il est mis en évidence une hausse de l'emploi plus importante à court terme chez les entreprises bénéficiaires du dispositif »Leakage: leakage found. « l'introduction du CII s'est accompagnée d'une baisse des dépenses de recherche déclarées dans le cadre du CIR »

Impact, leakage, permanence

General contribution reductions

Antoine Bozio et al. (2022)Évaluation d'impact de la bascule du Crédit d'impôt pour la compétitivité et l'emploi (CICE) en allègement de cotisations employeurGoal measured: « soutenir l'emploi en réduisant le salaire superbrut des salariés ». Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: no significant effect. « aucun effet n'est détecté sur les variables d'emploi, ni de valeur ajoutée, de chiffre d'affaires ou d'investissements, pour les années 2019 et 2020 »
Antoine Bozio and Étienne Wasmer (2024)Les politiques d'exonérations de cotisations sociales : une inflexion nécessaire (rapport final)Goal measured: « soutenir l'emploi en réduisant le salaire superbrut des salariés ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « La politique de réduction des cotisations employeur sur les bas salaires a eu un impact significatif sur l'emploi lors de sa mise en place dans les années 1990. »
Bruno Crépon and Rozenn Desplatz (2001)Une nouvelle évaluation des effets des allègements de charges sociales sur les bas salairesGoal measured: « soutenir l'emploi en réduisant le salaire superbrut des salariés ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « 460 000 emplois auraient été ainsi créés ou sauvegardés dans l'économie, entre 1994 et 1997 »
Francis Kramarz and Thomas Philippon (2001)The impact of differential payroll tax subsidies on minimum wage employmentGoal measured: « soutenir l'emploi en réduisant le salaire superbrut des salariés ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « Tax subsidies have a small and insignificant impact on entry. »
Mathieu Bunel and Yannick L'Horty (2012)The Effects of Reduced Social Security Contributions on Employment: an Evaluation of the 2003 French ReformGoal measured: « soutenir l'emploi en réduisant le salaire superbrut des salariés ». Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: mixed. « Ultimately, the Fillon reform has had no clear effect on aggregate employment »
Sophie Cottet (2020)Payroll Tax Reductions for Minimum Wage Workers: Relative Labor Cost or Cash Windfall Effects?Goal measured: « soutenir l'emploi en réduisant le salaire superbrut des salariés ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « the number of minimum-wage jobs increases »Leakage: leakage found. « and thus benefit ex ante from a cash windfall »
Yannick L'Horty et al. (2019)Baisses de charges : stop ou encore ?Goal measured: « soutenir l'emploi en réduisant le salaire superbrut des salariés ». Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: mixed. « ont peu d'effets positifs sur les exportations »
Thomas Breda et al. (2024)Equilibrium effects of payroll tax reductions and optimal policy designGoal measured: « soutenir l'emploi en réduisant le salaire superbrut des salariés ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Design: a structural or calibrated model's simulation, not a measured effect; not counted. Impact: effect. « leads to an overall improvement in economic efficiency by increasing employment »Leakage: leakage found. « with minor negative congestion spillovers »
Julien Albertini et al. (2025)Payroll Tax Reductions on Low Wages and Minimum Wage in FranceGoal measured: « soutenir l'emploi en réduisant le salaire superbrut des salariés ». Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Design: a structural or calibrated model's simulation, not a measured effect; not counted. Impact: effect. « reducing payroll tax cuts for low wages would result in declines in both employment and fiscal surplus »
Pierre Cahuc et al. (2019)The Effectiveness of Hiring CreditsGoal measured: « soutenir l'emploi en réduisant le salaire superbrut des salariés ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « the program has had a strong and rapid impact on employment »
Romain Aeberhardt and David Sraer (2009)Allègements de cotisations patronales et dynamique salarialeGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « low-wage growth for the categories covered by our study did not lose momentum after the introduction of contribution relief »
Richard Duhautois and Fabrice Gilles (2013)Payroll tax reductions and job flows in FranceGoal measured: « soutenir l'emploi en réduisant le salaire superbrut des salariés ». Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: no significant effect. « our estimates show that PTR let job flows unchanged »
Bruno Crépon et al. (2004)RTT, productivité et emploi : nouvelles estimations sur données d'entreprisesGoal measured: « soutenir l'emploi en réduisant le salaire superbrut des salariés ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « employment in these firms is found to have risen 9.9% compared with the firms that remained on a 39-hour week »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Other targeted exemptions

Simon Quantin et al. (2021)Évaluation du dispositif Jeune entreprise innovante (JEI). Un exemple d'application du modèle d'analyse de sensibilité de RosenbaumGoal measured: « Augmenter les dépenses de recherche (jeunes entreprises) ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « un effet du recours au dispositif JEI sur l'emploi salarié total et dédié à la R&D »Leakage: who ends up with it. « qui ne s'accompagne pas d'un effet sur la rémunération versée aux salariés »
Vincent Dortet-Bernadet and Michaël Sicsic (2017)L'effet des aides à la R&D sur l'emploi : une évaluation pour les petites entreprises en FranceGoal measured: « Augmenter les dépenses de recherche (jeunes entreprises) ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « l'effet du soutien public sur l'emploi consacré aux activités de R&D est positif et croissant entre 2004 et 2010 »Permanence: lasts. « positif et croissant entre 2004 et 2010 »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Overseas exemptions (LODEOM)

Inspection générale des affaires sociales (IGAS) with IGF (2025)Évaluation des mesures d'exonération de cotisations sociales spécifiques aux outre-merGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: no significant effect. « des effets limités sur l'emploi, les salaires et la rentabilité »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Exonération partielle, sous certaines conditions, de droits de mutation à titre gratuit lors de la transmission d'entreprises exploitées sous la forme individuelle ou détenues sous forme sociale

Laurent Bach et al. (2025)L'impact économique des transmissions d'entreprises réalisées avec un pacte Dutreil (IPP); results reported in Cour des comptes, Le Pacte Dutreil : un dispositif fiscal en forte croissance à mieux ciblerGoal measured: « Favoriser les reprises d'entreprises ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « L'effet légèrement positif du pacte Dutreil sur la pérennité des entreprises ne se traduit donc pas par une hausse de l'investissement et de l'emploi. »
Cour des comptes (with IPP) (2025)Le Pacte Dutreil : un dispositif fiscal en forte croissance à mieux ciblerGoal measured: « Favoriser les reprises d'entreprises ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « Le pacte Dutreil est donc, comme il est attendu, favorable à la pérennité du contrôle familial et à la stabilité de l'actionnariat. »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Exonération des sommes versées au titre de la participation, de l'intéressement, de l'abondement, d'un partage de plus-value, des primes de partage de la valeur, d’un plan de partage de la valorisation de l’entreprise, aux plans d'épargne salariale et aux plans d'épargne retraite d'entreprise collectifs ou obligatoires

Noélie Delahaie and Richard Duhautois (2019)Profit-Sharing and Wages: An Empirical Analysis Using French Data between 2000 and 2007Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Leakage: leakage found. « changes in the base wage over this period are lower among firms that have had profit‐sharing for a number of years »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Taux de 10 % pour les travaux d’amélioration, de transformation, d’aménagement et d’entretien, autres que les travaux de rénovation énergétiques soumis au taux de 5,5 % en application de l’article 278-0 bis A, portant sur les logements achevés depuis plus de deux ans

Clément Carbonnier (2007)Who pays sales taxes? Evidence from French VAT reforms, 1987-1999Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Leakage: who ends up with it. « 77% in the housing repair services market »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Exonération de l’impôt sur le revenu, sous certaines conditions et limites, des rémunérations versées à raison des heures supplémentaires et complémentaires réalisées à compter du 1er janvier 2019

Pierre Cahuc and Stéphane Carcillo (2014)The Detaxation of Overtime Hours: Lessons from the French ExperimentGoal measured: « Favoriser le recours aux heures supplémentaires ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « this reform has had no significant impact on hours worked »Leakage: leakage found. « it has had a positive impact on the overtime hours declared by highly qualified wage earners, who have opportunities to manipulate the overtime hours they declare »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Taux de 10% pour la restauration commerciale (consommation sur place et vente à emporter en vue d'une consommation immédiate)

Youssef Benzarti and Dorian Carloni (2019)Who Really Benefits from Consumption Tax Cuts? Evidence from a Large VAT Reform in FranceGoal measured: « Favoriser l'emploi dans le secteur de la restauration ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Leakage: leakage found. « the reform mostly benefited owners of sit-down restaurants, who pocketed 41 percent of the tax cut »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Réduction d'impôt au titre des dons

Gabrielle Fack and Camille Landais (2010)Are Tax Incentives for Charitable Giving Efficient? Evidence from FranceGoal measured: « Aider les associations d'intérêt général ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « the price elasticity of contributions is relatively small, but tends to increase with the level of gifts »
Gabrielle Fack and Camille Landais (2016)The effect of tax enforcement on tax elasticities: Evidence from charitable contributions in FranceGoal measured: « Aider les associations d'intérêt général ». Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: effect. « the reform was also associated with a substantial decline in the absolute value of the elasticity of reported contributions »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Réductions d'impôt sur le revenu en faveur de l'investissement locatif intermédiaire (dispositifs Duflot et Pinel)

Guillaume Chapelle et al. (2018)Impact of a Housing Tax Credit on Local Housing Markets: Evidence from FranceGoal measured: « Augmenter l'offre de logements locatifs ». Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: no significant effect. « without reducing the production of new housing units »Leakage: leakage found. « the removal of these tax credits decelerated house prices »
Pierre-Henri Bono and Alain Trannoy (2019)The Impact of the 'Scellier' Income Tax Relief on Building Land Prices in FranceGoal measured: « Augmenter l'offre de logements locatifs ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Leakage: leakage found. « point to land price capitalisation »
This site: Pinel and the A/B/C housing zoningPinel and the A/B/C housing zoningReform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « The 1,090 communes moved up the zoning in 2023-2025 authorised +0.03 more flats per 1,000 inhabitants a year after their move (95% interval -0.62 to +0.72), which excludes a rise of more than 21% of their usual rate; permits answer with a lag and Sitadel's 2023-2025 counts are provisional. »Permanence: no loss when removed. « Closing Pinel to the 3,776 B2 communes in 2018, with the cut in their new-build PTZ, moved their flats authorised by +0.35 per 1,000 inhabitants a year against B1 communes (95% interval -0.61 to +1.38), which excludes a fall larger than half their usual rate; the estimators that show a fall show as large a one where no rule changed. Diluted by the B2 communes where Pinel never applied. »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Exonération d’impôt sur les bénéfices pour les entreprises créées ou reprises dans les ZRR

Luc Behaghel et al. (2015)Replacing churches and mason lodges? Tax exemptions and rural developmentGoal measured: « Aider certains espaces géographiques (espaces ruraux) ». Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « We find no impact of the program on employment and wages »
This site: ZRR rural tax zoneZRR rural tax zoneReform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « Entrants' private jobs moved by -7.4% against matched communes by 2025 (95% confidence interval -14.5% to -0.4%), employers by -3.9%: no gain, and falls at the edge of significance, of the order of the drift between the pairs before 2016. On the aims its classification names: population moved by -1.4% between the 2015 and 2021 censuses (95% interval -2.3% to -0.5%), the labour force by -1.9% (-3.2% to -0.7%) and net migration by -11.1 per 1,000 inhabitants (-20.6 to -1.6), but unclassified neighbours moved alike, which points to the area rather than the zone. »Leakage: no leakage found. « Unclassified neighbours within 10 km moved by +2.2% in jobs against far communes (95% confidence interval -3.1% to +7.5%): no displacement can be distinguished from zero. »Permanence: no loss when removed. « Communes that left the zone in 2017 moved by +2.8% in jobs against those that stayed (95% confidence interval -2.0% to +7.7%): a loss of more than 2% is excluded. »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Old age

Montserrat Botey (2026)Pension Reform and Indebtedness in Retirement: Consumption Smoothing or Credit Expansion? Evidence from FranceGoal measured: Adequate living standard for retirees and solidarity among them (pensions in line with earnings, purchasing power, poverty). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: adverse. « La réforme Balladur augmente principalement l'endettement des retraités les moins diplômés et financièrement vulnérables »
Antoine Bozio et al. (2021)Impact of later retirement on mortality: Evidence from FranceGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: no significant effect. « has no significant impact on the probability to die »
Hélène Blake and Clémentine Garrouste (2019)Collateral Effects of a Pension Reform in FranceGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: adverse. « a negative effect of the 1993 reform on perceived and physical health »
Elsa Perdrix (2022)Does later retirement change your healthcare consumption? Evidence from FranceGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a cut, less money against more.
Christophe Daniel et al. (2018)Durée d'assurance et équivalent patrimonial des droits à retraite : l'impact de la réforme de 1993Goal measured: Adequate living standard for retirees and solidarity among them (pensions in line with earnings, purchasing power, poverty). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: adverse. « reporter son départ en retraite réduit l'EPDR moyen d'environ 20% »
Antoine Bozio (2006)Réformes des retraites : estimations sur données françaisesGoal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: mixed. « a one-quarter increase in the contribution period led to an average increase of one and a half months in the length of careers »
Antoine Bozio (2011)La réforme des retraites de 1993 : l'impact de l'augmentation de la durée d'assuranceGoal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: effect. « un report de neuf mois pour toute année supplémentaire d'assurance requise »
Julie Tréguier (2021)Départ à la retraite : femmes et hommes prennent-ils les mêmes décisions ?Goal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: effect. « Les hommes sont plus sensibles aux incitations financières et décalent davantage leur âge de départ »
Denis Fougère and Pierre Gouëdard (2021)The effects of financial incentives and disincentives on teachers' retirement decisions: Evidence from the 2003 French pension reformGoal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Design: a structural or calibrated model's simulation, not a measured effect; not counted. Impact: effect. « the reform has progressively increased the average retirement age up to 61 »
Manuella Baraton et al. (2011)Une évaluation de l'effet de la réforme de 2003 sur les départs en retraite. Le cas des enseignants du second degré publicGoal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: effect. « la réforme a bien eu un impact sur la probabilité de partir après 60 ans »
Sarah Le Duigou et al. (2020)Financial incentives to postpone retirement: Estimating the impacts of the 2003 French pension reform on the employment and wages of older workers by using a lifetime job search modelGoal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Design: a structural or calibrated model's simulation, not a measured effect; not counted. Impact: mixed. « attenuate the impacts of financial incentives that cause wage increases and few new jobs »
Samia Benallah (2011)Comportements de départ en retraite et réforme de 2003 : les effets de la surcoteGoal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « un report de deux mois de l'âge de liquidation des droits à la retraite »
Kadija Charni (2019)Do the French pension reforms increase re-employment of older unemployed workers?Goal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: mixed. « the 2003 pension reform reduces significantly the exit to employment »
Patrick Aubert et al. (2025)Impact de la réforme des retraites de 2010 sur l'équilibre financier de l'assurance chômageGoal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: effect. « la réforme a accru l'emploi entre 60 et 62 ans »Leakage: leakage found. « une hausse du chômage indemnisé entre 60 et 62 ans »
Denis Fougère et al. (2021)Slow Down Before You Stop: The Effect of the 2010 French Pension Reform on Older Teachers' Sick LeavesGoal measured: Financial balance of the pension system (medium and long term), contributions shared fairly, full employment. Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Leakage: leakage found. « teachers affected by the reform have an increased probability to take short sick leaves before retirement »
Eve Caroli et al. (2023)The Health-Consumption Effects of Increasing Retirement Age Late in the GameGoal measured: Financial balance of the pension system (medium and long term), contributions shared fairly, full employment. Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Leakage: leakage found. « it increases health expenditures »
Yves Dubois and Malik Koubi (2017)La réforme des retraites de 2010 : quel impact sur l'activité des seniors ?Goal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: effect. « serait entre 19 et 22 points plus élevé que celui des salariés non impactés »Leakage: leakage found. « mais également par un accroissement du chômage »
Mohamed Ali Ben Halima et al. (2022)L'effet de la réforme des retraites de 2010 sur l'absence maladieGoal measured: Financial balance of the pension system (medium and long term), contributions shared fairly, full employment. Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Leakage: leakage found. « une augmentation de la probabilité d'avoir au moins un arrêt maladie (+1,7 point de pourcentage) »
Simon Rabaté and Julie Rochut (2019)Employment and substitution effects of raising the statutory retirement age in FranceGoal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: effect. « despite a sizable effect on the employment rate »Leakage: leakage found. « around one fifth in the decrease in public spending is offset by increasing expenses in other public insurance schemes »
Jean-Olivier Hairault et al. (2010)Distance to Retirement and The Job Search of Older Workers: The Case For Delaying Retirement AgeGoal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: effect. « the likelihood of employment is significantly affected by the distance from retirement »
Jean-Olivier Hairault et al. (2009)Le faible taux d'emploi des seniors : distance à l'entrée dans la vie active ou distance à la retraite ?Goal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: effect. « the negative effect of proximity to retirement on older workers' employment is confirmed »
Elena Stancanelli and Arthur van Soest (2012)Retirement and Home Production: A Regression Discontinuity ApproachGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged.
Nicolas Moreau and Elena Stancanelli (2015)Household Consumption at Retirement: A Regression Discontinuity Study on French DataGoal measured: Adequate living standard for retirees and solidarity among them (pensions in line with earnings, purchasing power, poverty). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: mixed. « We find a significant and sizable drop in food and clothes expenditure upon retirement of the male partner. However, the drop in food expenditure is not robust »
Elena Stancanelli (2012)Spouses' Retirement and Hours of Work Outcomes: Evidence from Twofold Regression DiscontinuityGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged.
Elena Stancanelli and Arthur van Soest (2012)Joint Leisure Before and After Retirement: a double Regression Discontinuity ApproachGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged.
Elena Stancanelli (2017)Couples' Retirement under Individual Pension Design: a Regression Discontinuity Study for FranceGoal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: effect. « We find a significant drop in each spouse's probability of retirement. »
Nicolas Moreau and Elena Stancanelli (2022)L'effet du passage à la retraite sur l'emploi du temps des retraitésGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged.
Luc Behaghel et al. (2014)Retirement, Early Retirement and Disability: Explaining Labor Force Participation after 55 in FranceGoal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Design: a structural or calibrated model's simulation, not a measured effect; not counted. Impact: effect. « a decrease in the generosity of the pension and DI schemes induces people to stay longer in the labor market »
Simon Rabaté (2019)Can I stay or should I go? Mandatory retirement and the labor-force participation of older workersGoal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: effect. « exit rates from employment are estimated to be 6% higher when mandatory retirement is possible »
Sarah Le Duigou and Pierre-Jean Messe (2024)The influence of unemployment insurance rules on employment effects of pension reformsGoal measured: Lengthen working lives and raise employment of older workers (effective retirement age, contribution length, 55-64 employment rate). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Design: a structural or calibrated model's simulation, not a measured effect; not counted. Impact: effect. « combining an increase in the retirement age with a reduction in the generosity of the unemployment insurance scheme is an efficient policy for raising older workers' employment rates »
Pierre-Jean Messe and François-Charles Wolff (2019)Healthier when retiring earlier? Evidence from FranceGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « we fail to find any significant causal effect of early retirement on poor health »
Pierre-Jean Messe and François-Charles Wolff (2019)The short-term effects of retirement on health within couples: Evidence from FranceGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: mixed. « transition into retirement has a short-term beneficial effect on respondents' self-assessed health. Conversely, we fail to find any significant effect of respondents' retirement on their spouses' health »
This site: Retirement age (2023 reform)Retirement age (2023 reform)Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: not informed. « Descriptive: the employment gap between 60-64 and 55-59 grew by 4.5 points in 2024 and 5.5 points in 2025 against 2019-2022; no counterfactual design separates the reform from other trends. »
This site: Retirement age (2010 reform)Retirement age (2010 reform)Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: no significant effect. « France's employment rate at 60-64 was 1.3 points above a synthetic France of European countries that were also raising pension ages, in 2011-2019; a fake start in 2005 finds -1.3. »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Hospital services

Philippe Choné et al. (2013)Introducing Activity-Based Payment in the Hospital Industry: Evidence from French DataGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: effect. « we find empirical evidence supporting these predictions »
Laurent Gobillon and Carine Milcent (2017)Competition and Hospital Quality: Evidence from a French Natural ExperimentGoal measured: Improve quality of hospital care (healthcare-associated infections). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: effect. « enjoyed larger declines in mortality in places where there is greater competition »
Benoît Lalloué et al. (2017)Evaluation of the effects of the French pay-for-performance program-IFAQ pilot studyGoal measured: Improve quality of hospital care (healthcare-associated infections). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « the difference-in-differences effect was positive but not significant »
Carine Milcent (2021)From downcoding to upcoding: DRG based payment in hospitalsGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: adverse. « The implementation of a finer classification led to an upcoding-learning effect. »Leakage: leakage found. « The end result has been a budget transfer from public non-research hospitals to for-profit hospitals. »
Jan Chrusciel et al. (2023)Effect of the Implementation of the French Hospital Regionalization Policy on Patient MobilityGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: no significant effect. « the policy did not achieve major changes in patterns of mobility between hospitals »
Anne Penneau (2023)Do mobile hospital teams in residential aged care facilities increase health care efficiency: an evaluation of French residential care policyGoal measured: Improve quality of hospital care (healthcare-associated infections). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « The MHT had a significant impact on health care quality in treated RACFs »
Payen A et al. (2023)The impact of including a medication review in an integrated care pathway: A pilot studyGoal measured: Improve quality of hospital care (healthcare-associated infections). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « The pathway did not change potentially inappropriate medications; the same abstract reports fewer 30-day readmissions. »
Brigitte Dormont and Alexis Dottin (2024)Does the opening of an emergency department influence hospital admissions? Evidence from French private hospitalsGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged.
Roubille F et al. (PRADOC investigators) (2024)PRADOC: A Multicenter Randomized Controlled Trial to Assess the Efficiency of PRADO-IC, a Nationwide Pragmatic Transition Care Management Plan for Hospitalized Patients With Heart Failure in FranceGoal measured: Improve quality of hospital care (healthcare-associated infections). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « The PRADO-IC has not significantly improved clinical outcomes »
Carine Milcent (2025)Competition in French hospital: Does it impact the patient management in healthcare?Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: mixed. « with a positive effect on high-technical procedures in the private sector and a negative effect on length of stay in public hospitals »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Outpatient services

Michel Grignon et al. (2008)Does free complementary health insurance help the poor to access health care? Evidence from FranceGoal measured: Equal access to care (low out-of-pocket costs, no extra forgoing of care for the poorest). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « CMU-C had no overall effect on utilisation, with effects concentrated among enrollees previously without complementary cover »
Julien Mousquès et al. (2010)Effect of a French experiment of team work between general practitioners and nurses on efficacy and cost of type 2 diabetes patients careGoal measured: Care pathways: coordinated, continuous, accessible, high-quality and efficient care across territories (law). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « Asalée patients were more often correctly followed up and under glycaemic control than controls at no extra cost »
Sophie Guthmuller et al. (2014)Improving Takeup of Health Insurance Program: A Social Experiment in FranceGoal measured: Equal access to care (low out-of-pocket costs, no extra forgoing of care for the poorest). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « a voucher increase has a small but significant effect on takeup and the invitation to an information meeting discourages it »
Olivier Saint-Lary and Jonathan Sicsic (2015)Impact of a pay for performance programme on French GPs' consultation lengthGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « the CAPI was no longer a significant predictor of the consultation length »
Panayotis Constantinou et al. (2016)Effect of pay-for-performance on cervical cancer screening participation in FranceGoal measured: Quality of care: GPs reaching public-health targets (ROSP). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « P4P had a modest positive effect on recommended screening participation. »Permanence: fades. « apparently transiently »
Audrey Michel-Lepage and Bruno Ventelou (2016)The true impact of the French pay-for-performance program on physicians' benzodiazepines prescription behaviorGoal measured: Quality of care: GPs reaching public-health targets (ROSP). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « The P4P contract has a positive but modest impact on the achievement of GPs regarding benzodiazepines indicator. »
Jonathan Sicsic and Carine Franc (2017)Impact assessment of a pay-for-performance program on breast cancer screening in France using micro dataGoal measured: Quality of care: GPs reaching public-health targets (ROSP). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « The French P4P program had a nonsignificant impact on breast cancer screening uptake. »
Sophie Guthmuller and Jérôme Wittwer (2017)The Impact of the Eligibility Threshold of a French Means-Tested Health Insurance Programme on Doctor Visits: A Regression Discontinuity AnalysisGoal measured: Equal access to care (low out-of-pocket costs, no extra forgoing of care for the poorest). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « with more specialist visits among adults under 30 »
Magali Dumontet et al. (2017)Gatekeeping and the utilization of physician services in France: Evidence on the Médecin traitant reformGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: effect. « fell after the policy was in place »
L. Arnaud Lafargue (2017)Intérêt au déploiement du PAERPA dans l'Oise ? Comparaison des pratiques des médecins généralistes avec un territoire piloteGoal measured: Care pathways: coordinated, continuous, accessible, high-quality and efficient care across territories (law). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « les pratiques des médecins PAERPA étaient significativement meilleures sur la prévention des chutes »
B. Carré et al. (2019)Does the take up of public insurance programs improves health care consumption of poor individuals?Goal measured: Equal access to care (low out-of-pocket costs, no extra forgoing of care for the poorest). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « may play an important role in access to care for the poor population »
Guillaume Chevillard et al. (2019)Has the diffusion of primary care teams in France improved attraction and retention of general practitioners in rural areas?Goal measured: Contain the share of the population in under-served areas (GP distribution). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « suggest that they could attract and retain GPs there »
Matthieu Cassou et al. (2020)General practitioners' income and activity: the impact of multi-professional group practice in FranceGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « an increase in income 2.5% higher than that of other GPs »
Fanny Duchaine et al. (2020)L'impact des zonages déficitaires sur l'évolution des disparités territoriales d'infirmiers libéraux en France entre 2006 et 2016Goal measured: Contain the share of the population in under-served areas (GP distribution). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « un effet positif, bien qu'à nuancer »
Guillaume Chevillard and Julien Mousquès (2021)Medically underserved areas: are primary care teams efficient at attracting and retaining general practitioners?Goal measured: Contain the share of the population in under-served areas (GP distribution). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « PCT settlements are efficient to attract young GPs »
Christophe Loussouarn et al. (2021)Can General Practitioners Be More Productive? The Impact of Teamwork and Cooperation with Nurses on GP ActivitiesGoal measured: Everyone has a médecin traitant (100% coverage). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « un effet positif du dispositif mais relativement modeste sur le nombre de jours travaillés par les médecins (+1,2 %) »
Matthieu Cassou et al. (2023)General Practitioners activity patterns: the medium-term impacts of Primary Care Teams in FranceGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « GPs in MPCGs increased their patient list more rapidly than control GPs »
Julie Gilles de la Londe et al. (2023)How does the quality of care for type 2 diabetic patients benefit from GPs-nurses' teamwork? A staggered difference-in-differences design based on a French pilot programGoal measured: Care pathways: coordinated, continuous, accessible, high-quality and efficient care across territories (law). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « a positive and significant positive impact »
Aimée Kingsada (2024)Can financial incentives improve access to care? Evidence from a French experiment on specialist physiciansGoal measured: Equal access to care (low out-of-pocket costs, no extra forgoing of care for the poorest). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « Both the CAS and OPTAM successfully enhance access to care. »
Quitterie Roquebert et al. (2025)Strengthening primary health care: The new contribution of midwives to gynecological care in FranceGoal measured: Equal access to care (low out-of-pocket costs, no extra forgoing of care for the poorest). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: effect. « Our results show an increase in midwives' use following the reform »
Estelle Augé and Nicolas Sirven (2026)Improving Healthcare Utilization in Retired Self-Employed Workers: Evidence From an Experiment in FranceGoal measured: Equal access to care (low out-of-pocket costs, no extra forgoing of care for the poorest). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: effect. « Proactive information outreach alone increased healthcare utilization by 0.6% »
S. Tubert-Jeannin et al. (2026)The French 100% Santé Reform: Impacts on Dental Care UtilizationGoal measured: Equal access to care (low out-of-pocket costs, no extra forgoing of care for the poorest). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « Full denture utilization was 58.85% higher »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Sickness and disability

Mohamed Ali Ben Halima and Malik Koubi (2022)The effects of expanding the generosity of statutory sick leave insurance: The case of a French reformGoal measured: Guarantee workers against risks that reduce or remove their income. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: touched. « the number of sick days' increases significantly (+ 0.5 days) »
Mohamed Ali Ben Halima et al. (2015)Quel est l'impact du système d'indemnisation maladie sur la durée des arrêts de travail pour maladie ?Goal measured: Guarantee workers against risks that reduce or remove their income. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: touched. « La simple présence d'une convention collective a un effet positif sur la probabilité d'avoir un arrêt maladie dans l'année »
Catherine Pollak (2017)The impact of a sick pay waiting period on sick leave patternsGoal measured: Efficiency and medical control of spending: dynamics of sickness cash benefits (IJ). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: touched. « employees who are compensated during the 3-day waiting period are not more likely to have an absence. On the contrary, their sickness leaves are significantly shorter by 3 days on average »
Mélina Hillion and Édouard Maugendre (2024)L'effet du « jour de carence » sur les absences pour maladie des personnels du secteur public de l'éducation nationaleGoal measured: Efficiency and medical control of spending: dynamics of sickness cash benefits (IJ). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: touched. « le jour de carence s'accompagne en moyenne d'une baisse de 23 % du nombre d'épisodes de CMO »
Mélina Hillion and Édouard Maugendre (2023)L'effet du « jour de carence » sur les absences pour maladie ordinaire, la santé perçue et le recours aux soins à court-termeGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: no significant effect. « le jour de carence n'a pas eu d'effet notable sur la perception de l'état de santé général »Leakage: no leakage found. « les visites médicales (généralistes et spécialistes), les délivrances de médicaments et les hospitalisations »
Mohamed Ali Ben Halima et al. (2026)Quels effets du jour de carence sur les absences maladie des agents publics territoriaux en 2018-2019 ?Goal measured: Efficiency and medical control of spending: dynamics of sickness cash benefits (IJ). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: touched. « une baisse significative des congés pour maladie ordinaire dans la fonction publique territoriale suite à la mesure »
Alexandre Cazenave-Lacroutz and Alexandre Godzinski (2017)Effects of the one-day waiting period for sick leave on health-related absences in the French central civil serviceGoal measured: Efficiency and medical control of spending: dynamics of sickness cash benefits (IJ). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: touched. « the total prevalence of health-related absences is not affected by the policy. However, its duration distribution is. »Leakage: leakage found. « The prevalence of short-term absences decreases, while the prevalence of long-term absences increases. »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Family and children

Philippe Chone et al. (2004)Offre de travail feminine et garde des jeunes enfantsGoal measured: Reconcile family and working life (formal childcare coverage and cost, parents' employment, women-men pay gap; services to families). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Design: a structural or calibrated model's simulation, not a measured effect; not counted. Impact: effect. « Le temps partiel féminin est fortement sensible aux incitations financières de l'APE »
Thomas Piketty (2005)L'impact de l'allocation parentale d'education sur l'activite feminine et la fecondite en France, 1982-2002Goal measured: Reconcile family and working life (formal childcare coverage and cost, parents' employment, women-men pay gap; services to families). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « entre 100 000 et 150 000 mères de 2 enfants »Leakage: leakage found. « entre 100 000 et 150 000 mères de 2 enfants (sur environ 300 000 allocataires de l'APE de rang 2 au 31 décembre 1997, dont 220 000 à plein taux) »
Julie Moschion (2010)Reconciling Work and Family Life: The Effect of the French Paid Parental LeaveGoal measured: Reconcile family and working life (formal childcare coverage and cost, parents' employment, women-men pay gap; services to families). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « having more than two children no longer has a negative effect on the participation probability of mothers »
Laurent Lequien (2012)The Impact of Parental Leave Duration on Later WagesGoal measured: Reconcile family and working life (formal childcare coverage and cost, parents' employment, women-men pay gap; services to families). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « this reform did induce many mothers to withdraw from the labor market in the 3 years following the birth »Permanence: lasts. « interruption duration would have a negative causal impact on wages after the return to work »
Laudine Carbuccia et al. (2025)A randomised controlled trial on the effect of administrative burden and information costs on social inequalities in early childcare access in FranceGoal measured: Reconcile family and working life (formal childcare coverage and cost, parents' employment, women-men pay gap; services to families). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: mixed. « the information-only treatment had minimal impact, while adding personalised support to alleviate administrative burdens significantly bridged the SES and migration gaps in early childcare applications »
Nelly Elmallakh (2023)Fertility and Labor Supply Responses to Child Allowances: The Introduction of Means-Tested Benefits in FranceGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a cut, less money against more.
Guillaume Allegre et al. (2015)Child care and labour market participation in France: do monetary incentives matter?Goal measured: Reconcile family and working life (formal childcare coverage and cost, parents' employment, women-men pay gap; services to families). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Design: a structural or calibrated model's simulation, not a measured effect; not counted. Impact: effect. « We show that monetary incentives do play a role. »
Ariane Pailhe et al. (2024)Can Daddies Learn to Care for Babies? The Effect of A Short Paternity Leave on the Division of Childcare and HouseworkGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « Le fait de prendre un congé de paternité conduit à un partage plus équitable de plusieurs tâches parentales. Il n'a qu'un effet marginal sur le partage des activités ménagères. »
Lawrence M. Berger et al. (2021)The Impact of Center-Based Childcare Attendance on Early Child Development: Evidence From the French Elfe CohortGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « crèche attendance has a positive impact on language skills, no impact on motor skills, and a negative impact on behavior »
Pierre Pora (2020)Keep Working and Spend Less? Collective Childcare and Parental Earnings in FranceGoal measured: Reconcile family and working life (formal childcare coverage and cost, parents' employment, women-men pay gap; services to families). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « These plans did not lead to any substantial change in parents' labor outcomes or in paid parental leave take-up. »Leakage: leakage found. « these collective childcare expansions crowded out more costly formal childcare solutions »
Jerome Poulain et al. (2024)Evaluation de l'impact du dispositif Fais-moi une place sur les trajectoires professionnellesGoal measured: Reconcile family and working life (formal childcare coverage and cost, parents' employment, women-men pay gap; services to families). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: mixed. « Aucun effet du programme n'est détecté sur l'accès à la formation »
Guy Laroque and Bernard Salanie (2014)Identifying the Response of Fertility to Financial IncentivesGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Design: a structural or calibrated model's simulation, not a measured effect; not counted. Impact: effect. « financial incentives have had a significant effect on fertility decisions in France »
Thomas Piketty (1998)L'impact des incitations financieres au travail sur les comportements individuels : une estimation pour le cas francaisGoal measured: Reconcile family and working life (formal childcare coverage and cost, parents' employment, women-men pay gap; services to families). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « the data used do not enable us to show any significant effect of financial incentives to work on men's transition from non-employment to employment »
Pauline Givord and Claire Marbot (2015)Does the cost of child care affect female labor market participation? An evaluation of a French reform of childcare subsidiesGoal measured: Reconcile family and working life (formal childcare coverage and cost, parents' employment, women-men pay gap; services to families). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « the new policy results in a significant increase in the use of paid childcare services »
Olivier Joseph et al. (2013)The economic impact of taking short parental leave: Evaluation of a French reformGoal measured: Reconcile family and working life (formal childcare coverage and cost, parents' employment, women-men pay gap; services to families). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « full-time short paid parental leave had almost no effect on labour market participation and wages of first mothers at the global level »Permanence: lasts. « The wages remain lower two years after child birth »
Zsuzsanna Makay (2023)Paid Parental Leave Reforms and Mothers' Employment in Austria, France and HungaryGoal measured: Reconcile family and working life (formal childcare coverage and cost, parents' employment, women-men pay gap; services to families). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « We found however, no significant effect of the 1986 reform for third children and the 2004 reform »
Helene Perivier and Gregory Verdugo (2023)Where Are the Fathers? Effects of Earmarking Parental Leave for Fathers in FranceGoal measured: Reconcile family and working life (formal childcare coverage and cost, parents' employment, women-men pay gap; services to families). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: mixed. « The reform increased mothers' labor earnings, but it had no significant impact on fathers' earnings. »
Mathilde Guergoat-Lariviere and Mathieu Narcy (2024)La reforme du conge parental de 2015 : un impact heterogene sur les meres et les peres selon les groupes sociaux et le contexte localGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: mixed. « cette réforme n'a pas réellement encouragé les pères à prolonger le congé parental de leur conjointe à temps plein, certains l'ont fait à temps partiel »
Mathilde Guergoat-Lariviere et al. (2023)L'impact de la PreParE sur l'activite, les revenus et les modes de gardeGoal measured: Reconcile family and working life (formal childcare coverage and cost, parents' employment, women-men pay gap; services to families). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: effect. « la réduction d'un an de la durée d'indemnisation du congé parental a augmenté la probabilité des mères d'être en emploi »Leakage: leakage found. « a contribué à augmenter le taux de recours à certains modes de garde formels »Permanence: mixed. « mais également sur les trois années suivantes (+3,4 pp.) »
Mathieu Narcy and Florent Sari (2021)Quel est l'effet d'une reduction de la duree d'indemnisation du conge parental sur l'activite des meres ? Une evaluation de la reforme de 2015Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: effect. « Cette réforme a eu pour conséquence de réduire la probabilité de recourir au congé parental à temps plein d'environ 10 points de pourcentage »
Helene Perivier and Gregory Verdugo (2021)Cinq ans apres la reforme du conge parental (PreParE), les objectifs sont-ils atteints ?Goal measured: Reconcile family and working life (formal childcare coverage and cost, parents' employment, women-men pay gap; services to families). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: mixed. « la réforme n'a pas eu d'effet sur la probabilité pour le couple d'avoir un autre enfant ou de se séparer »
Luc Behaghel and Maria Florencia Pinto (2024)Extended maternity leave and children's long-term developmentGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « a three‐year paid leave in France had zero average effects on children's long‐term schooling achievement »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Secondary education

Thomas Piketty and Mathieu Valdenaire (2006)L'impact de la taille des classes sur la réussite scolaire dans les écoles, collèges et lycées français - Estimations à partir du panel primaire 1997 et du panel secondaire 1995Goal measured: All pupils master the core knowledge and skills by the end of primary school (CP/CM1 tests, delay at entry to 6e, REP gaps). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « Une réduction d'un élève par classe de la taille de CE1 conduit à une augmentation de 0,7 point du score »
Maxime Fajeau et al. (2025)Efficacité économique de la réduction de la taille des classesGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « une forte rentabilité de la politique dans l'enseignement primaire »
Julien Silhol and Lionel Wilner (2022 (WP); 2026 (journal))Teachers' Desired Mobility to Disadvantaged Schools: Do Financial Incentives Matter?Goal measured: Balanced territorial allocation of means (class-size gap and experienced teachers in priority education). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « most responsive teachers have less experience and work already in those areas »
Liliane Bonnal et al. (2002)School-to-work transition: apprenticeship versus vocational school in FranceGoal measured: Further study or labour-market entry after secondary school. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: effect. « apprentices have a distinct advantage over those who attended vocational school »
Élodie Alet and Liliane Bonnal (2011)Vocational schooling and educational success: comparing apprenticeship to full-time vocational high-schoolGoal measured: Bring as many young people as possible to expected competences and diplomas (6e tests, DNB, EP gap, delay at 3e). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: mixed. « is not associated with any significant effect on the probability to drop-out, apprenticeship training leads to a higher probability of success at the exam »
Robert J. Gary-Bobo and Mohamed-Badrane Mahjoub (2013)Estimation of Class-Size Effects, Using "Maimonides' Rule" and Other Instruments: the Case of French Junior High SchoolsGoal measured: Bring as many young people as possible to expected competences and diplomas (6e tests, DNB, EP gap, delay at 3e). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « These effects vanish in grades 8 and 9. »
Julien Grenet (2013)Is Extending Compulsory Schooling Alone Enough to Raise Earnings? Evidence from French and British Compulsory Schooling LawsGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « the impact of the change to French law was close to zero »
Dominique Goux et al. (2017)Adjusting Your Dreams? High School Plans and Dropout BehaviourGoal measured: Bring as many young people as possible to expected competences and diplomas (6e tests, DNB, EP gap, delay at 3e). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « the intervention reduces grade repetition and dropout by 25% to 40% »
Francesco Avvisati et al. (2014)Getting Parents Involved: A Field Experiment in Deprived SchoolsGoal measured: Bring as many young people as possible to expected competences and diplomas (6e tests, DNB, EP gap, delay at 3e). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « However, test scores did not improve under the intervention. »
Denis Meuret (1994)L'efficacité de la politique des zones d'éducation prioritaire dans les collègesGoal measured: Bring as many young people as possible to expected competences and diplomas (6e tests, DNB, EP gap, delay at 3e). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: adverse. « les élèves progressent en ZEP un peu moins qu'ils ne progresseraient ailleurs »
Roland Bénabou et al. (2009)The French zones d'éducation prioritaire: Much ado about nothing?Goal measured: Bring as many young people as possible to expected competences and diplomas (6e tests, DNB, EP gap, delay at 3e). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « there is no impact on student success of the ZEP program »
Laurent Davezies and Manon Garrouste (2020)More Harm than Good? Sorting Effects in a Compensatory Education ProgramGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: adverse. « the program decreases the individual probability of attending a treated school »Leakage: leakage found. « symmetrically increases the probability of attending a private school »
Corinne Prost (2013)Teacher Mobility: Can Financial Incentives Help Disadvantaged Schools to Retain Their Teachers?Goal measured: Balanced territorial allocation of means (class-size gap, experienced teachers in EP, replacement of absent teachers). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « the incentives driven by bonuses are not sufficient to retain teachers in ZEP schools »
Luc Behaghel et al. (2017)Ready for Boarding? The Effects of a Boarding School for Disadvantaged StudentsGoal measured: Bring as many young people as possible to expected competences and diplomas (6e tests, DNB, EP gap, delay at 3e). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « this effect mostly comes from strong students »
This site: Priority education (REP/REP+)Priority education (REP/REP+)Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: not informed. « The placebo fails: entering collèges were already falling behind before 2015, so the entry design cannot measure the label. »Permanence: not informed. « Collèges that left priority education in 2015 moved by -1.5 points of brevet pass rate against those that stayed (95% confidence interval -5.5 to +2.6): the data cannot tell a loss from none. The social position index of their pupils moved by +1.4 points (95% interval -1.0 to +3.7). »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Transport

Stéphanie Truchet-Aznar et al. (2024)Évaluation de l'impact de la gratuité des transports en commun sur leur fréquentation. Application au cas de Clermont Auvergne MétropoleGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « free-fare public transport has led to an increase in weekend ridership of 47 % »
Pauline Charnoz et al. (2018)Communication Costs and the Internal Organisation of Multi-Plant Businesses: Evidence From the Impact of the French High-Speed RailGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « HSR induced the creation of one production job for the average affiliate in these industries »Leakage: leakage found. « the shift of around one managerial job from affiliate to HQ »
Gabriel Loumeau and Antonio Russo (2026)Second-hand gentrification: theory and evidence from high-speed rail extensionsGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « the HSR connection raised housing prices in Bordeaux and Rennes by 12%, central-neighborhood median income by 2% »Leakage: leakage found. « Near Montparnasse, the connecting Paris terminal, prices fell 4% relative to the rest of Paris. »
Thierry Mayer and Corentin Trevien (2017)The impact of urban public transportation evidence from the Paris regionGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « the RER opening caused a 8.8% rise in employment in the municipalities connected to the network »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Unemployment

Laura Khoury et al. (2019)Entitled to Leave: the Impact of Unemployment Insurance Eligibility on Employment Duration and Job QualityGoal measured: Access and return to employment (P102-1). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: adverse. « a large negative impact of UI benefits receipt on employment probability up to 21 months after meeting the eligibility criterion »
Laurent Brembilla et al. (2025)Réforme 2019-2021 : premiers résultats d'évaluation du bonus-malusGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: effect. « Les premières évaluations tendent néanmoins à montrer que le dispositif a joué un rôle, limité, dans cette baisse »
Laurent Brembilla and Marie-Hélène Nguyen (2025)Réforme 2019-2021 : Évaluation de la dégressivité des allocations les plus élevées (Document d'étude)Goal measured: Access and return to employment (P102-1). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: mixed. « Nous ne trouvons pas d’effet statistiquement significatif de la dégressivité sur la probabilité de création d’entreprise »
Brice Fabre and Justine Obser (2026)Réforme 2019-2021 : Évaluation de la nouvelle condition d'ouverture de droit : quels effets sur la durée des contrats ? (Document d'étude)Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: mixed. « L’effet net sur le nombre de jours de contrat prévus dans les embauches en CDD de moins de 7 mois dans les entreprises de plus de 50 salariés est négatif »
Maxime Le Bihan and Brice Fabre (2025)Réforme 2019-2021 : Évaluation du nouveau mode de calcul de l'allocation chômage (Document d'étude)Goal measured: Access and return to employment (P102-1). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: mixed. « cet effet est porté par une hausse des contrats temporaires de moins de six mois »
Florent Fremigacci and Antoine Terracol (2014)L'activité réduite : effet d'enfermement et effet tremplin (Subsidized temporary jobs in France: lock-in and stepping stone effects)Goal measured: Access and return to employment (P102-1). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: mixed. « Simulations suggest that the lock-in effect first dominates, but that the overall effect eventually becomes positive. »
Pierre Granier and Xavier Joutard (1999)L'activité réduite favorise-t-elle la sortie du chômage ?Goal measured: Access and return to employment (P102-1). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: mixed. « Although the immediate effect is sometimes negative, working a limited number of hours would appear to make future integration into the labour market less difficult. »
Maëlle Fontaine and Julie Rochut (2014)L'activité réduite des demandeurs d'emploi. Quel impact sur la qualité du retour à l'emploi ?Goal measured: Access and return to employment (P102-1). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: mixed. « Quality of employment, measured by wages and number of hours worked, is not significantly better after reduced activity. »
Hélène Benghalem et al. (2023)The Lock-in Effects of Information on Part-Time Unemployment BenefitsGoal measured: Access and return to employment (P102-1). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: mixed. « The information provision had a significant positive impact on the propensity to work while on claim, but reduced the unemployment exit rate »Leakage: leakage found. « The extension of the duration of compensated unemployment counterbalanced the increase in the number of days worked while on claim »
Brigitte Dormont et al. (2001)L'effet de l'allocation unique dégressive sur la reprise d'emploiGoal measured: Access and return to employment (P102-1). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: adverse. « the type of degression implemented from 1992 to 1996 probably slowed down the return to work »
Ioana Marinescu and Daphné Skandalis (2020)Unemployment Insurance and Job Search BehaviorGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: effect. « search effort (the number of job applications) increases by at least 50% during the year preceding benefits exhaustion »
Laura Khoury (2021)Choosing Unemployment Benefits: the Role of Adverse Selection and Moral HazardGoal measured: Access and return to employment (P102-1). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: adverse. « choosing a short schedule with higher average benefits increasesunemployment duration by six months »
Luc Behaghel et al. (2008)The perverse effects of partial employment protection reform: The case of French older workersGoal measured: Access and return to employment (P102-1). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: adverse. « an adverse effect of the tax on the firms' propensity to hire older workers »
Béatrice Boutchenik and Raphaël Lardeux (2020)The Take-Up of Unemployment Benefit Extensions (Le recours aux extensions d'indemnisation à l'assurance chômage)Goal measured: Replacement income for job seekers (insurance and ASS entitlement). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: effect. « the letter reduced by 14 points the share of claimants who do not certify their full work history »
Laura Khoury (2023)Unemployment Benefits and Redundancies: Incidence and Timing EffectsGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none.
Olivier Baguelin and Delphine Remillon (2014)Unemployment insurance and management of the older workforce in a dual labor market: Evidence from FranceGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: effect. « the reform increased the mean age at job termination of workers dismissed close to retirement by 4months »Leakage: leakage found. « dismissals of insiders close to retirement are often scheduled so that they can receive benefits until retirement »
Thomas Le Barbanchon et al. (2019)Unemployment insurance and reservation wages: Evidence from administrative dataGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: no significant effect. « We cannot reject that the elasticity of the reservation wage with respect to PBD is zero »
Thomas Le Barbanchon (2016)The effect of the potential duration of unemployment benefits on unemployment exits to work and match quality in FranceGoal measured: Access and return to employment (P102-1). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: adverse. « the rate of return to work decreased by 28 per cent »
Pierre Cahuc et al. (2020)Taxation of Temporary Jobs: Good Intentions with Bad Outcomes?Goal measured: Access and return to employment (P102-1). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Design: a structural or calibrated model's simulation, not a measured effect; not counted. Impact: adverse. « the taxation of temporary jobs does not reach its objectives: it reduces the mean duration of jobs and decreases job creation »
Johan Hombert et al. (2020)Can Unemployment Insurance Spur Entrepreneurial Activity? Evidence from FranceGoal measured: Access and return to employment (P102-1). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « because new firms are more productive, the reform has the impact of raising aggregate productivity »Leakage: leakage found. « the effect of the reform on employment is largely offset by large crowd-out effects »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Military defence

Eric Maurin and Theodora Xenogiani (2007)Demand for Education and Labor Market Outcomes: Lessons from the Abolition of Compulsory Conscription in FranceGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: adverse. « a fall in their educational achievement relative to women »
Pierre Granier et al. (2011)Le service militaire et l'insertion professionnelle des jeunes suivant leur niveau d'étude : les leçons de la suspension de la conscription (Revue économique version: Military Service and the Integration of Young Men into the Labor Market Based on their Level of Education)Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: mixed. « Les rendements salariaux sont positifs pour les jeunes sortants sans diplôme du système scolaire et ceux de niveau BAC. Ils sont le plus souvent non significatifs pour les autres. »
Etienne Fize and Charles Louis-Sidois (2020)Military service and political behavior: Evidence from FranceGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: effect. « les individus ayant fait leur service militaire sont plus enclins à voter »
Yajna Govind and Louis Sirugue (2023)To become or not to become French: Conscription, naturalization, and labor market integrationGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: effect. « the probability of employment for EU males consequently increased by 2 percentage points »

Impact, leakage, permanence

General economic, commercial and labour affairs

Alexandre Gazaniol and Mathilde Lê (2021)The Impact of Public Loan Guarantees on Banks' Risk Taking and Firms' Growth: Evidence from FranceGoal measured: Effectiveness of aid to firms (growth and 3-year survival of aided firms vs comparable firms, leverage of guarantees, electricity prices) (P134-1). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « les garanties publiques ont un impact positif sur la survie, l'investissement, le chiffre d'affaires et l'emploi des entreprises »
Emmanuel Duguet (2012)The effect of the incremental R&D tax credit on the private funding of R&D: an econometric evaluation on French firm level dataGoal measured: Effectiveness of aid to firms (growth and 3-year survival of aided firms vs comparable firms, leverage of guarantees, electricity prices) (P134-1). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « the tax credit adds to the private funding of R&D »Leakage: no leakage found. « 1 Euro of tax credit would give slightly more than one Euro of total R&D »
Vincent Dortet-Bernadet and Michaël Sicsic (2017)The effect of R&D subsidies and tax incentives on employment: an evaluation for small firms in FranceGoal measured: Effectiveness of aid to firms (growth and 3-year survival of aided firms vs comparable firms, leverage of guarantees, electricity prices) (P134-1). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « between 18 and 34% of the supplementary aid obtained by businesses between 2008 and 2010 was used to finance new jobs »Leakage: leakage found. « only between 18 and 34% of the supplementary aid obtained by businesses between 2008 and 2010 was used to finance new jobs for highly qualified workers »
Clément Carbonnier et al. (2018)Évaluation interdisciplinaire des impacts du CICE en matière d'emplois et de salairesGoal measured: Effectiveness of aid to firms (growth and 3-year survival of aided firms vs comparable firms, leverage of guarantees, electricity prices) (P134-1). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « les entreprises les plus intensément ciblées par le CICE n'ont pas connu de hausse de l'emploi entre 2013 et 2015 »
Rémi Monin and Milena Suarez Castillo (2018)L'effet du CICE sur les prix : une double analyse sur données sectorielles et individuellesGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « cet effet déflationniste ne peut être distingué d'une baisse générale des prix dans ces secteurs »
Antoine Bozio et al. (2019)Évaluation d'impact de la réforme 2008 du crédit impôt rechercheGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « des effets positifs de la réforme sur les dépenses de R&D de l'ordre de 15 % à 18 % »
Clément Carbonnier et al. (2022)Who benefits from tax incentives? The heterogeneous wage incidence of a tax creditGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Leakage: who ends up with it. « Wage gains load on incumbents in high -skill occupations. »
Clément Brébion (2019)Vocational training and industrial relations in France and Germany (PhD thesis, chapter 3)Goal measured: Integration into work through apprenticeship and work-study (contracts signed, employment after the contract) (P103-3). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « a limited but significantly negative elasticity of the number of apprentices hired to training costs »Leakage: leakage found. « the subsidy fosters turnover strategies »
Pierre Cahuc et al. (2014)Do Hiring Credits Work in Recessions?Goal measured: Access and return to employment (P102-1). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « the program has had a strong and rapid impact on employment »
Pierre Cahuc et al. (2019)The Effectiveness of Hiring CreditsGoal measured: Access and return to employment (P102-1). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « had significant positive employment effects »Leakage: who ends up with it. « no effects on wages »
Laetitia Challe et al. (2020)Les effets des emplois francs sur les discriminations dans le recrutement : une évaluation par testing répétésGoal measured: Access to employment for residents of priority neighbourhoods (emplois francs) (P103-5). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « n'a pas coïncidé avec un changement des discriminations dans l'accès à l'emploi »
Bruno Crépon et al. (2005)Counseling the unemployed: does it lower unemployment duration and recurrence?Goal measured: Access and return to employment (P102-1). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « We find significant favorable effects on both outcomes »Permanence: lasts. « the program shifts the incidence of recurrence, one year after employment, from 33 to 26% »
Denis Fougère et al. (2009)Does the public employment service affect search effort and outcomes?Goal measured: Access and return to employment (P102-1). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Design: a structural or calibrated model's simulation, not a measured effect; not counted. Impact: effect. « the exit rate from unemployment increases with the arrival rate of job contacts obtained by the public employment service »
Bruno Crépon et al. (2013)Do Labor Market Policies have Displacement Effects? Evidence from a Clustered Randomized ExperimentGoal measured: Access and return to employment (P102-1). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « were significantly more likely to have found a stable job than those who were not »Leakage: leakage found. « they appear to have come partly at the expense of eligible workers who did not benefit from the program »Permanence: fades. « But these gains are transitory »
Luc Behaghel et al. (2014)Private and public provision of counseling to job seekers: evidence from a large controlled experimentGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: effect. « an effect per beneficiary that is twice as large under the public as under the private program »
Roland Rathelot and Patrick Sillard (2008)Zones Franches Urbaines : quels effets sur l'emploi salarié et les créations d'établissements ?Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « L'impact du classement en ZFU sur les créations d'établissement et d'emplois s'avère alors significatif et positif. »Leakage: leakage found. « résulte pour les deux tiers d'un déplacement d'activités économiques en provenance de zones non ciblées »
Pauline Givord et al. (2012)A Long-Term Evaluation of the First Generation of the French Urban Enterprise ZonesGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « a strong positive impact of the Entreprise Zone policy on employment and business location during the first years of the policy »Permanence: fades. « after some years, the early positive results are reduced »
Thierry Mayer et al. (2012)Les effets de (re)localisation des Zones FranchesGoal measured: Access to employment for residents of priority neighbourhoods (emplois francs) (P103-5). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « sans grand impact sur l'emploi des résidents »Leakage: leakage found. « cet effet est largement dû à des (re)localisations opportunistes de petites entreprises au sein des villes considérées »
Laurent Gobillon et al. (2012)Do unemployed workers benefit from enterprise zones? The French experienceGoal measured: Access to employment for residents of priority neighbourhoods (emplois francs) (P103-5). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « It had a small but significant effect on the rate at which unemployed workers find a job »Permanence: fades. « This effect is localized and significant only in the short run »
Pauline Givord et al. (2013)Place-based tax exemptions and displacement effects: An evaluation of the Zones Franches Urbaines programGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « significant effects on business creation and on employment while the effect on firms that were located in the treated areas before the program is not significant »Leakage: leakage found. « significant negative spillovers of the program on neighboring areas »
Anthony Briant et al. (2015)Can Tax Breaks Beat Geography? Lessons from the French Enterprise Zone ExperienceGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « only accessible neighborhoods were able to draw benefits from tax breaks and social exemptions »
Laurent Gobillon and Thierry Magnac (2016)Regional Policy Evaluation: Interactive Fixed Effects and Synthetic ControlsGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none.
Thierry Mayer et al. (2017)The impact of Urban Enterprise Zones on establishment location decisions and labor market outcomes: evidence from FranceGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « the policy has a positive effect on employment, especially for low-wage workers »Leakage: leakage found. « this positive effect is entirely due to within-municipality diversion effects »
Pauline Givord et al. (2018)A long-term evaluation of the first generation of French urban enterprise zonesGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « a strong positive impact of the Entreprise Zone policy on employment and business location during the first years of the policy »Permanence: fades. « but gains faded as closures rose »
Pauline Charnoz (2018)Do Enterprise Zones Help Residents? Evidence from FranceGoal measured: Access to employment for residents of priority neighbourhoods (emplois francs) (P103-5). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « the unemployment rate of French EZ residents has decreased significantly as a result of the program »
Pascale Lofredi (2005)Stimulating rural development through tax incentives: an evaluation of France's Zones de revitalisation rurale (ZRR) programGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « no positive effects were found, apart from a mixed impact on certain particularly targeted sectors »
Luc Behaghel et al. (2015)Replacing churches and mason lodges? Tax exemptions and rural developmentGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « We find no impact of the program on total employment or the number of businesses »
Jérémy Hervelin and Pierre Villedieu (2022)The Benefits of Early Work Experience for School Dropouts: Evidence from a Field ExperimentGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « the chances to be invited for a job interview are more than doubled »
Bruno Crépon et al. (2012)Training the Unemployed in France: How Does it Affect Unemployment Duration and Recurrence?Goal measured: Skills society: training of job seekers, certifying training, positive exits 6 months after training (PIC) (P103-4). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « training does not accelerate the exit from unemployment, but has a significant and positive effect on the duration of the subsequent employment spell »Permanence: lasts. « a significant and positive effect on the duration of the subsequent employment spell »
Bruno Crépon et al. (2018)Information shocks and the empirical evaluation of training programs during unemployment spellsGoal measured: Skills society: training of job seekers, certifying training, positive exits 6 months after training (PIC) (P103-4). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « notification has a strong positive effect on the training probability but a negative one on the probability of leaving unemployment »
Héloïse Burlat (2024)Everybody's got to learn sometime? A causal machine learning evaluation of training programmes for jobseekers in FranceGoal measured: Skills society: training of job seekers, certifying training, positive exits 6 months after training (PIC) (P103-4). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « Only qualifying training shows a positive medium-term effect. »Permanence: mixed. « a short-term negative lock-in effect for all programmes, persisting in the medium term for combined training »
Kevin Michael Frick et al. (2025)Skill Distance Between Occupations and Post-Training Professional Transitions of JobseekersGoal measured: Skills society: training of job seekers, certifying training, positive exits 6 months after training (PIC) (P103-4). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « the "return to employment" differential between jobseekers with and without training is driven by a reallocation of workers »
Mathilde Gaini et al. (2018)Résultats de l'évaluation quantitative de la Garantie jeunesGoal measured: Use insertion tools for those furthest from work (subsidised contracts, IAE, youth support, disabled workers) (P102-3). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « a eu un effet sur le taux d'emploi des bénéficiaires »Permanence: lasts. « effet qui perdure dans les mois qui suivent la sortie de l'accompagnement »
This site: Apprenticeship hiring aidApprenticeship hiring aidReform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: not informed. « Descriptive: higher-education contracts fell by 17% (early 2025) and 38% (early 2026) relative to secondary when they lost the aid, while large firms lost it at every level; with the same aid for both, the ratio still fell by 8% in March-December 2025. »
This site: France Relance industrial grantsFrance Relance industrial grantsReform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « Among surviving firms, winners' turnover moved by +2.3% against matched firms by 2024 (95% confidence interval -4.7% to +9.4%), operating margin by +1.0 points (-0.3 to +2.4); winners published accounts 7.6 points less often. The CO2 declared by their facilities moved by +3.3% against matched facilities by 2024 (95% interval -7.1% to +13.8%). »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Medical products, appliances and equipment

Riou França L et al. (2013)A cohort study of therapeutic prescriptions after the end of phytotherapy drug reimbursement by French Social SecurityGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: adverse. « patients exposed to de-reimbursement were more likely to switch to psychotropic drugs (OR = 1.46) »Leakage: leakage found. « patients exposed to de-reimbursement were more likely to switch to psychotropic drugs (OR = 1.46) »
Laurie Rachet-Jacquet et al. (2021)Hospital payment schemes and high-priced drugs: Evidence from the French Add-on ListGoal measured: Efficiency and medical control of spending: generic substitution rate. Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: no significant effect. « Prescription volumes, generic shares and price levels are not systematically affected by delisting. »
Marion Tano et al. (2023)What About Offering a Financial Incentive Directly to Clinical Units to Encourage the Use of Biosimilars? Results of a Two-Year National Experiment in FranceGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: effect. « The French experimental incentive appeared to be more effective at increasing biosimilar use. »
Marion Tano et al. (2024)Comparison of Two Financial Incentives to Encourage the Use of Adalimumab Biosimilars: Results of a French Experiment Close to CliniciansGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: effect. « General case hospitals had a significantly lower mean biosimilar uptake (16.7% vs 23.2%, p = 0.029) »
Lecerf S et al. (2026)Long-term effect of discontinuing anticholinesterase treatment on cognitive decline and mortality in Alzheimer's disease in France: a quasi-experiment and target trial emulation studyGoal measured: Health policy: guarantee health protection, improve population health, reduce social and territorial health inequalities, effective access to prevention and care (law). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: mixed. « had faster cognitive decline (per the same abstract) but no significant difference in five-year mortality »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Executive and legislative organs, financial and fiscal affairs, external affairs

Gabrielle Fack and Camille Landais (2016)The effect of tax enforcement on tax elasticities: Evidence from charitable contributions in FranceGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: effect. « The reform led to a substantial drop in the amount of contributions reported to the administration »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Pre-primary and primary education

Pierre Merle (2022)Le dédoublement des classes de CP et CE1 : quel bilan ?Goal measured: All pupils master the core knowledge and skills by the end of primary school (CP/CM1 tests, delay at entry to 6e, REP gaps). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « a exercé des effets modérés, voire nuls, sur la progression scolaire des élèves »
Laurent Lima et al. (2020)Réduction de la taille des classes : évaluer les effets au-delà des modifications de performancesGoal measured: Allocate means according to need: more staff in disadvantaged and sparse areas, individual support for pupils in difficulty (law). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « de faibles modifications à la fois de la qualité des interactions et du type d'interactions langagières mais pas de variation de l'implication des élèves »
Pascal Bressoux et al. (2009)Teachers' Training, Class Size and Students' Outcomes: Learning from Administrative Forecasting MistakesGoal measured: All pupils master the core knowledge and skills by the end of primary school (CP/CM1 tests, delay at entry to 6e, REP gaps). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « a small class is beneficial to students, especially to low-achieving ones »
Pascal Bressoux et al. (2019)Reducing the number of pupils in French first-grade classes: Is there evidence of contemporaneous and carryover effects?Goal measured: All pupils master the core knowledge and skills by the end of primary school (CP/CM1 tests, delay at entry to 6e, REP gaps). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « significant positive contemporaneous effect of the class size reduction in Grade 1 »Permanence: fades. « At the end of Grade 2, the effects have faded. »
Adrien Bouguen et al. (2017)La taille des classes influence-t-elle la réussite scolaire ?Goal measured: All pupils master the core knowledge and skills by the end of primary school (CP/CM1 tests, delay at entry to 6e, REP gaps). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « ces effets sont élevés »
Céline Piquée and Bruno Suchaut (2004)Un maître supplémentaire dans la classe. Quels effets sur les progressions au cycle III ?Goal measured: All pupils master the core knowledge and skills by the end of primary school (CP/CM1 tests, delay at entry to 6e, REP gaps). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « les élèves en difficulté pris en charge dans des petits groupes ne progressent pas plus que les élèves de caractéristiques comparables »
Christelle Dumas and Arnaud Lefranc (2012)Early schooling and later outcomes : Evidence from pre-school extension in FranceGoal measured: Education as first national priority: equal opportunity, reduce social and territorial inequalities in school success (law). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « We find some sizeable and persistent effect of preschool »Permanence: lasts. « sizeable and persistent effect of preschool »
Dominique Goux and Eric Maurin (2010)Public School Availability for Two-year Olds and Mothers' Labour SupplyGoal measured: All pupils master the core knowledge and skills by the end of primary school (CP/CM1 tests, delay at entry to 6e, REP gaps). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « early school availability has a significant employment effect on lone mothers, but no effect on two-parent families »Permanence: lasts. « the effect grows larger as the child grows older »
Géraldine Farges et al. (2023)Scolarisation à 2 ans : effets sur le développement des enfants et la réduction des inégalitésGoal measured: All pupils master the core knowledge and skills by the end of primary school (CP/CM1 tests, delay at entry to 6e, REP gaps). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « En revanche, elle n'a aucun effet sur les capacités de raisonnement non verbal. »
Dominique Goux et al. (2017)Reading enjoyment and reading skills: Lessons from an experiment with first grade childrenGoal measured: All pupils master the core knowledge and skills by the end of primary school (CP/CM1 tests, delay at entry to 6e, REP gaps). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « taste for reading is significantly improved. However, there is no indication that this translates into higher reading skills »
Thomas Piketty and Mathieu Valdenaire (2006)L'impact de la taille des classes sur la réussite scolaire dans les écoles, collèges et lycées français - Estimations à partir du panel primaire 1997 et du panel secondaire 1995Goal measured: All pupils master the core knowledge and skills by the end of primary school (CP/CM1 tests, delay at entry to 6e, REP gaps). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « Une réduction d'un élève par classe de la taille de CE1 conduit à une augmentation de 0,7 point du score »
Maxime Fajeau et al. (2025)Efficacité économique de la réduction de la taille des classesGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « une forte rentabilité de la politique dans l'enseignement primaire »
Julien Silhol and Lionel Wilner (2022 (WP); 2026 (journal))Teachers' Desired Mobility to Disadvantaged Schools: Do Financial Incentives Matter?Goal measured: Balanced territorial allocation of means (class-size gap and experienced teachers in priority education). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « most responsive teachers have less experience and work already in those areas »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Survivors

Léa Cimelli (2023)Are the widowed too much insured? Survivor's pensions and living standards upon widowhood in FranceGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « Survivor's pensions largely ensure that women's living standards do not plummet upon widowhood »Leakage: who ends up with it. « those earning more tend to be overcompensated »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Social exclusion n.e.c.

Yves Goulard de Curraize and Helene Perivier (2009)L'allocation de parent isole a-t-elle favorise l'inactivite des femmes ?Goal measured: Social and professional integration; incentive to work and stay in work (RSA support, prime d'activité, P304-2). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « la réaction de l'offre de travail des mères isolées a été faible au regard de la désincitation potentiellement introduite par l'API »
Mathilde Badufle et al. (2026)L'impact du Contrat d'engagement jeune sur les trajectoires professionnelles des bénéficiairesGoal measured: Social and professional integration; incentive to work and stay in work (RSA support, prime d'activité, P304-2). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: no significant effect. « L’effet mesuré reste toutefois modeste et statistiquement peu significatif en moyenne »
Mathilde Badufle et al. (2026)Le contrat d'engagement jeune - jeunes en rupture : une évaluation quantitativeGoal measured: Social and professional integration; incentive to work and stay in work (RSA support, prime d'activité, P304-2). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « Cet effet moyen du traitement (ATT) est estimé à 0,07 avec une p-value de 0,09 »
Arthur Félix W. Sawadogo and Océane Vilches (2024)Bénéficier de la Garantie jeunes : une plus-value pour l'insertion des jeunes en situation de vulnérabilité ?Goal measured: Social and professional integration; incentive to work and stay in work (RSA support, prime d'activité, P304-2). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « la Garantie jeunes exerce un effet positif mais modeste sur l'insertion »
Mathilde Gaini et al. (2018)Résultats de l'évaluation quantitative de la Garantie jeunesGoal measured: Social and professional integration; incentive to work and stay in work (RSA support, prime d'activité, P304-2). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « a eu un effet sur le taux d'emploi des bénéficiaires »
Michaël Sicsic (2022)Does labour income react more to income tax or means-tested benefits reforms?Goal measured: Social and professional integration; incentive to work and stay in work (RSA support, prime d'activité, P304-2). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « around 0.1 in response to in-work benefit reforms, while I found no statistically significant response to family allowance reforms »
Arthur Heim (2024)Social investment and the changing face of poverty: essays on the design and evaluation of family and social policies in France (chapter 2)Goal measured: Adequate means of existence and fight against poverty (RSA minimum income; prime d'activité purchasing power). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « the programme has no average effect on labour market participation and poverty after the end of the training »
Laura Castell et al. (2025)Take-up of Social Benefits: Experimental Evidence from FranceGoal measured: Reduce non-take-up of minimum benefits. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: mixed. « a meeting with social services to assess eligibility and help with applications to social benefits increased new benefit take-up by 29 percent. By contrast, an online simulator that gave personalized information on benefit eligibility did not increase take-up »
Laurent Lequien (2011)Essais d'évaluation de politique publique dans les champs de l'éducation, de la santé et des politiques d'emploi (chapitre 1)Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none.
Arthur Heim and Alexandra Galitzine (2024)Social investment and the changing face of poverty: essays on the design and evaluation of family and social policies in France (chapter 3)Goal measured: Adequate means of existence and fight against poverty (RSA minimum income; prime d'activité purchasing power). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: adverse. « indicating significant disincentives to employment and increased in-work poverty »
Antoine Bozio et al. (2026)Impact de la revalorisation de la prime d'activité sur les comportements d'activitéGoal measured: Adequate means of existence and fight against poverty (RSA minimum income; prime d'activité purchasing power). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « en augmentant significativement le pouvoir d’achat des travailleurs modestes »
Marco Fugazza et al. (2003)L'influence de la PPE sur l'activité des femmes : une estimation à partir du modèle InesGoal measured: Social and professional integration; incentive to work and stay in work (RSA support, prime d'activité, P304-2). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Design: a structural or calibrated model's simulation, not a measured effect; not counted. Impact: no significant effect. « l'impact de la PPE demeure limité »
Elena G.F. Stancanelli (2008)Evaluating the impact of the French tax credit on the employment rate of womenGoal measured: Social and professional integration; incentive to work and stay in work (RSA support, prime d'activité, P304-2). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « We find evidence of a negative employment effect for married women »
Hans Bloemen and Elena Stancanelli (2007)A Model with Endogenous Programme Participation: Evaluating the Tax Credit in FranceGoal measured: Social and professional integration; incentive to work and stay in work (RSA support, prime d'activité, P304-2). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « We find no significant impact of the tax credit on either employment or hours of French women. »
Marion Cochard et al. (2008)Les effets incitatifs de la prime pour l'emploi : une évaluation difficileGoal measured: Social and professional integration; incentive to work and stay in work (RSA support, prime d'activité, P304-2). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « Il n'apparaît pas d'effet significatif de la PPE sur l'emploi »
Olivier Bargain and Karina Doorley (2011)Caught in the trap? Welfare's disincentive and the labor supply of single menGoal measured: Social and professional integration; incentive to work and stay in work (RSA support, prime d'activité, P304-2). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: adverse. « the RMI reduces the participation of uneducated single men by 7–10% at age 25 »
Olivier Bargain and Augustin Vicard (2014)Le RMI et son successeur le RSA découragent-ils certains jeunes de travailler ? Une analyse sur les jeunes autour de 25 ansGoal measured: Social and professional integration; incentive to work and stay in work (RSA support, prime d'activité, P304-2). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « le RMI et le RSA n'ont pas d'effet désincitatif marqué sur l'emploi des jeunes autour de cet âge »
Marc Gurgand and David N. Margolis (2008)Does work pay in France? Monetary incentives, hours constraints, and the guaranteed minimum incomeGoal measured: Social and professional integration; incentive to work and stay in work (RSA support, prime d'activité, P304-2). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Design: a structural or calibrated model's simulation, not a measured effect; not counted. Impact: mixed. « have little impact in this population due to their very limited scope. The negative income tax (Prime pour l'emploi), seems to be an exception. »
Matthieu Chemin and Etienne Wasmer (2021)Ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of the 1989 French welfare reform using a natural experiment: the 1908 social laws in Alsace-MoselleGoal measured: Social and professional integration; incentive to work and stay in work (RSA support, prime d'activité, P304-2). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: adverse. « a 3% fall in employment (among unskilled workers 25-55 years old) »
Antoine Terracol (2009)Guaranteed minimum income and unemployment duration in FranceGoal measured: Social and professional integration; incentive to work and stay in work (RSA support, prime d'activité, P304-2). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: adverse. « RMI receipt has a strong negative impact during the first months of program participation »
Olivier Bargain and Karina Doorley (2017)The Effect of Social Benefits on Youth Employment: Combining Regression Discontinuity and a Behavioral ModelGoal measured: Social and professional integration; incentive to work and stay in work (RSA support, prime d'activité, P304-2). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Design: a structural or calibrated model's simulation, not a measured effect; not counted.
Thomas Breda et al. (2026)Évaluation quantitative de l'accompagnement rénové des bénéficiaires du RSAGoal measured: Social and professional integration; incentive to work and stay in work (RSA support, prime d'activité, P304-2). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: effect. « la probabilité d’être en emploi salarié à six mois augmente d’environ 0,9 point de pourcentage dans les zones traitées »Leakage: leakage found. « les effets négatifs observés sur les bénéficiaires non éligibles des zones d’emploi compensent en partie les effets positifs dans les zones d’expérimentation »
Guillaume Allègre (2011)Le RSA : redistribution vers les travailleurs pauvres et offre de travailGoal measured: Social and professional integration; incentive to work and stay in work (RSA support, prime d'activité, P304-2). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Design: a structural or calibrated model's simulation, not a measured effect; not counted. Impact: adverse. « en net, 12 000 individus renonceraient à travailler »
Gedeão Locks and Josselin Thuilliez (2023)The impact of minimum income on homelessness: Evidence from FranceGoal measured: Adequate means of existence and fight against poverty (RSA minimum income; prime d'activité purchasing power). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « the RSA benefit reduces the homelessness rate by 20% among young adults aged 22 to 27 »
Véronique Simonnet and Elisabeth Danzin (2014)L'effet du RSA sur le taux de retour à l'emploi des allocataires. Une analyse en double différence selon le nombre et l'âge des enfantsGoal measured: Social and professional integration; incentive to work and stay in work (RSA support, prime d'activité, P304-2). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « S'ils ne mettent pas en évidence de réel effet du RSA sur l'emploi des hommes »
Sylvain Chareyron et al. (2022)Droits et devoirs du RSA : l'impact des contrôles sur la participation des bénéficiairesGoal measured: Social and professional integration; incentive to work and stay in work (RSA support, prime d'activité, P304-2). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: effect. « l'avertissement augmente la participation aux démarches d'insertion »
Sylvain Chareyron et al. (2018)Raising Take-Up of Social Assistance Benefits through a Simple Mailing: Evidence from a French Field ExperimentGoal measured: Reduce non-take-up of minimum benefits. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: mixed. « pourrait permettre d'accroître la participation de certains types de bénéficiaires »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Police services

Laurent Carnis and Etienne Blais (2013)An assessment of the safety effects of the French speed camera programGoal measured: Fight road insecurity (accidents, alcohol, drugs). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « The fatality rate per 100,000 vehicles fell by 20% »Permanence: fades. « a 26.2% reduction was recorded in the first month but dropped to 0.8 % for the last observation of the series »
Etienne Blais and Laurent Carnis (2015)Improving the safety effect of speed camera programs through innovations: Evidence from the French experienceGoal measured: Fight road insecurity (accidents, alcohol, drugs). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « the ASEP was associated with a decrease of 19.7% in traffic fatalities and crashes with injuries »
Guillaume Gormand (2017)L'évaluation des politiques publiques de sécurité : résultats et enseignements de l'étude d'un programme de vidéosurveillance de la Ville de MontpellierGoal measured: Prevention and repression: reduce recorded crimes and victims (violence, property, against officers). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « a marginal contribution of CCTV cameras against crime in public areas »
Sebastian Roché et al. (2025)And the law relaxed the rules. A quasi-experimental study of fatal police shootings in EuropeGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: adverse. « The monthly number of killings has significantly increased for the national police »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Community development

Marie-Noëlle Lefebvre and Imen Daly (2026)Who Builds What When Subsidies Flow? Evidence from Place-Based Housing Policies in Small and Mid-Sized French CitiesGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « Policy exposure increases authorized housing supply by about 45% »Leakage: no leakage found. « we find little evidence of average price capitalization »
Lucie Letrouit (2020)Three essays on the economics of social integration in an urban context (PhD thesis, essay 3)Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « the program had non-significant and, in any case, very limited effects (i.e. smaller than 3.5%) on housing prices »
Sylvain Chareyron et al. (2022)Externalities from urban renewal: evidence from a French programGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « we find no significant aggregate impact of the program on housing prices »
Sylvain Chareyron et al. (2022)Can subsidies paid directly to employers reduce residential discrimination in employment? An assessment based on serial field experimentsGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « the programme decreases residential discrimination after six months »Permanence: fades. « we cannot conclude that the effect is still present 12 months later »
This site: Petites villes de demain and Territoires d'industriePetites villes de demain and Territoires d'industrieReform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « Private jobs moved by +0.0% (Petites villes de demain, 95% confidence interval -1.7% to +1.7%) and +0.4% (Territoires d'industrie, -2.1% to +2.9%) against matched communes by 2025; placebos pass. Industrial jobs in the communes of Territoires d'industrie moved by -6.0% between the 2015 and 2021 censuses (95% interval -11.0% to -1.0%). »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Housing

Anne Laferrère and David Le Blanc (2002)Comment les aides au logement affectent-elles les loyers ?Goal measured: Meet housing needs: decent, good-quality, independent housing and access to it (law). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « Grâce à l'aide, les ménages ont pu se loger mieux »Leakage: leakage found. « Il y a donc eu aussi augmentation pure de loyer »
Gabrielle Fack (2005)Pourquoi les ménages pauvres paient-ils des loyers de plus en plus élevés ?Goal measured: Help modest households meet housing costs (net housing-cost burden) (P109-1; law: take charge of part of housing expenses). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « entre 50 % et 80 % des allocations logement perçues par ces ménages auraient été absorbées par les augmentations de leurs loyers »Leakage: leakage found. « entre 50 % et 80 % des allocations logement perçues par ces ménages auraient été absorbées par les augmentations de leurs loyers »
Gabrielle Fack (2006)Are housing benefit an effective way to redistribute income? Evidence from a natural experiment in FranceGoal measured: Meet housing needs: decent, good-quality, independent housing and access to it (law). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « students who used the benefit to become independent »
Anne Laferrère and David Le Blanc (2004)Gone with the Windfall: How Do Housing Allowances Affect Student Co-residence?Goal measured: Meet housing needs: decent, good-quality, independent housing and access to it (law). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « housing allowances provide an increased opportunity for students to move out of their parents' home »Leakage: leakage found. « as much as half of the allowance came as a windfall gai to students and their parents »
Céline Grislain-Letrémy and Corentin Trevien (2014)The Impact of Housing Subsidies on the Rental Sector: the French ExampleGoal measured: Meet housing needs: decent, good-quality, independent housing and access to it (law). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « higher subsidies seem to have almost no effect on housing quality and to have no impact on the number of offered rental dwellings »Leakage: leakage found. « housing subsidies had an inflationist impact »
Gabrielle Fack (2006)Are housing benefit an effective way to redistribute income? Evidence from a natural experiment in FranceGoal measured: Help modest households meet housing costs (net housing-cost burden) (P109-1; law: take charge of part of housing expenses). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « leaving only 22 cents available to reduce their net rent and increase their consumption »Leakage: leakage found. « one additional euro of housing benefit leads to an increase of 78 cents in the rent paid by new benefit claimants »
Céline Grislain-Letrémy and Corentin Trevien (2014)The Impact of Housing Subsidies on the Rental SectorGoal measured: Help modest households meet housing costs (net housing-cost burden) (P109-1; law: take charge of part of housing expenses). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: touched. « housing subsidies had an inflationist impact »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Subsidiary services to education

Luc Behaghel et al. (2017)Ready for Boarding? The Effects of a Boarding School for Disadvantaged StudentsGoal measured: Bring as many young people as possible to expected competences and diplomas (6e tests, DNB, EP gap, delay at 3e). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « this effect mostly comes from strong students »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Cultural services

Abel Aussant (2025)What Do Culture Vouchers Really Buy? Evidence from France's 'pass Culture' Policy EffectsGoal measured: Equitable access to culture, arts and cultural education (pass Culture, EAC, priority areas) (P361-2). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « while the voucher does not affect participation in institutional highbrow cultural activities like museum visits, theater, or opera attendance, it significantly increases engagement with commercial popular culture »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Recreational and sporting services

Swantje Allmers and Wolfgang Maennig (2009)Economic impacts of the FIFA Soccer World Cups in France 1998, Germany 2006, and outlook for South Africa 2010Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « For France, no effects could be isolated. »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Fuel and energy

Odran Bonnet et al. (2024)Compensating against fuel price inflation: Price subsidies or transfers?Goal measured: Control energy: reduce consumption and develop renewable heat (Fonds chaleur, CEE savings). Reform studied: more money, or money against none.
Marine Adam et al. (2024)Cross-border shopping for fuel at the France-Germany borderGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Leakage: leakage found. « When relative prices increase by 1%, the relative cross-border demand decreases by 7.8%. »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Tertiary education

Gabrielle Fack and Julien Grenet (2015)Improving College Access and Success for Low-Income Students: Evidence from a Large Need-Based Grant ProgramGoal measured: Equal opportunity of access to higher education across social classes; reduce social and cultural inequalities (bursary holders' success, social origin of students, bursary holders in CPGE). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « increases their college enrollment rates by 5 to 7 percent »
Sébastien Grobon and François-Charles Wolff (2022)Do public scholarships crowd out parental transfers? Evidence at the intensive margin from FranceGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Leakage: who ends up with it. « a substantial part of student scholarship benefits low-income parents through a reduction in the money they give to their student children »
Camille Remigereau and Clara Schäper (2024)The Impact of Student Aid Eligibility on Higher Education ApplicationsGoal measured: Equal opportunity of access to higher education across social classes; reduce social and cultural inequalities (bursary holders' success, social origin of students, bursary holders in CPGE). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « the financial aid reform did not affect application decisions for all students, but it impacted students differently based on gender and academic performance »
Sophie Morlaix and Cathy Perret (2013)L'évaluation du Plan Réussite en Licence : quelles actions pour quels effets ? Analyse sur les résultats des étudiants en première année universitaireGoal measured: Success of all students (licence in 3-4 years, L1 success, master and BTS completion). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « Ces derniers soulignent les difficultés à appréhender un effet positif des actions du PRL. »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Housing development

Laurent Gobillon and David le Blanc (2008)Economic effects of upfront subsidies to ownership: The case of the Prêt à Taux Zéro in FranceGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Design: a structural or calibrated model's simulation, not a measured effect; not counted. Impact: effect. « the PTZ significantly increases access to ownership by allowing some households to leave the rental sector sooner »Leakage: leakage found. « We estimate that 85% of the beneficiaries in a 4-year period would still have moved to own in the absence of the subsidy. »
Ilya Eryzhenskiy et al. (2025)Zero-Interest Green Loans and Home Energy Retrofits: Evidence from FranceGoal measured: Sustainable development in housing and construction (MaPrimeRénov energy savings, social housing energy use). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « eligibility to the program had a 20-22% impact on the extensive margin of investment »Permanence: fades. « but only in the first two years »
Guillaume Chapelle et al. (2018)Impact of a Housing Tax Credit on Local Housing Markets: Evidence from FranceGoal measured: Meet rental housing demand quickly, especially in tight areas and for the lowest-income applicants (social housing approvals, allocations). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: no significant effect. « without reducing the production of new housing units »Leakage: leakage found. « the removal of these tax credits decelerated house prices »
Pierre-Henri Bono and Alain Trannoy (2019)The Impact of the 'Scellier' Income Tax Relief on Building Land Prices in FranceGoal measured: Meet rental housing demand quickly, especially in tight areas and for the lowest-income applicants (social housing approvals, allocations). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Leakage: leakage found. « point to land price capitalisation »
Sylvain Chareyron et al. (2021)Ownership incentives and housing affordability: Evidence from FranceGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « Taking both markets together, the overall effect is non-significant. »Leakage: leakage found. « the price of new housing increased by 30% »
Imen Daly (2024)Housing Policy and Urban Development in France (PhD thesis, chapter 1)Goal measured: Improve the quality of the private housing stock (substandard housing, ANAH renovations, modest households). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « the scheme significantly increased renovation activities »
Claire Dujardin and Florence Goffette-Nagot (2009)Does public housing occupancy increase unemployment?Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « living in public housing has no effect on the probability of being unemployed in France »
Pierre-Henri Bono et al. (2012)Analyse Contrefactuelle de l'Article 55 de la Loi SRU sur la Production de Logements SociauxGoal measured: Promote social mix through mixed supply (SRU article 55 targets). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: effect. « For a quadrennial production gain is estimated at 0.35 additional percentage point »
Laurent Gobillon and Benjamin Vignolles (2016)Évaluation de l'effet d'une politique spatialisée d'accès au logement. La loi SRUGoal measured: Promote social mix through mixed supply (SRU article 55 targets). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: effect. « La loi sru aurait eu un effet positif significatif sur la construction de logements sociaux »Permanence: lasts. « croissant au cours du temps »
Guillaume Chapelle et al. (2025)Building without income mixing: Public housing quotas in FranceGoal measured: Promote social mix through mixed supply (SRU article 55 targets). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: mixed. « the law stimulated public housing construction in treated municipalities, but only slightly increased the presence of low-income households »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Law courts

Arnaud Philippe (2015)How far do criminal understand the criminal law? Evidence from French mandatory sentencingGoal measured: Effective penal response; meaning and effectiveness of sentences (alternatives, enforcement rate and delay). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: effect. « the law equally deterred targeted and untargeted crimes in the short term »Permanence: mixed. « while only targeted behaviors remain affected in the medium term »
Benjamin Monnery (2017)The Cost of Slow Justice: How Delayed Incarceration Fuels RecidivismGoal measured: Effective penal response; meaning and effectiveness of sentences (alternatives, enforcement rate and delay). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: effect. « fast-track incarceration has large significant deterrent effects on recidivism »
Arnaud Philippe (2017)Do jurors and professional judges differ in their treatment of crime?: Evidence from French reformGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: no significant effect. « do not permit me to identify any change in the probability of being convicted or in sentences »
Romain Espinosa et al. (2017)Fewer courts, less justice? Evidence from the 2008 French reform of labor courtsGoal measured: Quality justice at first instance (case durations, stock clearance, cases per judge and clerk). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: mixed. « duration did not increase, but the demand for litigation decreased »
Anne Épaulard and Chloé Zapha (2023)Corporate Bankruptcy and the (In-)Efficiency of Small Commercial CourtsGoal measured: Quality justice at first instance (case durations, stock clearance, cases per judge and clerk). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: effect. « the reform unambiguously reduced Type 1 errors for small firms in absorbed court and left unchanged Type 2 errors »
Matthieu Belarouci et al. (2024)Did the French reform of the judicial map affect conciliation activities?Goal measured: Adapt and modernise justice (legal costs, digital, successful conciliations, reception). Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: mixed. « the number of conciliators decreased more significantly in treated courts than in control courts »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Public health services

Guillaume E et al. (2017)Patient navigation to reduce social inequalities in colorectal cancer screening participation: A cluster randomized controlled trialGoal measured: Develop prevention: raise organised cancer-screening participation (European targets; colorectal screening 50-74). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « The intervention mainly with phone navigation increased individual participation (OR=1.19 [1.10, 1.29]) »
Denis B et al. (2017)Tailored telephone counselling to increase participation of underusers in a population-based colorectal cancer-screening programme with faecal occult blood test: A randomized controlled trialGoal measured: Develop prevention: raise organised cancer-screening participation (European targets; colorectal screening 50-74). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « participation was significantly higher in the two intervention groups than in the control group »
Thomas C. Buchmueller and Léontine Goldzahl (2018)The effect of organized breast cancer screening on mammography use: Evidence from FranceGoal measured: Develop prevention: raise organised cancer-screening participation (European targets; colorectal screening 50-74). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « France's organized screening program has reduced socioeconomic disparities in access to mammography »
Affret A et al. (2020)Effectiveness of the e-Tabac Info Service application for smoking cessation: a pragmatic randomised controlled trialGoal measured: Improve population health: reduce daily smoking prevalence. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « Use of the e-TIS app was not associated with a higher rate of smoking cessation. »
Guignard R et al. (2021)Effectiveness of 'Mois sans tabac 2016': A French social marketing campaign against smokingGoal measured: Develop prevention: raise organised cancer-screening participation (European targets; colorectal screening 50-74). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « These analyses suggest the effectiveness of the 2016 Mois sans tabac intervention »
Berlin I et al. (2021)Financial incentives for smoking cessation in pregnancy: multicentre randomised controlled trialGoal measured: Improve population health: reduce daily smoking prevalence. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « Financial incentives to reward smoking abstinence compared with no financial incentives were associated with an increased abstinence rate in pregnant smokers. »
Delphine Teigné et al. (2024)Organized cervical cancer screening: A randomized controlled trial assessing the effect of sending invitation lettersGoal measured: Develop prevention: raise organised cancer-screening participation (European targets; colorectal screening 50-74). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « resulted in a modest increase in participation among non-adherent women six months later »
Thilly N et al. (2024)Effectiveness of a School- and Primary Care-Based HPV Vaccination Intervention: The PrevHPV Cluster Randomized TrialGoal measured: Develop prevention: vaccination coverage (95% infant coverage; influenza 65+). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « At-school HPV vaccination significantly increased vaccination coverage. The trial did not show a significant effect for training GPs and education and motivation. »
Guignard R et al. (2026)Effectiveness of an in-office intervention to improve general practitioners' support for tobacco smoking cessation: results from a randomised controlled trial (TABAC-PRO)Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « Providing simple paper-based tools was associated with a greater likelihood of GPs discussing smoking cessation with their patients. »
Bocquier A et al. (2026)One-year impact on HPV vaccination coverage of a school- and primary care-based intervention: the PrevHPV cluster randomised trialGoal measured: Develop prevention: vaccination coverage (95% infant coverage; influenza 65+). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « School-based vaccination was effective in increasing HPV VC in the medium term »Permanence: lasts. « effective in increasing HPV VC in the medium term »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting

Andrea Pufahl and Christoph R. Weiss (2009)Farm Structure and the Effects of Agri-Environmental Programs: Results from a Matching Analysis for European CountriesGoal measured: Combine economic and environmental performance of farms, agri-food and forestry (public support/EBE, organic share, export shares, wood harvest). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « significant effects of AE participation on production (Germany, France) and farm profits (France, Ireland, United Kingdom) »
Sylvain Chabé-Ferret and Julie Subervie (2013)How much green for the buck? Estimating additional and windfall effects of French agro-environmental schemes by DID-matchingGoal measured: Combine economic and environmental performance of farms, agri-food and forestry (public support/EBE, organic share, export shares, wood harvest). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « the AES subsidizing conversion to organic farming has low windfall effects and high additionality »Leakage: leakage found. « at the expense of almost 7 ha of windfall effect »
Linda Arata and Paolo Sckokai (2016)The Impact of Agri-environmental Schemes on Farm Performance in Five E.U. Member States: A DID-Matching ApproachGoal measured: Combine economic and environmental performance of farms, agri-food and forestry (public support/EBE, organic share, export shares, wood harvest). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: mixed. « The effects of the AESs adoption largely depend on the share of the agri-environmental payment on farm revenue. »
Laure Kuhfuss and Julie Subervie (2018)Do European agri-environment measures help reduce herbicide use? Evidence from viticulture in FranceGoal measured: Combine economic and environmental performance of farms, agri-food and forestry (public support/EBE, organic share, export shares, wood harvest). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « the quantity of herbicides used by participants in the scheme in 2011 ranges from 38 to 53 percent below what they would have used without the scheme »
Margaux Lapierre et al. (2019)Providing technical assistance to peer networks to reduce pesticide use in Europe: Evidence from the French Ecophyto planGoal measured: Combine economic and environmental performance of farms, agri-food and forestry (public support/EBE, organic share, export shares, wood harvest). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « participants have used 8 to 22 percent lesser pesticides than they would have used in the absence of the program »
Sylvain Chabé-Ferret et al. (2019)Can we nudge farmers into saving water? Evidence from a randomised experimentGoal measured: Combine economic and environmental performance of farms, agri-food and forestry (public support/EBE, organic share, export shares, wood harvest). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: mixed. « though it reduced consumption among the heaviest irrigators »
Marine Coinon (chapter 2 co-authored with Sylvain Chabé-Ferret, Arnaud Reynaud, Eva Tène) (2022)Essais sur les externalités spatiales associées à l'agriculture biologique (Essays on Spatial Externalities and Organic Farming), chapter 2Goal measured: Combine economic and environmental performance of farms, agri-food and forestry (public support/EBE, organic share, export shares, wood harvest). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « organic farming decreases nitrate concentrations in water by up to 1.3mg/l »
Rose Deperrois et al. (2023)Social Learning for the Green Transition: Evidence from a Pesticide Reduction PolicyGoal measured: Combine economic and environmental performance of farms, agri-food and forestry (public support/EBE, organic share, export shares, wood harvest). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: effect. « doubling the proportion of participants would reduce pesticide use by about 10% within representative cohorts »
Alexandre Sauquet (2023)Ex post analysis of the crop diversification measure of CAP greening in FranceGoal measured: Combine economic and environmental performance of farms, agri-food and forestry (public support/EBE, organic share, export shares, wood harvest). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: effect. « farms greater than 30 ha increased compliance with the measure and the number of crops grown on their lands »
Thierno Bocar Diop and Lionel Védrine (2024)Did crop diversity criterion from CAP green payments affect both economic and environmental farm performances? Quasi-experimental evidence from FranceGoal measured: Combine economic and environmental performance of farms, agri-food and forestry (public support/EBE, organic share, export shares, wood harvest). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: mixed. « This suggests that the crop diversity criterion did not result in much additional change. »
Isabelle Chort et al. (2024)Agricultural policies and biodiversity: impact of the CAP greening on bird abundance and diversity in FranceGoal measured: Combine economic and environmental performance of farms, agri-food and forestry (public support/EBE, organic share, export shares, wood harvest). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: mixed. « an increase in overall bird abundance after 2015 in sites with a higher ex-ante proportion of arable land, driven by a small number of generalist species, and no impact on species richness »Permanence: fades. « the positive effects were limited to the first two years »
Valentin Cocco et al. (2025)Guilty or scapegoat? Land consolidation and the hedgerow declineGoal measured: Combine economic and environmental performance of farms, agri-food and forestry (public support/EBE, organic share, export shares, wood harvest). Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: adverse. « consolidation led to a significant reduction in hedgerow density of -14.3m/ha »
Valentin Cocco (2025)Haie-conomie — Analyses économiques de l'évolution des paysages agricoles (Hedgerow-nomics — Economic analyses of agricultural landscape changes), chapter 2Goal measured: Combine economic and environmental performance of farms, agri-food and forestry (public support/EBE, organic share, export shares, wood harvest). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged.

Impact, leakage, permanence

Prisons

Eric Maurin and Aurélie Ouss (2009)Sentence Reductions and Recidivism: Lessons from the Bastille Day Quasi ExperimentGoal measured: Favour reintegration of offenders (alternatives under écrou, TIG, training, work, pre-trial share). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: adverse. « collective sentence reductions increase recidivism »
Anaïs Henneguelle et al. (2016)Better at Home than in Prison? The Effects of Electronic Monitoring on Recidivism in FranceGoal measured: Favour reintegration of offenders (alternatives under écrou, TIG, training, work, pre-trial share). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: effect. « estimated reductions in probability of reconviction of 6-7 percentage points (9-11%) after five years »Permanence: lasts. « has long-lasting beneficial effects on recidivism »
Benjamin Monnery et al. (2020)Prison, Semi-Liberty and Recidivism: Bounding Causal Effects in a Survival ModelGoal measured: Favour reintegration of offenders (alternatives under écrou, TIG, training, work, pre-trial share). Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: effect. « semi-liberty is associated with a reduction of 22% to 31% in offenders' hazard of recidivism »

Impact, leakage, permanence

Transfers of a general character between different levels of government

Benoit de Lapasse and Julien Desclodur (2025)Les trajectoires budgétaires des communes nouvelles : comparaison avec leurs "proches voisines"Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: more money, or money against none.
Roberto Brunetti (2026)Municipalities' Voting Power and Housing Supply: Evidence from French Intermunicipal CooperationGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: mixed. « with no statistically significant change in the total number of permits it issues »
Andrew C. Eggers et al. (2018)Regression Discontinuity Designs Based on Population Thresholds: Pitfalls and SolutionsGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged.
Abel François et al. (2025)Legislature Size does Matter for Public Spending: Causal Evidence and Mechanisms at WorkGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: effect. « the council size is clearly a positive causal factor of municipal public spending »
Marie-Laure Breuillé et al. (2018)Inter-municipal cooperation and local taxationGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged.
Touria Jaaidane et al. (2023)Inter-municipal cooperation and public employment: evidence from French municipalitiesGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: effect. « cooperation triggers personnel downsizing at the municipal level »
Clémence Tricaud (2025)Better Alone? Evidence on the Costs of Intermunicipal CooperationGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: mixed. « rural municipalities ended up with fewer local public services »
Federica Galli et al. (2026)Is compulsory inter-municipal cooperation an efficiency booster?Goal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: effect. « the RCT law increased municipal efficiency by 1.1% to 1.9% »
Tidiane Ly and Sonia Paty (2020)Local taxation and tax base mobility: Evidence from FranceGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a rule that leaves the amount unchanged. Impact: effect. « the reduction in the mobility of the tax base indeed results in higher business property tax rates »
Touria Jaaidane and Sophie Larribeau (2023)The effects of inter-municipal cooperation and central grant allocation on the size of the French local public sectorGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Impact: effect. « cuts in grants lead to cuts in municipalities' public wage bills »
Touria Jaaidane and Sophie Larribeau (2026)When the money stops: fiscal and political reactions to changing grant eligibilityGoal measured: an outcome that is not one of the line's goals; its reading has no colour and is not counted. Reform studied: a cut, less money against more. Leakage: who ends up with it. « municipalities substitute grants with local tax revenues »
This site: DETR rural investment grant (eligibility cap)DETR rural investment grant (eligibility cap)Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: not informed. « At the cap on potentiel financier, eligibility adds €5.3 of DETR per inhabitant in the first year, so the design detects only leverages above about 12. Per euro of DETR, equipment spending rose by 10.3 over one year (95% Anderson-Rubin interval 1.3 to 23.5), 8.0 over two (-0.3 to 17.8) and 6.9 over three (-1.3 to 15.6): every interval holds the State's 3.6, and those over two and three years hold zero. Placebo cutoffs on the eligible side find jumps in equipment spending half as large as those at the cap. »
This site: DSR, fraction cible (rank 10,000)DSR, fraction cible (rank 10,000)Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: no significant effect. « A euro of fraction cible raised the commune's self-financing capacity by 1.36 euros in the first year (95% interval 0.62 to 2.10): it was saved. The intervals exclude more than 0.21 euro of extra operating spending, 0.66 of extra equipment spending and 0.03 of local tax cuts. By the third year equipment spending per euro reaches 0.32 (-0.97 to 1.63), so investing the saved money later is not excluded. »
This site: DSU (two-thirds rank)DSU (two-thirds rank)Reform studied: more money, or money against none. Impact: not informed. « At the two-thirds rank the DSU jumps by €5.6 per inhabitant, too little against town budgets: per euro, equipment spending moved by 0.53 in the first year (95% interval -10.6 to 10.3), and operating spending, borrowing and debt have intervals as wide. »